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Rhineland floods are the result of human-made Climate Change

Unless we stop dependency on energy companies, the floods will continue.


18/07/2021


by Mark Bergfeld, who grew up in the area

I grew up in Erftstadt, went to school in Kerpen and played soccer (ages 6-19) in most of the towns and villages hit by the floods. I also was a local council candidate and have been part of progressive mobilisations in the area.

The flooded areas of the Rhein-Erft Kreis and in particular Erftstadt are both historically and economically intertwined with lignite coal mining, one of the dirtiest fossil fuels. All lakes in the region are former open cast coal mines and Garzweiler still operates today.

Most of my friends’ dads worked for the energy company RWE, and many young guys in the area still regard it as a good employer which affords them a decent life. When I was in school we would regularly visit the open cast coal mine down the road to learn about lignite.

But the lignite mining industry does not only dominates our cultural identity, career aspirations and education system – it also shapes our political representation. Gregor Golland (CDU) who earns 120k Euros for his part-time job at RWE, is also the representative in the Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW) state parliament.

RWE’s political and economic power are a major obstacle to moving toward carbon neutrality and shifting away from fossil fuels. Unfortunately, the German federal government will only exit from coal production in 2038. This constitutes a breach of the Paris Climate Agreement.

The devastation that Erftstadt and other towns in the regions are seeing are not due to technical issues but human-made climate change. However, there is a technical issue at hand which cannot be neglected.

The dams are breaking because they haven’t been built for such scenarios. The little streams have turned into rivers because they have been straightened and folks built their houses on the banks. Such ‘technical issues’ need to be addressed in Erftstadt and across the EU.

Importantly, there is a political dimension to this man-made disaster. The EU Commission has put forward its #Fitfor55 package. It offers too little, too late. Germany is putting its car and coal industries before human lives in Erftstadt and elsewhere.

Erftstadt will never be the same after this. Towns like Blessem stand in ruins. The collective trauma can be witnessed already. Politicians are only gearing up for the federal elections in September by promising money for home owners and those affected by the floods.

But in the cracks & amidst the ruins old social networks are being reactivated and new mutual aid networks are emerging. I don’t know whether they will be strong enough to dislodge the power of the CDU and RWE. But they sure will be important for others when catastrophe strikes.

To finish up: Greta Thunberg has consistently said that politicians should listen to climate scientists. In September, the German electorate should punish all those who have been denying climate science or putting the coal and car industry’s interests above people and planet.

It requires equitable solutions to the climate crisis. This means folks need green union jobs that provide them with a strong occupational and cultural identity that lignite and the car industry once provided. That is a small piece of the puzzle that will need to be addressed.

Covid, crisis, migration: How is the European working class changing?

Interview with Beatriz Casas González, one of the authors of Coalition of Labour: Worker’s Voice in Europe


16/07/2021


Hello Beatriz. Could you start by just saying a few words about who you are?

Hi Phil. I’m a migrant worker from Spain, currently based in Munich, where I work as a social researcher. I do empirical research on labour in different settings, ranging from factories to hospitals. Before that I lived in Berlin, and later in London. During that time, I was a student and part of different grassroots movements, like the [Spanish anti-austerity movement]15-M and the labour union UVW [United Voices of the World].

Now, I’m a PhD scholar of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, RLS), and investigate workers’ perception of domination in digitalised factories.

Transform! Europe has just issued a new dossier Coalition of Labour: Worker’s Voice in Europe to which you contributed the chapter on Germany. What is the aim of the dossier, and how did you get involved?

I got to know about the possibility of participating in the empirical research that Transform! Europe was planning through the RLS-network. The project immediately appealed to me, so I got in touch with the organisers in Germany and Italy and applied to be part of it.

The purpose of the research was to find out how people in different European countries – Italy, France, and Germany – felt about their living and working experiences. We wanted to know how the changes in the labour markets in those countries affected peoples’ lives and self-perceptions, how they relate to politics in a broader sense, meaning welfare state institutions, labour unions… and to other workers as well.

