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Mass Strikes, Class and Trade Unions Struggle

A brief attempt to analyse the current strike wave in Europe from a Marxist perspective


13/06/2023

UCU Strike

The current strike wave across Europe is part of a revival in workers’ confidence and workers’ struggle. There have, in recent months, been important strikes in Germany and in Portugal; Britain is witnessing its most sustained wave of strike action since the late 1980s, and France is experiencing perhaps its highest level of workers’ struggle since 1968. On May Day this year, over two million people protested on the French streets as part of the movement against the government’s attack on pension rights. On the 7 March, there was something close to a general strike—with most rail services and much of the public transport network stopped, schools shut down and striking energy workers blockading refineries.

Strikes are a basic expression of the collective self-activity of the working class. For Karl Marx, unions could, at their best, be organising centres for the working-class struggle, “schools of socialism” as he put it in an 1869 speech to German workers, in which workers train themselves in the fight against capital. However, unions are also complex organisations, often with powerful bureaucratic tendencies that can act as a brake on struggle. This article offers a brief attempt to analyse the strike wave we are seeing from a Marxist perspective, focusing on the struggles in Britain, where my own activity is focused, exploring the tensions within the unions.

Drivers of the strike wave

There are always specific causes of strike action. In France, the trigger has been attempted pensions reform. However, we also see common drivers in instance of action. First, there has been a lengthy build-up of discontent due to wage stagnation and growing inequality. In Britain wage growth has stalled during the past decade and a half of Conservative rule with many jobs becoming more precarious.

Second, there is the more recent impact of Covid-19. The pandemic highlighted the central role workers play in the functioning of capitalist societies. Many workers expected to receive some recognition or reward for their sacrifices once lockdowns ended. They received none. Some important strikes in Britain involve workers whose labour was key to sustaining society during the pandemic, including health workers, schoolteachers, Amazon depot workers, dock workers, rail workers and postal workers.

Third, there is of course the immediate issue of the cost-of-living crisis. In the case of Britain, any worker who received a pay rise below about 15 percent over the past year experienced a real-terms pay cut. Some workers in the private sector were able to blunt the impact of inflation a little by securing pay rises, often without strike action, but in the public sector, and other workforces covered by national pay bargaining, things have been far worse. Whatever the specificities of the various disputes in Britain, inflation and pressure on pay has been the major driving force.

The halting British strike wave

The wave of action in the UK began with a rail workers’ strikes in summer 2022. Rail workers are a relatively small but well-organised and powerful group. The leader of the RMT rail workers’ union, Mick Lynch, quickly became a celebrity figure on the left, arguing a basic class politics in the face of a series of patronising TV and radio interviews.

Soon the Communication Workers’ Union (CWU) also began to take action, in both telecommunications and the postal service. The CWU also played a central role in launching Enough is Enough—a broader campaign over the cost of living. With other unions, in education, the civil service and health, joining the strike movement in the autumn and winter, there were big Enough is Enough rallies in many cities. However, just as these groups appeared to be developing a base of support, there was an effort by those running the campaign nationally to clamp down on groups that appeared too radical or diverged from its preferred approach. The project was strangled by the union bureaucracy and now plays little role in most areas of the country.

The pattern of national strikes has also revealed important limitations. They have largely taken the form of episodic actions, lasting a single day or, in a few cases, a few days at a time. On the rail network this could have some impact. Similarly, in schools, which, as well as providing education, are also sources of free day-care, allowing many parents to work, there is a significant economic and social impact when strikes take place. However, in neither of these cases have the episodic strikes been sufficient to achieve major victories.

In other areas—such as the postal service or in the universities—short strikes are even less effective. Managers can easily plan around these actions. In the universities, my own union, the University and College Union (UCU), has undertaken an unusual amount of strike action in recent years. Most of our action has consisted of multi-day strikes. However, these mobilisations have not proved terribly effective and, as each day of action involves a loss of a day’s pay, this can breed cynicism among some union members, despite the efforts of activists maintain enthusiasm. In the civil service, the stop-start pattern of strikes has allowed the PCS and other unions to obtain talks with the government, but it is unlikely that any offer will come close to what members desire.

Even in France the pattern is for unions to call “days of action”, rather than indefinite strikes, despite two-thirds of workers there saying they would support indefinite action.

Escalation

In Britain, as in France, there have been calls from a section of the union membership for escalation. Arguments for escalation have taken two forms: the coordination of strikes across unions and the extension of specific strikes to prolonged or even all-out action. While both forms of escalation are welcome, on occasion the former has been counterposed to the latter, with some union leaders showing enthusiasm for coordination without mapping out a strategy that can win their own dispute.

The push for coordination is at least an improvement on the approach of some union leaders, such as those from the Royal College of Nursing (RCN), who have resisted joint strike action. This appears to reflect the belief that health workers enjoy such a high level of popular support that they can secure special deals from the government. The leadership of the National Education Union (NEU), which organises in schools, has, by contrast, been among the keenest on coordination. The NEU placed itself at the centre of a couple of important days of coordinated action in 2023, where half a million, and then close to a million, workers struck together. There were large joint union rallies in many towns and cities, forming a welcome celebration of working-class resistance.

However, less progress has been made on the more important form of escalation—extending the action. The power of this tactic is seen in some of the local disputes in recent months, driven by groups of workers with a more militant approach. For instance, 580 dock workers on Merseyside recently won pay rises ranging from 14.3 to 18.5 percent after five weeks of action. Some 250 bus drivers in Hull won 20 percent after four weeks or continuous strikes. Criminal barristers won a 15 percent increase to their fees after calling all-out indefinite strike action, with a large minority seeking to hold out for a bigger settlement when the deal was put to members.