We also asked our interviewees – men and women in very different life and work situations – about their prospects and wishes for their personal and collective future. And of course, how the COVID-19 pandemic, and the responses to it, affected them on different levels.

The product of this empirical research is a lively picture, a sort of colourful mosaic made of peoples’ testimonies— who, despite their differences, often share common experiences of inequality and injustice, but also of solidarity and hope.

You say that ‘the so-called German “employment miracle” has been accompanied by a rising prevalence of low hourly pay’ – with many people being paid well below the minimum wage and having to work unsocial hours. How strong is the German economy, and are workers benefiting?

This is an interesting question, and the answer to it depends on how we define the German ‘economy’. Our research tells us something which is by no means new, but still worth emphasising one more time: that the ‘economy’, far from being distinct, homogeneous system, closed in itself, is in fact marked by inequalities, conflicting interests, blurred limits and interdependencies with other social spheres –like the household, the ‘informal’ economy, the education system, etc.

The strength of the German economy, like every other one, depends upon the exploitation of both waged and unwaged, visible and invisibilised labour, in the workplace, in the household, in other countries… Thus, the benefits of relative minority go hand in hand with the life and work precarisation of many others, and with the reproduction and further deepening of inequalities on the grounds of class, gender, nationality, ‘race’, etc.

And, again, this is nothing new, but far from outdated either. It has indeed been further aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the political responses to it.

The dossier also covers France and Italy. How do you think Germany compares with what is happening elsewhere in Europe?

Of course there are differences not only among countries, but also within them, among workers. However, the interviews exemplify the general deterioration of the working conditions of European workers: great contractual instability and the perception of a decreasing control over one’s own employment situation were common among respondents.

Job insecurity is coupled with low compensation, and more people, here and in the other two countries we considered, are faced with a trade-off between decent employment conditions and earning enough for meeting their own needs. Workers are increasingly forced to accept overtime and working multiple jobs as the only viable solution to low wages.

In the interviews I conducted in Germany, the interviewees widely held the belief that the conditions of the labour markets were exceptionally favourable, in comparison to other countries. Again, there are aspects where this might be the case. Still, slash workers, that is, people doing more than one job at once, were common among the respondents in Germany too.

How has Covid-19 affected German workers and unemployed people? For example, what was the experience of Kurzarbeit?

The Kurzarbeit is a very good example of how the responses to the COVID-19 in Germany have affected workers unequally, and sometimes even reinforced existing inequalities.

First, because Kurzarbeit was a measure which especially applied to employees in relatively secure employment relations. Those workers who were, for instance, in probation time, subcontracted, temporary workers, apprentices… they didn’t get any Kurzarbeit, in most cases, they simply lost their jobs during the crisis.

Just like people working in the gastronomy sector. One of the interviewees, a young man doing several jobs at the same time, one of them as a waiter, told us how the combination of lockdown plus years of gentrification in the city where he works and lives meant that the bar where he worked had to shut down, and he lost his main source of income overnight.

So, we see also there how this current crisis is intertwined with other elements of our capitalist systems that were already there, and then got reinforced or accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic. But also among those workers who did get Kurzarbeit we find big differences.

Our interviews show how for those workers in employment situations with relative high levels of employment security and pay, a reduction of working time and wage didn’t imply serious financial constraints. Moreover, Kurzarbeit gave them the possibility of having more free time for other activities, which they often perceived as more meaningful than labour, like political activism, leisure, family time…

On the other hand, for workers with part-time jobs, earning 600€/month, a reduction of wage and working time meant not being able to pay their rent anymore.

Your findings on the politicisation of migrant workers appear to be contradictory. On the one hand, the non-Germans who you interview tend to have a higher level of political awareness. On the other, you report that for various reasons (language, a sense of only being here temporarily, precarious jobs), migrants are also less engaged in German politics. Is this a contradiction? If not, how can it be resolved?

Yes, I find this also very interesting. In my experience as a migrant worker, and as a person who has been engaged in different kinds of social and labour movements with a great majority of migrant people, I don’t necessarily see it as a contradiction. I think it has to do with the little openness and approachability of institutions like traditional labour unions towards migrant people, in particular, and towards ‘atypical’ workers, in general.

It is not by chance that migrant people are overrepresented among ‘atypical’ workers, by which I mean fix-termed, part-time, temporary, often precarious workers, all things that today, and since a couple of decade, are not so ‘atypical’ anymore…

So, it’s a mixture of factors, on the one hand, these structural obstacles: as you said, the language barrier; the sense of only being here for a short period of time, whether this ends up being the case or not is another question; the lacking citizenship rights, that is, not being able to vote in most of the elections in Germany; not having enough labour-free time because of multiple, precarious jobs…

And on the other hand, as I said, the still unresolved problem with traditional labour unions, which unfortunately fail to make space for the needs and circumstances of migrant workers, among other groups of workers.

However, the fact that migrants are often not engaged in German politics, because of all these reasons, does not mean that they are not politically engaged in Germany at all. I mentioned before the grassroots movement 15-M, of which I was part during my time in Berlin. Following the financial crisis of 2007, the 15-M expanded from Spain to different cities across Europe, where mostly young, highly qualified people, without future perspectives in their country of origin but thirsty for a radical change in the system, migrated.

The 15-M as such does not exist anymore, neither in Spain nor elsewhere, but some initiatives that were launched under its spirit, like the “Oficina Precaria” in Berlin, are still active and they do a very important job, supporting and giving advice to migrant people who struggle with the job centre, abusive employers and landlords, etc.

This is an example of self-organisation by migrant workers, not through the official institutions, but in response to them. That is, either looking to compensate a lack of support, like in the case of labour unions, or looking to solve problems with those institutions, like the job centre.

Your report says that the gender pay gap has narrowed in Germany in recent years – but only by a few percentage points. What is changing, and is it changing quickly enough?

The gender pay gap has to do with various factors, but at the origin of it there is a gender division of labour. This is a structuring feature of our capitalist and patriarchal systems, deeply rooted in our minds, cultures, institutions, etc., and therefore not so easy to subvert. This gender division of labour is also another expression of capitalist exploitation, and a key factor upon which the strength of the German ‘economy’, about which we talked before, depends. And the same applies to the French, the Italian, the Spanish…

What is changing? Look, I always try to be optimistic and find reasons for hope, but with regards to this issue, I don’t see much change, unfortunately. If I look in my personal circles, If I look at the numbers and statistics, if I look at other empirical, qualitative reports…everywhere I see that women do most of the unpaid, invisibilised reproductive work. Very often on top of their waged activity.

Of course, there are many people exploring other ways of caring for each other that break with this patriarchal and exploitative model: collectivising care, challenging gender roles and expectations, questioning productivist ways of living, feeling and thinking, and looking for other sources of meaning and fulfilment beyond economic success and the centrality of waged labour. But in my view, this isn’t changing quick enough, no. Maybe such a transcendental change, affecting the very core of our systems, can’t undergo a quick change.

One of the women I interviewed for the report told me about her experiences as a single mother and a precarious worker. She told me about her lacking control over her own work and free time, the negative experiences with the job centre, the lack of state support, having to do multiple jobs, on top of caring for her son alone. She told me about her worries about the future, since she knew public pensions in Germany wouldn’t suffice for carrying a decent life, as she saw in the case of her mother.

Hers is not a single case, but paradigmatic of a structural phenomenon: it’s not only, as I said before, that women do most of the unpaid, reproductive work, often on top of waged labour. Also, women are over proportionally affected by precarity and old-age poverty. And I don’t think this is a “system failure”, but again, a very defining feature of our systems.

Many of your interviewees say that they have a poor work-life balance. Do you this that this affects more people now than in previous years? Why?

I think that poor work-life balance is a result of lacking control over own’s work-time and work-free time, and this has to do, on the one hand, with the precaritisation of work and life. As the report makes clear, precaritisation is a general trend in all three countries under consideration.