This approach—prolonged, hard-hitting action—has not been replicated nationally. The executive of my own union, the UCU, did vote to move to all-out strike action across the universities (ie action with no designated end point). Again, this reflects the extent to which the UCU has taken strike action in the past few years. In this context, the UCU has developed an unusual degree of internal debate and a militant minority prepared to challenge the union leadership—and, to some extent, that is reflected on the union’s executive. However, in this case, the UCU’s general secretary, Jo Grady, managed to overturn the executive’s approach. This involved her making an appeal to more conservative layers within the union, through an electronic survey of members, publishing an alternative plan for action, which was sent to every member directly, and holding a branch delegates’ meeting, based on a discussion of confused and often leading questions. Through such manoeuvres Grady and her supporters managed to convince enough members of the executive to retreat on their plan for all-out action.

The UCU executive instead agreed to 18 strike days over two months but the opportunity to break the pattern of episodic action among unions at a national level was sadly lost. Moreover, in mid-February, UCU leaders “paused” strikes—without consulting members, the executive or even the union’s elected negotiators—announcing a “two-week period of calm” and retrospectively seeking support through another e-ballot. There were also attempts to persuade members to accept a lousy deal over pay, which would have amounted to a 15 percent pay cut over two years, which members rejected when balloted.

Poor pay deals have, though, become the norm. Typically, these are two-year deals—offering workers a couple more percent on their 2022-23 pay deal and around 5 percent for 2023-24. These are often presented to members as a victory, or at least “the best we can get”, even though they fall well below what would have been possible with a more determined programme of strike action. Strikes are continuing in some parts of the rail services, and among doctors and nurses within the National Health Service. Other groups such as post workers, university workers and teachers remain in dispute, and others groups, for instance in local government, are balloting to take action.

However, many groups of workers have grudgingly accepted poor deals to end their disputes. Episodic strike action is clearly not leading to breakthroughs that can reverse this pattern.

This is the first part of a speech Joseph should have given at the Marxismuss conference in Berlin before he was unfortunately taken ill. Reproduced with permission. Part 2 will be published on theleftberlin.com tomorrow.

From the hot autumn to the spring of uncertainty

The urgent need for peace in Ukraine

More than a year has passed since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. During all this time, German public opinion and most political parties have shown absolute support for Vladimir Zelensky’s government. This includes the shipment of weapons worth 2.2 billion in 2022 alone, ten successive packages of economic sanctions on Russian imports and the reception of more than one million Ukrainian refugees. [1] However, this policy has begun to show its first signs of exhaustion. Very slowly and from different political perspectives, diplomatic negotiations are emerging as necessary.

That the war is an expression of inter-imperialist interests, was already expressed by the Latin American Bloc from the very start. If we return to the subject today, it is not to congratulate ourselves for the wisdom of our political intuition, nor to offer an exhaustive review of the causes and development of the confrontation. Instead, it is an ideological reading of the geopolitical conflict and the current situation in Germany formed in the heat of the political praxis of a popular and migrant organisation in the very heart of the empire. We are trying to contribute some elements to the debate between the German and European Left which we can use to develop a concrete line of action.

The German government at the crossroads

Only a week after the outbreak of war, Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) authorised an extraordinary budget of 100 billion euros for the German army. He is now under great political pressure, facing a profound upheaval. Social democracy’s cultivation of international relations with the East dates back to the “new Eastern policy” [neue Ostpolitik] of Willy Brandt (SPD) in the 1970s. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the rapprochement with the Kremlin was deepened by  former chancellor Angela Merkel and Putin’s personal friend Gerhard Schröder, Manuela Schwesig through her support for the Nord-Stream-Pipeline. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, president of the republic [Bundespräsident] and foreign minister during the last Merkel government, coined the slogan ‘intertwining and integration’ and played a key role.

 

Scholz has to manoeuvre through a process of profound geopolitical reconfiguration, both inside and outside the SPD, with a military conflict a thousand kilometres away from Brandenburg Gate. But it is not only US economic interests in bringing liquid gas into Europe and NATO’s geopolitical ambitions that are dragging Germany towards the war front. The image of a perplexed and vacillating chancellor that has managed to establish itself in public opinion is also due to the internal pressure on Scholz resulting from the political and economic interests of the liberals (FDP) and the Green party (Die Grüne). It is above all the members of the latter, the clumsy heirs of a pacifist and environmentalist legacy, who are the most fervent supporters of arms exports and the implementation of economic sanctions against the Russian economy. “We are fighting a war against Russia!” exclaimed foreign minister Annalena Baerbock in her fury at the European Council conference in Strasbourg on 24 January, causing an international scandal that forced her own ministry to make it clear to Russia and the rest of the world that Germany was not in fact at war with them!

Scholz has to manoeuvre through a profound geographical reconfiguration following a military conflict a thousand kilometres away from the Brandenburg Gate. This reconfiguration is taking place both inside and outside the SPD. it is not only US economic interests in bringing liquid gas into Europe and NATO’s geopolitical ambitions that are dragging Germany towards the war front. The political interests of the liberals (FDP) and the Green party (die Grünen) have created internal pressure which has created the image of a perplexed and vacillating chancellor. The latter are the most fervent supporters of arms exports and economic sanctions against the Russian economy. “We are fighting a war against Russia!” exclaimed foreign minister Annalena Baerbock on 24 January.

The German government and Europe see a geopolitical confrontation in which the main imperial blocs (the US, Europe and China) vie for global hegemony.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), states states  that European arms imports increased by 47% over the previous five years. Despite a global fall of 5%. The systematic increase in the region’s military spending was long before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. European companies and their governments envisage a scenario of armed confrontation with Europe at the centre.

In 2022, the Middle East became the leading region for arms imports, accounting for 32% of the world total [2]. Since 2011, the confrontation in Syria between allies of the West and those of Russia completely destroyed the country. On the export side, the top five countries remain the United States (40%), Russia (16%), France (11%), China (5%) and Germany (4%). The map of weapons flows matches the collision of interests between the world’s major powers. NATO and Europe were arming and preparing for a conflict like the one Ukraine, Western governments were not surprised.