We know this already from many other studies over the past decades; this is indeed nothing new; but despite not being new, this trend is far from being over or reverted. So, yes, I think in that sense, this phenomenon is something that affects more people now than before. But, and this is the key aspect, it does not affect everyone in society equally: it is a class issue.

Moreover, poor work-life balance has also to do with other topics we have already touched, like the unequal division of reproductive work among women and men, and the overrepresentation of women in precarious work and life situations throughout their lives. In that sense, it is also a gendered phenomenon. It has also a cultural dimension, I think, related to the centrality of waged labour in our lives, and its construction as a symbol of status at the expenses of other aspects of social life.

That is, being ‘busy’ has a positive connotation in our society, even when it has negative consequences for our mental and physical health. But, again, this is not in the first, a purely cultural phenomenon, and by no means a free choice, at least for most people: it has structural causes and consequences.

What do you think was the most important finding of the dossier?

The dossier concludes with an important ambiguity: although the material and subjective conditions for the formation of a ‘European working class’ are far from given today, most workers we interviewed sent a message of unity and solidarity with other workers across countries.

There is a sense of not knowing exactly how, and on what grounds, this solidarity should be constructed. But the will and the intuition of this unity is there, despite national borders, despite fragmentations in the structure of the labour markets, even despite a clear idea of what ‘working class’ actually means today.

There is still a will, even a need, for alliances among workers, within and across countries. This arises, so the people we interviewed, from the awareness that the individual situation, the personal experiences of injustice, precarity, lack of autonomy, the financial constraints… all this is not something affecting only them as individuals. They know it is a collective problem, and as such, the solution needs to be collective.

And it must come from below, from the people themselves, with their differences: employed, unemployed, underemployed, moonlighters… This isn’t easy, I know, they know. But the alternative, the things as they are now, is for most of them not a realistic option either.

Beatriz and the other authors of the Coalition of Labour: Workers’ Voices in Europe Dossier will be introducing their findings an an online book launch on Monday, 19th July

German Communists banned from standing in the general election

This is a bureaucratic manoeuvre which could be used in the future against Muslims and the Left


14/07/2021

On 8th July 2021 it was announced by the Federal Election Commissioner (Bundeswahlleiter) that the German Communist Party (DKP) will not be allowed to contest the coming national election in September. The reason given for this was that the party had repeatedly handed in its financial report too late. As financial reports have to be compiled following a lot of time-consuming work by accountants, it is not surprising that small parties often find it difficult to follow the timetable.

This bureaucratic problem could lead to a full ban of the DKP. In 2018, the German law on parties was amended. The new law – which takes effect retroactively from 2015 (or 2016, the exact date is disputed) – contains the following passage:“An organisation loses its legal status as a party when they do not take part in a national or local election with their own election proposals for six years.”

This means that if a party decides not to take the expensive step of contesting local elections, it only needs to miss one general election to lose its legal status. If the DKP challenge to this decision fails, they will lose their legal status on the 29th of July. This has several implications.

In an interview with the newspaper junge Welt, DKP chair Patrik Köbele explained: “the loss of party status has two implications: that, like every random association, we can be banned by a decision of the interior minister, and that it is no longer possible to issue a certificate that would enable donations to be written off against tax. The latter is an attack on the financial base of the DKP.”

Increase in state bans

The ban of the DKP is not an isolated case. At the beginning of this year, Germany’s main anti-fascist organisation, the VVN-BdA (Association of people persecuted by the Nazis – Federation of antifascists) had its charity status removed, as did the anti-globalisation organisation attac. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) has put the junge Welt newspaper under observation.

Flags of the Kurdish organisations PKK and YPG are banned in Germany, and a recent ban has been issued on the non-existent flag of Hamas. Bans on Palestinians and their supporters go much further than Hamas. We have reported on several instances of how organisations and individuals giving a platform to Palestinian voices have had concerts cancelled and funding removed in recent months. Even the Jewish Voice for Peace (Jüdische Stimme) has had its bank account closed.

This is not just a matter for the Left and supporters of Palestine. In the run up to the election, and under the name of “fighting Islamism”, a working group of MPs from the governing party, the CDU, is considering “if and how the introduction of a mosque register is constitutional.” The CDU/CSU fraction in the Bundestag is demanding surveillance of mosques by the security services. Many mosques have been under surveillance for quite some time.

Meanwhile, the German State seems to be a lot more sanguine about the far right. A Thüringen court recently rescinded the decision to view the AfD as a “test case” and a possible danger to democracy. This at a time when the growing Nazification of the AfD is becoming increasingly clear. This is before we get to the Nazis who are organising in state institutions like the police.

Meanwhile the number of right wing extremists in Germany who are sanctioned to own weapons is growing. The “NSU Complex”, which led to the trial of five Neo-Nazis has shown an astonishing level of state support for the Nazis. It does seem that the state is, as the saying goes, “blind in the right eye”. This means that any bans will be used disproportionately against the Left and religious minorities.

An attack on us all

I am not a member of the DKP – but of another party, die LINKE. I have significant political differences with the DKP and believe that it is a mistake for them to stand in elections and to split the Left vote. However, they are part of the wider political Left, and such debates should be resolved through comradely discussions and not state bans.

This is not least because any strengthening of the state’s ability to decide which parties are “legitimate” – and which are not – could be used against all of us. The German state has already banned left-wing organisations. One of the first acts of the Nazi government in 1933 was to Enabling Act which banned the KPD. A similar ban was issued by Konrad Adenauer’s CDU government in 1956. In both cases, the “fight against communism” was used to justify wider repression and attacks on civil liberties.

When push comes to shove, the state is not neutral. Black Lives Matter has made clear what many of us already knew – there is a high level of racist police violence, both in Germany as well as the USA. Demonstrations against racism are often heavily policed, particularly those containing a significant number of young Muslims. Meanwhile demonstrations of Corona deniers – often with a strong Nazi presence – are generally allowed to run rampant.

Ultimately, the people who would ban the DKP would be the same people who prevent serious investigations into the AfD, who allow a serious Nazi presence in the police and security services, and who are maintaining a neo-liberal racist state. They are not our friends. Any ban on the DKP will only strengthen the power of this state.

As LINKE MP Niema Movassat says

“with the loss of their party status, the DKP loses the specific protections for parties – such as against banning orders. The interior minister can ban the DKP relatively easily. With the history of the persecution of Communists in this country, this all has a politically unsavoury taste”.

A ban on elections is not the same as a full ban of the party, but it is a distinct possibility, depending on how we react.This means that the starting point for any serious socialist is not to question whether the DKP followed their bureaucratic obligations to the last detail, nor to bring up specific differences we may have, say, on the nature of the Chinese state. This is not why the DKP is under attack. If they are successfully removed, right wing forces will be coming for socialists, Muslims and other minorities next.

But if we stand together, we will all be stronger.

The Racialization of Anti-Semitism in Post-Holocaust Germany

Outsourcing a History of Racism to the Muslim Other


13/07/2021

“The charge of anti-Semitism becomes a strong projection of the history of the Holocaust onto the bodies of ‘outsiders’ like myself, those not directly interpellated by that history, as a classic form of psychoanalytic disavowal; I accuse you of doing what I am afraid I might be doing myself, what I very much so fear doing, what I don’t want to do myself” (J. Puar).

In Spring 2020, Felix Klein, the federal government commissioner for “Jewish life and the fight against anti-Semitism” in Germany, urged the organizers of the German Arts Festival ‘Ruhrtriennale’ to revoke their invitation of the renowned postcolonial scholar Achille Mbembe. Klein asserted that Mbembe was ‘unsuitable’ to speak at the Ruhrtriennale and legitimized his political stance on a cultural festival by accusing Mbembe of anti-Semitism and of ‘relativizing the Holocaust’ as Mbembe had equated the state of Israel with the apartheid system of South Africa in one of his academic writings.