That Baerbock’s statement betrays the Greens’ (Die Grüne) support for economic sanctions against Russia. These have mainly harmed workers in both the EU and Russia. They consist of interrupting natural gas and oil imports,  making fuels more expensive, which impacts food prices and heating costs.  The Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, found that inflation caused a real wage loss of 4.7% in 2022. Finance minister Robert Habeck (Die Grüne), recently introduced a bill to ban all gas and oil-fired heaters by 2024. Supposedly to encourage the transition to “renewable” energies. But these alternatives to Russian gas  (Colombian coal or Bolivian lithium) also have disastrous environmental consequences. Habeck’s law means enormous costs in infrastructure and housing refurbishment, which falls on the shoulders of workers or the public coffers.

The German Left and the spring of uncertainty

Last year, the slogans “the hot autumn” [heißer Herbst] and “the winter of rage” [Wutwinter] became very popular slogans. heralding a winter full of demonstrations and social struggles. Despite alliances formed by left-wing groups and some important trade union strikes such as those of Ver.di (public services) and EVG (transport and railways), the government implemented successfully subsidy packages worth 95 billion euros and managed, to contain the social outburst from the economic crisis. [3]

Diplomatic negotiations in Ukraine is becoming recognised by some political actors and journalists who question the hegemony of the warmongering discourse. One dissident voice was Sahra Wagenknecht (Die Linke), with Alice Schwarzer. Their manifesto for peace, called to mobilise broad sectors of society and different civil initiatives to become a movement for peace [Friedensbewegung]. Another call for an armistice came from the historian Peter Brandt, signed by historical figures from the SPD and trade unions. Now various progressive media outlets publish opinion pieces critical of the indiscriminate delivery of weapons and the prolongation of the conflict. Why has it taken so long for these voices to speak out? Why has the German left been paralysed by the outbreak of war within Europe’s borders?

From the start, progressive and left-wing groups presented the armed conflict as an imperialist advance on an independent country. They promoted unconditional and widespread support for the attacked country in the name of free self-determination of peoples and against Russian imperial interests. However, it is not entirely legitimate to compare the current struggle of that nation with the classic examples of countries (mainly in Africa or Asia) confronting European imperial powers for their autonomy during the 20th century. To adopt the classical analysis of the self-determination of peoples, of Lenin, to speak of a war of liberation in the case of Ukraine we should argue against both NATO forces and Russian interests. [4]

Moreover some progressive sectors ignore the chronological events. Prior to the Russian invasion – NATO and Western elites supported conservative and neo-fascist groups, parties and governments in Ukraine. During the 2014 ‘Euromaiden’, far-right political and paramilitary groups showed extensive and public links with Western powers and their institutions. Western countries financed, organised and supported neo-fascist sectors to conclude agreements with the EU and the IMF, distancing Ukraine from Russia. This catapulted  Swoboda and Right Sector to fame, and began armed conflict persisting to today. The current conflict in Ukraine is not comparable to wars of liberation such as those in Vietnam or Cuba. The main difference in these cases is the existence of a hegemonic aggressor, the USA, and of populist and leftist forces fighting to break this colonial domination.

In this context, Trotsky’s words before the Zimmerwald Conference are strangely contemporary and alert us to the historical continuity of concessions and capitulations on the part of progressivism: “The capitalists of all countries, who mint with the blood of the peoples the red coin of war profits, claim that the war will serve for the defence of the fatherland, of democracy and of the liberation of the oppressed peoples. They are lying… What will result from the war will be new chains and new burdens, and it is the proletariat of all countries, victors or vanquished, that will have to bear them.”

Those who promote the advance of Ukrainian troops as a way of defending the right of peoples to freedom and democracy, deliberately hide the neo-conservative and neo-liberal character of the Zelensky government and the previous semi-colonial status of Ukraine.

We should not be surprised by this warmongering discourse of some sectors of the European left and progressivism, as it manifests an unfortunate historical continuity. Remember that in 1914 Russian social democratic parties approved and promoted the war efforts that triggered the First World War. At the end of it, there were tens of millions of dead bodies, and the first workers’ state in the world was torn between a warlike position and one that sought peace at all costs. Lenin as head of the Soviet government, resolved this tension in favour of peace, arguing that continuing an imperialist war would only delay the possibility of improving conditions for the working class sectors of the countries involved in the conflict. His position was rejected by of large sectors of the left both within and outside his party. However, time proved that it was precisely peace that enabled the survival of the Soviet Republic, and the beginning of revolutionary processes in Germany and Europe. The history of the 20th Century would have been completely different without opposing the worst warring confrontation of mankind, not on ethical stances but as the basis for the reconstruction of the popular forces to revolution.

However, today we are told that to defend a “revolutionary” standpoint we must impose peace by force, that we must go all the way to Moscow to banish roots of the oligarchic danger. Again the fable of a clash of antagonistic civilisations, again the fable that the greatest danger to democracy is to be found in the Kremlin. We have learned little from the successes and failures of the past and the saddest thing of all is that the argument put forward by these sectors is very similar to that of revolution by conquest, which Stalin and his allies used to impose puppet governments in all the Eastern countries where the Red Army advanced after the Second World War.

The situation reached its paroxysm when some extra-parliamentary leftists supported sending arms to Ukraine in the hope that they would reach revolutionary groups, favouring a popular rebellion. They wanted a version 2.0 of the Kurdish experience in Rojava with weapons from the US. In the case of Ukraine,  at the beginning of the war small groups of militias independent of the state were armed and organised with the aim of defending the main cities and especially Kiev from the advance of the Russian army. The hope was that these militias would contribute to a revolutionary movement opposed to the Zelensky regime. But the conflict showed that these militias are completely irrelevant. After the end of the siege of Kiev these groups were disbanded or incorporated into regular state forces or official paramilitary groups.

The only forces benefiting from Western arms deliveries and funding are the official Ukrainian army, under the orders of a neo-conservative government; and far-right groups allied to the government – the Azov battalion and Kraken regiment. The latter gained international fame  as key players in the repression  after 2014, being accused of committing war crimes against the civilian population in the low-intensity confrontation against the pro-Russian separatist provinces in the Donbas.

To believe that weapons alone can contribute to political change in Ukraine is to overlook the absence of the key factor represented by the organisations of the left as the only possible protagonists of a real social transformation.

For all these reasons, those on the left who advocate a military victory for the Ukrainian government or the Russian government are mistaken. A military victory for Putin would condemn Ukraine to the status of a Russian semi-colony. If Zelensky’s government is maintained, Ukraine would be reduced to the status of a US protectorate. There is no progressive outcome if the war continues.

At present the war front has been virtually stabilised, despite minor advances and setbacks, for more than six months now. The Russian army and its shareholders know that a defeat in the Donbas could mean extending the war within Russia’s borders that could delegitimise the  Russian government. Zelensky and the Ukrainian bourgeoisie know that the funding from Western resources, will only come with continued war success. Finally, NATO, the great director of the play, has nothing to lose.

In the absence of an immediate possibility of a cessation of hostilities, we stress the geopolitical value of the Latin American countries’ homogeneous rejection of the German government’s request to contribute to the supply of armaments. After Scholz’s recent tour of Latin American, a wedge in the geopolitical conflict needs to be shored up by political work from below demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities, the recovery of the territories annexed by Russia and a policy of disarmament by the NATO powers.

It is along these lines that we welcome the peace initiatives in Germany mentioned above. This is not because we agree more or less with any of the protagonists but because these experiences require us to generalise the social ruptures where we can work closely with the sectors most affected by the inflationary crisis unleased by the war – most notably wage earners and migrants – and to bring them together in a popular movement.

After a prolonged winter in which German government subsidies contained social rage, spring has arrived in Berlin. New energies are making their way through the jungle of warmongering, pragmatism and political follow-through. Now it is time to move forward. After mass demonstrations for May Day in many German cities, new energies are emerging in opposition to the jungle of warmongering, pragmatism and political follow-through. Now it is time to move forward to ensure that this warm spring awakening turns into a summer of burning certainties among German and migrant left-wing groups. The need for peace in Ukraine is a fundamental condition for true internationalist political praxis.

Footnotes

[1] The budget for equipment and armaments to be sent to the Ukrainian front in 2023 amounts to 2.4 billion Euros. Germany exports more war supplies than France and Great Britain combined and is second only, of course, to the United States. The extensive and detailed list of military supplies can be found here.

[2] At the national level, the main arms importers are Qatar (10% of the total), India (9%) and Ukraine (8%), followed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (7% each) and Pakistan (5%).

[3] Industry and the business sectors have been the main beneficiaries of subsidies. Public spending on these measures is expected to amount to 200 billion Euros

[4] In the discussion with Polish militants and especially in the face of Rosa Luxemburg’s arguments, Lenin argued that advocating national self-determination was a slogan that should appear in the programmes of social democratic parties. It was not a revolutionary slogan in itself. However, the formation of an autonomous bourgeois national state implied better conditions for the development of the revolutionary struggle than remaining under the imperialist mantle. In 1917, during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, the Bolshevik delegation, led by Trostky, defended a similar position in the cases of Poland and the Ukraine vis-à-vis the German and Austro-Hungarian empires. There it was argued that defending the right to self-determination did not mean accepting the autonomy of these countries under the tutelage of the German-Austrian power.

This article first appeared in Spanish in a longer version on the Website of the Bloque Latinamericano in May 2023. Reproduced with permission

The rise and fall (and rise and fall) of the Egyptian Left – Part 3

The1990s and early 2000s: Palestine provides a spark for the Egyptian Left


10/06/2023

Editor’s Note: Phil Butland and Helena Zohdi recently interviewed Hossam el-Hamalawy about the history of the Egyptian Left. You can read Part 1 of the Interview here and Part 2 here.

Hi again Hossam. At the end of our last interview, the Soviet Union was collapsing while the Left in Egypt – as elsewhere – was in disarray. This was also the time where you personally became more politicized, drawn toward Arab nationalism. Describe this time for our readers.

The mid-1990s were a tough time for all Egyptian activists. Between 1991 and 1992, President Hosni Mubarak and his government clamped down again on social movements while starting a number of economic reforms amid a severe debt crisis, guided by an IMF-imposed structural adjustment program (ERSAP), the details of which were hotly debated at the time. It is important to note that often, “wars on terror” go hand in hand with neoliberal reforms. Egypt is no exception in this regard.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was collapsing and there was plenty of propaganda about the end of history and a clash of civilizations, the need for a “third way” separate from socialism and capitalism, such as New Labour in Great Britain. Also, right-wing parties were on the rise everywhere.

I was raised in a highly political family environment, and I did read a lot. I considered myself to be left-leaning politically, but I wasn’t really sure what that meant. In this context, I started looking for political alternatives. As the Egyptian Left at that time was in bad shape, in my searching I came across the Egyptian Revolutionary Socialists.

Tell us a bit about what drew you to this particular group.

During the 1980s, the Egyptian Revolutionary Socialists were mainly Marxist study circles made up of radical Egyptian students, and Palestinian students who were studying in Egypt. While they critiqued the policies of the Soviet Union, they weren’t sure about alternatives. The group then came across the theory of state capitalism, which helped to provide answers about Nasserism, as well as the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.

The collapse of the Soviet Union was a chance for the group to start picking up disillusioned young Communists. But like I said, these were tough times to be an activist. In the 1990s, right-wing politics prevailed. I started university in 1995 in this context, looking for political alternatives. By sheer coincidence I came across the Revolutionary Socialists and I joined the group in 1998, during my third year at school.