Similar things happened that year to rapper Talib Kweli and the band Young Fathers who had their concerts cancelled after they were accused of anti-Semitism due to their support for the BDS-movement, and to Palestinian journalist Khaled Barakat who was denied a renewal of his residency permit in Germany because he constituted ‘a security risk’ for his ‘anti-Semitic’ viewpoints on the situation in Israel and Palestine.

Most recently, peaceful demonstrations in several German cities in response to the continued ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in Jerusalem –attracting thousands of protestors– have been condemned by popular German newspapers, such as Der Bild-Zeitung, as “Judenhass-Demos” that, according to Die Tagesschau, illustrate the “Problem mit Islamischem Antisemitismus in Deutschland”.

Mbembe’s disqualification from the right to speak in public for being judged as an anti-Semite, then, is not an isolated event in Germany, but part of a long list of cases in which primarily minority background Germans and non-Germans have been accused of promoting anti-Semitic sentiments.

In practice, then, one could argue that the interconnected commitments of German leaders to fabricate a redeemed ‘post-racial’ society through an almost obsessive and unidirectional focus on fighting anti-Semitism and remembering the Holocaust –now constituting a source of ‘German pride’ and a ‘new’ post-war German identity– increasingly work to project anti-Semitism onto racialized ‘Others’. Meanwhile, the constructed centrality of the Holocaust as the paradigmatic experience of racism and German and European racial history effectively works to sideline Germany’s colonial past as constitutive of German identity and to disavow the continued application of colonial instruments of racial rule in German and European post-colonial societies.

Hence, while I certainly do not wish to understate the seriousness of anti-Semitism or anti-Jewish attacks, whether perpetrated by Muslims or by right-wing extremists, this article sets out to discuss the outsourcing of anti-Semitism as a new field of racial governance that attributes to Muslims supposedly culturally transmitted psychopathologies that allegedly make them inherently prone to ‘intolerance’, subsequently driving a wedge between a ‘revitalized’, ‘redeemed’ and ‘color-blind’ Germany and minority, primarily Muslim, populations that have ‘not yet’ internalized the values of the post-Holocaust inclusive ‘Judeo-Christian’ society.

The Holocaust as ‘Screen-Memory’ and the Disavowal of Colonial Violence

The Holocaust against the Jews of Europe is internationally recognized as a modern genocide that changed the world. It has become a universal moral paradigm in democratic societies and its remembrance continues to have a significant impact on world politics and international law . The importance of remembering and ‘working through’ the Holocaust is, of course, particularly acute in contemporary Germany, where historical responsibility and “a primal scene of guilt and shame” for the crimes committed against the Jews by the National-Socialist regime have become the core around which German national identifications and self-consciousness are organized. Indeed, Moses notes how, after the end of the Second World War, German foreign policy officials were acutely conscious that “the world will carefully watch the new Germany and one of the tests by which it will be judged and allowed reintegration into the ranks of ‘civilized nations’ will be its attitude towards the Jews and how it treats them”.

In 1949, the US High Commissioner for Germany, John J. McCloy, spelled out to Germans that: “What this Jewish community will be, will be watched very closely and very carefully by the entire world. It will, in my judgement, be one of the real touchstones and the test of Germany’s progress toward light”. Hence, ‘stigma management’ became Germany’s main occupation, leading to what Nolte has referred to as a ‘theater of remembrance’ in which the memory of the Holocaust became reified into a ritualized narrative of social transformation.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, then, Germany’s ability to confront its dark past served to legitimize Germany’s reappearance on the world stage, transforming the act of coming to terms with the past into a positive attribute of German society, a moral ‘uplift’ story of the human spirit against intolerance, and a mark of special moral qualifications.