We were a tiny, marginalized group amid an ocean of reactionary politics. The government was pushing right-wing ideas and capitalism as the way forward, combined with the privatization of the public sector. There was one expression at the time, the “socialism of poverty,” which was coined by Sadat and that was spread later on by Mubarak’s regime. Whenever we stood in front of the University campus, people would accuse us of being lunatics or aliens, completely removed from reality.

People who held right-wing ideas used to confront us, mostly with the question, “When was the last time Egyptians had a revolution?” Our opponents would say, “Our country has always been used to being ruled by a pharaoh and by the whip. Do you really think Egyptians would ever rebel against Mubarak?”

These positions were colonialist-inspired ideas, a mentality that the British or other Western powers would typically spread in colonized nations amid people of color. After a while, these ideas would become internalized, used by post-colonial ruling elites. These right-wing ideas were accompanied by a third set of right-wing ideas – those of Islamism, which were strongest at the time.

So we’ve reached the early 2000s, where things really begin to change. The second intifada in Palestine has begun, as well as the second Gulf War with the invasion of Iraq. At the same time in Egypt, textile workers in Mahalla have renewed industrial actions. What did these events mean for the broader Egyptian Left?

The start of the second Palestinian intifada was in 2000, and this changed the rules of activism on the ground in Egypt. Before 2000, while I was in university, as I’ve said, right-wing ideas prevailed and industrial actions were almost unheard of. Many experienced labor organizers were simply laid off through early buyouts.

So, there was no street activism. To hold a protest in public was suicidal. There was still a space to organize on university campuses, but you could not even whisper Hosni Mubarak’s name. At best, you could chant against the regime, you could denounce the government, you could denounce ministers. But once you started chanting against Mubarak, that’s when you knew you were in deep trouble.

In some instances, even before the security forces got to you, the students themselves would attack you – because they were afraid and didn’t want trouble. There were a number of times in the 1990s and early 2000s when our socialist group would meet before protests as organizers, and other student organizers – mainly nationalists and independents – would tell me, “No, you’re not going to speak at the protest because you’re the one who always insists on denouncing Mubarak. We just want to talk about Palestine.”

The intifada did change everything. It triggered mass protests in Egypt, the size and extent of which had not been since 1977. They started on the university campuses and soon extended to students in high school – even children in kindergarten were going on protests.

So students and children were protesting, but what about the rest of society? Where is the working class in this moment?

At this time the professional syndicates also became active. To clarify for your readers, in Egypt there are trade unions, mainly for blue-collar workers and civil servants. Professional syndicates in contrast unionize the middle-class professions, like doctors, pharmacists, lawyers and journalists.

While trade unions since 1957 had been bureaucratized and dominated by the state, within the professional syndicates there was some room to maneuver politically. And dissidents too could find a foothold within these syndicates. These groups would host space for forums and public talks, and solidarity actions with the Palestinians.

And so protests would start with a message of solidarity with the Palestinians, and slogans against the United States and Israel. But soon, the protests would be besieged by the police. And once the police arrive, that’s when the focus of the demonstration pivots toward domestic dissent. Why are the police coming to our peaceful protest? Why isn’t our government doing enough to help the Palestinians? Why doesn’t the government want to close down the Israeli Embassy? Why do we even have this peace treaty with Israel?

And then protestors would start generalizing about the domestic situation even more. The same government that doesn’t want to help the Palestinians, and is sending our troops to squash our peaceful dissent, is also providing us with poor education and housing.

These 2000 protests took the regime by surprise and the reaction was ruthless. It was from these protests where my first experience of being detained and tortured at the hands of the state security police occurred, in October 2000. I was interrogated and tortured for roughly four days.

Because of the brutal repression on behalf of the regime, the protest wave subsided. But actions were re-ignited in March 2002, following Operation Defensive Shield, put into motion by Israel’s Ariel Sharon as he sent Israeli tanks into West Bank cities. That’s when you had the Battle of Jenin and other infamous massacres. Once again, another wave of protests within Egypt erupted.

This was also when the so-called Cairo University intifada took place, in the neighborhoods surrounding Cairo University in Giza. Running battles with security services lasted for two days.

This was the first time that I heard explicit, anti-Mubarak slogans chanted and then repeated by thousands of people. Most famously was, “Hosni Mubarak is just like Sharon. He’s the same color. He’s the same figure.” Again, these protests were ruthlessly repressed, with more arrests, including my second.

Protests ignited once again with the Iraq war in March 2003. When the United States, Great Britain and their allies invaded Iraq, protest erupted and Tahrir Square in Cairo was taken over for two days as activists fought with the security services.

Protestors set banners of the ruling National Democratic Party on fire. They set posters of Hosni Mubarak on fire, and chanted against him. Security forces responded with tear gas. This was the first time that I saw those colored water cannons, and they were being used against us.

This was my third arrest, and I wasn’t alone, as the regime rounded up hundreds of activists. They were arresting activists en masse, so much so that there was no room for us to be detained. The prison truck I was in drove to a number of police stations in Cairo, asking if they had room. The crackdown was massive.

All the mobilizations between 2000 and 2003 had been triggered mainly by events in Palestine and in Iraq. They created for the Egyptian Left, for our group, the room for move and to revive Egyptian street politics.

So at this point it looks like the Egyptian Left has a new lease on life. Where did the movement go from here?

In 2004, we witnessed the rise of the “Kefaya” movement for change. Kefaya is Arabic for “enough.” It was an umbrella organization that included Revolutionary Socialists and other groups, mainly secular opposition parties. Very few Islamists were involved, however, mainly from the Islamist-leaning Labor Party. The Muslim Brotherhood was not part of Kefaya at the time. Until 2011, in fact, the Muslim Brotherhood did not push back publicly against Mubarak.

Kefaya introduced the slogan, “No extension of Mubarak’s rule! No succession!” which meant no political succession for Mubarak’s son, Gamal. Kefaya mobilized anti-Mubarak protests for two years. But the movement was led mainly by middle-class professionals, like pharmacists, engineers, doctors, university graduates, students and artists. Kefaya never really found a foothold with the working class.

But the brilliance of Kefaya and its outreach strategy was the use of visual elements to inspire protest. We activists watched closely to figure out why Egyptians took to the streets in 2000. We realized it was because the satellite television station Al-Jazeera was broadcasting video of the protests in Palestine to every single Egyptian home, every night. Satellite dishes may have been expensive in the beginning, but they began to get cheaper and available to more homes. And each house would also share connections, too.

So, these powerful images were on Egyptian screens all the time, and this inspired people to act. In contrast, our protests never really exceeded a handful of protesters. They were usually about 20 protesters, 100, maybe 500. On a very good day, we could get 1,000 in downtown Cairo.

We managed to mobilize 5,000 once, but this was a special moment in September 2005 during the presidential elections. Mubarak wanted to show a good image to Western nations, so state repression at this time was muted. This was an exceptional moment.

But we made sure that for later protests, we would liaise with Al-Jazeera and other satellite TV stations, and with newly established private newspapers, to guarantee coverage – which meant that our small protest would be aired to millions of Egyptians.

We are planning to publish Parts 4 and 5 of this interviewo on theleftberlin.com on Saturday 17th June and Saturday 24th June.

You can subscribe to Hossam’s blog on contemporary Egyptian politics here.

Can feminism be banned in Russia?

Why Russia’s new bill calling feminism an extreme ideology is absurd


06/06/2023

Trap for the Deputy

The new proposal in Russia to recognize feminism as an extremist ideology has led its leading advocate MP Oleg Matveychev into a trap. How to define feminism in such a way as to separate objectionable feminist organizations from, for example, Clara Zetkin, buried in a necropolis near the Kremlin wall? What to do with March 8 or with the recently passed National Action Strategy for Women?

The strategy document refers to the need to “improve the legislation of the Russian Federation in the field of prevention of violence against women, including domestic violence, harassment, sexual harassment at work, sexualized violence.” And the strategy ends with a promise that “as a result of the implementation of the strategy, there should be formed a system of measures aimed at ensuring the implementation of the principle of equal rights and freedoms for men and women and creating equal opportunities for their implementation by women in all spheres of life, at increasing economic independence, political activity, expansion of opportunities for self-realization of women, as well as to overcome stereotypical ideas about the social roles of men and women”.

The question is how to define feminism in law in such a way as to separate it from such public policy, on the surface. It is no coincidence that, according to Matveychev himself, some deputies suggested: “Let’s not destroy ideology, but specific organizations?”

It is not difficult to guess what kind of organization we are talking about: the Feminist Anti-War Resistance (FAR), which was placed last year in the register of “foreign agents” by the Ministry of Justice . On April 9, Director of the Safe Internet League Ekaterina Mizulina, proving her inability to read, said that the FAR activists “confessed that they were directly involved in the implementation of sabotage and terrorist attacks on railways and in military registration and enlistment offices”, mistaking an interview with activists of another organization — BOAC (Fighting organization of anarcho-communists).

In general, the FAR, like many other feminist organizations in Russia, lives under attack from more “correct” women’s media personalities and channels: from small to those with million audience, below I use their quotes to reflect on the relationship between the women’s movement and the state in the history and present of Russia.

State feminism

Feminism has a long history in Russia, and much of it is tightly intertwined with state politics. But the institutionalization of the feminist agenda and top-down policies of gender equality, as well as women’s organizations affiliated with the government, were not at all a special feature of the USSR. Rather, they can be called a common political phenomenon in many countries that were actively included in the UN Decade of Women (1976-1985).

Sometimes the term “state feminism” is used to talk about this — for the first time in relation to the Soviet gender order, Elizabeth Wood used it in the 1997 book The Baba and the Comrade. She meant by that exactly the top-down policies of gender equality. In this sense, the term is still often found in relation to the Soviet, supporting the exoticization of the experience of the second world.

I am talking about exoticization because state feminism is by no means an exclusive feature of the USSR and other socialist countries. Researchers note the rise of so-called women’s political agencies — government-affiliated organizations in liberal democracies that mediate between independent feminist movements and governments and lead to the “institutionalization of feminist interests” after the UN Decade of Women. Since the late 1980s, the term “state feminism” has also been used to describe them in political science. Researcher Helga Hernes proposed it in 1987 to describe “public policies and organizational measures designed partly to solve general socio-economic problems, partly to meet women’s needs.”

Since the second half of the 1990s, a whole field of comparative studies of state feminism has emerged, which made it possible to overcome the false dichotomy of the state and the “autonomous” women’s movement in liberal democracies. The main focus of the analysis of state feminism is the extent to which women’s political agencies, or state-affiliated women’s organizations, are associated with independent feminist movements and how much they have access to the decision-making process and the achievement of goals consistent with the feminist agenda.

Thus, we can move from the impasse question of who is how autonomous, to the question of how much grassroots movements, or “ordinary” women, have had and are able to influence the agenda of women’s political agencies and how much the women’s movement and the women’s rights agenda are used in the interests of accumulation of capital, imperialist expansion and other goals contrary to “women’s interests”.

Is it possible to separate the “women’s movement” from “feminism”?

This question isn’t new as well. The official Soviet women’s organizations (from the Zhenotdel to the Committee of Soviet Women) diligently separated themselves from “feminists”. In the post-war years, even a stable expression for a clear demarcation was formed — the women’s democratic movement. That was the name of the women’s movement of the socialist block.

Yet despite this painstaking distancing, it was never truly possible. Even an ardent opponent of the “feminists”, the first in history woman ambassador Alexandra Kollontai wrote: the assertion that for women’s liberation it is necessary to abandon capitalism, “does not eliminate the possibility of a partial improvement in women’s life within the framework of the modern system … each newly acquired right brings women closer to a certain goal — to their complete emancipation.” The Zhenotdel (Women Office), organized by her, also did not escape accusations of “creating some ground for feminist deviations,” which, according to some groups in the party leadership, could lead to “separation of the female part of the labour people from the class struggle.”

In the 1970s, against the backdrop of the rise of the feminist movement in the United States, employees of the Committee of Soviet Women reported to the Central Committee on various branches in the feminist movement in America and concluded: “The feminist movement can help in awakening the political consciousness of women, which is why the cooperation of women’s organizations of the socialist camp with this move seems appropriate.”

And already in 1975, the Rabotnitsa (Working woman) magazine, which was published in millions of copies, reported on the struggle of American women against “sexism.” Of course, this did nothing to help the feminist groups among Soviet dissidents. The creators of the almanacs “Woman and Russia” and “Maria” were persecuted by the KGB and expelled from the country for their feminist criticism of the USSR and the war in Afghanistan in 1979-1982, writes Anna Sidorevich. They were repressed not so much for advocating women’s rights — in the end, many of the problems they voiced resonated with the official women’s press (and on the pages of other official newspapers, in trade union reports and in other documents, there was no less harsh criticism, with references to the achievements of the party and the Soviet states). They were repressed for trying to challenge the dominant value system (“common sense”) and offer a fundamentally different linguistic and value perspective.

The Committee of Soviet Women, the official Soviet women’s organization whose members had fought for the right to abortion 24 years earlier, played a role in 1979 in condemning “feminists.” But it seems that it didn’t gain political strength from this. And that did not bring any improvement in the status of women.

Attempts to separate women from “politics”

The past does not repeat itself, but sometimes it makes it possible to better discern the processes of the present that are not yet obvious. For example, the efforts that the Russian state is making today to demarcate the boundaries between the “normal” women’s movement and the “wrong” feminists.

The topic of women’s rights is increasingly heard in the state media and on various state platforms. The launch of the “United Russia Women’s Movement” in addition to the already existing Union of Women of Russia (the successor to the Committee of Soviet Women) and the Eurasian Women’s Forum is another sign of the growing attention to the definition of what is acceptable in the conversation about women’s rights and feminism in Russia today.

The consonance of comments about women in Russia and feminism in the censored Russian information field draws a new silhouette of the state-approved women’s movement — as opposed to the wrong “feminists”.

It is worth exploring it separately, but I will outline only some strokes using the example of a curious document of the era — an article about the “split” of the feminist movement in Russia (which establishes this split and, judging by the selection of experts from the Kremlin’s political technology pool, may be diligently working on it).

Connection with the West

The first stroke is the issue of connection with the West. Whether physical, intellectual or political, any connection with the world outside of Russia is constitutive of the definition of a bad women’s movement. Thus, a month before the initiative of Deputy Matveychev, Senator Daria Lantratova stated in the article: “Personally, I consider feminism, at least in the form in which the West presents it to society now, a destructive phenomenon — propaganda that dictates things alien to the Russian mentality.”

It is interesting that the well-known political technologist and feminist Anna Fedorova in the text suddenly removes this identity from herself in order to emphasize that she is different from those “media feminists who … left.” The physical or even intellectual crossing of a boundary serves in this narrative as a point of irreversible change.

This is rather strange when applied to the women’s movement, which has always been both ideologically and materially transnational, built on the exchange of ideas, the travel of activists and the transit of political strategies, and emigration throughout history has provided and continues to provide support to activists within the country. Moreover, now we see much more articulated projects to build solidarity between “those who left” and the “remaining ones”.

We already have the rights

The second stroke is the approach to women’s rights. An important part of the “normal” women’s movement is the assertion that “everything is already there” or “everything is already being done” without feminists. By the way, the official women’s movement in the USSR had a similar approach. Here one can note both remarks like “We are not fighting for rights — we have them” or “Over the past year, the role of women in Russia has become even more significant”, sounding from the patriotic camp, as well as critical remarks (that the problems that were in the country before the war, did not evaporate, even new ones appeared), but even those with a positive twist, as, for example, in the remark of Maria Baronova: “The only temporary advantage that women got [thanks to the war] is when they get a job”. Thus, feminist analysis and criticism are replaced by unfounded clichés and are accompanied by the ritual “Life has become more fun.”

Patriotism

Finally, the third stroke is patriotic participation in politics or non-participation in it. For example, the rejection of political action in favor of a humanitarian one, the rejection of the political identity of feminism in favor of the political polyphony of the “woman” identity, a polyphony that obviously excludes only one position — rejection of war and participation in political associations against it. The war itself is hardly presented in the article as a negative factor in the context of women’s rights, except perhaps in the remark of Elena Klimanskaya. In most of the selected lines, the fight against the war is opposed to the fight for women’s rights: “No one pays attention to this situation: everyone is fighting Russian imperialism.”

Such a contrast cannot but surprise those who have read at least one feminist text criticizing militarism and capitalism, or those who honestly observe the consequences of the war: the abolition of a number of labor guarantees, delays in wages and social benefits, an increase in domestic and state violence, an increase in housing and communal services tariffs and so on. The fight against war is an integral part of feminism, not a side story. But the “correct” women’s movement claims the opposite and tries to separate military and state violence from gender violence.

What is a ban anyway?

I do not believe in the possibility of banning feminism in Russia: even with a legal ban, this will definitely not kill our ideas and deeds. They permeate our laws, cities, history. But it can be said with confidence that the conceptual work in order to stigmatize feminism in the Russian public field and put in its place a “normal” women’s movement, from patriotic to opposition-humanitarian, is actively being carried out.

I don’t want to condemn the difficult political choices of the authoritarian era. The same Committee of Soviet Women knew different periods. In one of its members, they used their status as a legal women’s movement to promote new laws, decriminalize abortion, improve working conditions, the Family Code, and so on. At other times, committee members seemed to lose their agency and found themselves in the service of Soviet foreign policy, which they themselves did not determine. “State feminism” in Russia is by no means an exception and can contribute to the improvement of the status of women as much as possible in the case of the existence of a state in general and an authoritarian one in particular.

The future of the “normal” women’s movement is open. I would like to believe that at least those who work against “feminists” in Russia today will not step on the same rake — they will not confuse the protection of women’s rights with kissing with authoritarian power.

This article first appeared in Russian on Glasnaya Media. Translated by: Dani Romanova, coordinator of the Feminist Anti-war Resistance. Reproduced with permission.

Dominick Fernow (Prurient) Releases Split Album with Neo-Nazi Band Genocide Organ

German clubs and music media must stop supporting a Fascist musician

Content notes: white supremacy, Confederate flag, KKK, neo-Nazism

Dominick Fernow, aka Vatican Shadow/Prurient is known for collaborating with neo-Nazis and fascist artists and releasing their work on his label Hospital Productions. He has received a lot of support from platforms Resident Advisor and Pitchfork, and the club Berghain and its label Ostgut. To catch up, see the open letter with more information here, and the list of 258 signatories to the open letter is here.

 

…we ask you to join us in calling upon Resident Advisor, Pitchfork, and Berghain/Ostgut. These platforms should address their support for and collaboration with Dominick Fernow, because they have directly contributed to the worrying rise of fascism within music.

Dominick Fernow never responded to the open letter. Recently Fernow emerged from his silence, by releasing a split EP on his own label Hospital Productions, with a German band called – we kid you not – Genocide Organ. Their album is called Carte Blanche, with song titles like True Son, Layer of Bodies, and Pro-Serial Killer. The refusal from Resident Advisor, Pitchfork and Berghain to publicly address why they actively supported him while knowing about his fascist ties, is a big part of why he feels comfortable enough to make a comeback.

Genocide Organ is widely known for their support of the KKK and releasing neo-Nazi music. Dominick Fernow and Becka Diamond’s label Hospital Productions intends to bring Genocide Organ to Japan in April 2024, for an all-ages festival cohosted by a group called Nuclear War Now!

Screenshot of an instagram post from user @beckadiamond. At left is a square image of a flyer for the music festival with an off-white background. In red text on the right hand side, it says NWN! (Nuclear War Now!) / Hospital Fest Vol I 2024. Sat Apr 6, Sun Apr 7 in Osaka Japan. On the far right side is a collage-style black-and-white image of a knife overlaid on top of a skeleton. Logos for bands are on the left hand side in black stylized German Fraktur font for bands Beherit, Blasphemy, Masonna, and Genocide Organ. More artists TBA. In red text along the bottom is written: Tickets Available: nwnprod.com, hospitalproductions,net. Venue: Gorilla Hill Osaka. 559-0023 Osaka Suminoe Ward Izumi, I Chome-1-82. Sports Village Suminoe. On the right, the username @beckadiamond is visible at the top, and @nicovascellari commented, "yes ticket bought" with some sword emojis.
Instagram post from Becka Diamond, who runs Hospital Productions with Dominick Fernow and is also his girlfriend

Many of Genocide Organ’s albums have been banned from sale on Discogs because of their white supremacist content, going back to the late 1980s. Genocide Organ has released KKK and neo-nazi music, like their 1998 album Klan Kountry, with cover art featuring a Confederate flag. Some song titles from other albums include White Power Forces, Woman Is Meat, and John Birch Society, referencing a far-right extremist group in the US.

Screenshot from website Discogs, showing at left a black square album cover. At the top, white text says "Genocide Organ" in all-capitals. Underneath is a confederate flag in white on black: a cross with white stars in an X-formation. Below the flag in white text is the album title, "Klan Kountry"
Discogs listing for Genocide Organ’s 1998 release “Klan Kountry”, which features a Confederate flag. The album is banned from sale on Discogs’ marketplace. https://www.discogs.com/master/1172-Genocide-Organ-Klan-Kountry

Dominick Fernow is also releasing a new album on his own label under the name Prurient. He continues to receive a lot of support from well-known artists within dance music, many of whom claim progressive/leftist politics, such as TelefonTelAviv, Nico Vascellari, Volvox (Unter), Silent Servant (Hospital Productions), and Berghain/Ostgut affiliates Shifted and Phase Fatale.

Screenshot of an instagram post from user @beckadiamond. At left, Dominick Fernow is wearing black plastic glasses, a black hat that says "Vatican Shadow" on it, a black jean hacket. Silent Servant has short dark hair visible, and is wearing a black leather jacket and a striped black-and-white shirt. They are seated close together, looking into the camera, and in the background are walls and a lamp casting light on the walls behind them
Instagram post from @beckadiamond, with a photo of Silent Servant and Dominick Fernow together on New Years Eve, and well-wishes from Phase Fatale, Shifted, amongst others

 

Instagram post from user @beckadiamond, showing at left an image of Dominick Fernow with a black jacket and a white patch or design on a shirt of a spider web or target design. At right, a comment is visible from @telefontelaviv, commenting "We miss y'all xoxo", under which @beckadiamond commented "@telefontelaviv miss you & @desertmoonchild" with two black heart emoji. Underneath, there is a comment from user @idealbeast, "Happy New Year" with a black heart emoji.
Instagram post from user @beckadiamond. Dominick Fernow is in the picture, and telefontelaviv comments “We miss y’all xoxo”

As we wrote in the open letter, we ask you to join us in calling upon Resident Advisor, Pitchfork, and Berghain/Ostgut. These platforms should address their support for and collaboration with Dominick Fernow, because they have directly contributed to the worrying rise of fascism within music.

More reading

Links

  • Antifascist Music Alliance on Twitter
  • Antifascist Music Alliance on Substack