By performing an explicit break with and a ‘moving on from’ the Nazi state legacy, however, Germany effectively positioned the Third Reich as the paradigmatic example of racist practice, effectively freezing racism in a very specific period in history. Lewicki & Schoolman rightly note how this narrative is highly selective in its sole focus on only one of race’s many incarnations and in its disavowal of colonialism as part of an ‘enlightened’ German history. Indeed, El-Tayeb notes how German colonial activities were often neglected as irrelevant to German society and to colonial history in general. This perception, according to El-Tayeb, requires correction, as German colonialism, and particularly their genocidal intent to annihilate the Herero in Namibia in 1904, put the race theories already dominating the public mind into practice on a broad scale, breaking down previously effective taboos with regards to racial massacres.

As early as 1942, Korsch, a German philosopher wrote: “The novelty of totalitarian politics… is simply that the Nazis have extended to ‘civilized’ European peoples the methods hitherto reserved for the ‘natives’ or ‘savages’ living outside so-called civilization”. In his Discourse, Césaire famously described Nazi brutality as a “crime against the white man” that applied to Europe already existing and widely applied colonialist procedures, and, in a similar vein, Hannah Arendt wrote that African colonial possessions became the most fertile soil for the flowering of what later was to become the Nazi elite and opened the door for “a totalitarian government on the basis of racism”.

A number of scholars have pointed out, in this regard, that the designation of the Holocaust and anti-Semitism as the paradigmatic historical experience of racism, and the designation of ‘the fight for liberal tolerance’ as the ultimate benchmark for the ‘new’ German identity, not only salvages the ‘white mythology’ of contemporary Europe’s universalist claims to moral exemplarity, but paradoxically also ‘buries’ race. It fails to acknowledge that racialization and racially based inequalities are of a period that far precede the Holocaust and that its permutations continue to persist today.

The Externalization of Anti-Semitism to the Muslim Other

Bashir and Goldberg note how this ‘sorting operation’ is reenacted in the increasing use of the term ‘Judeo-Christian civilization’ which, according to Topolski, is a “post-Shoah by-product of Western Christian dominance that serves as a symbolic apology for Christian anti-Semitism” and has been so normalized and naturalized as ‘long-standing’ that it is often mistaken as ‘secular’ . This normalized ‘secular’ stance, however, very much forms the dominant norm by which other groups are symbolically judged, classified, categorized and excluded from the ‘European project’. Indeed, Bashir & Goldberg note that in an immense act of negation and denial, the Jew suddenly stands by (secular-)Christian civilization against Islam, leading to a situation in which responsibility for the Holocaust is gradually shifted to a very specific Other: that is, the Muslim immigrant (2019, 87).

Indeed, in today’s plural European societies, the construction of a ‘racism without race’ by ascribing to certain bodies a combination of perceived unsurmountable cultural attributes that excludes them from what is constructed as an exclusively civilized realm, is, according to El-Tayeb, Mbembe and Wekker, particularly visible in the externalization of Muslim populations. Ozyurek notes how a public discourse now dominates in Germany primarily concerning the Muslim ‘importation’ of anti-Semitism and it is in this context that Alice Weidel, a German politician in the Bundestag for the right-wing ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ could contend that “of course we have a problem with racism; but it is not the [problem of] German citizens, but of those Muslim migrants that do not want to integrate and do not accept our values”.

Germany’s commitment to human rights and tolerance implied in the phrase ‘Never Again’ is now widely perceived as being besieged by alleged ‘Islamic fundamentalists and Muslim anti-Semitists’. The choc en retour of the disavowed lineage of Orientalist projections, then, is the violence embedded in the naturalization of Islamophobic sentiments under the banner of ‘the fight for tolerance’.

Romeyn and Younes note how in the new geopolitical realities after 9/11, the idea of Muslim anti-Semitism fitted perfectly with the scenario of a ‘clash of civilizations’: the discourse around the War on Terror was merged with the parallel idea of a ‘War on Anti-Semitism’ in the body and psyche of the Muslim Other. Indeed, at the anti-Semitism conference in Vienna in 2005, it was argued that “at the root of [today’s] anti-Jewish efforts is the same kind of extremist [i.e., Islamist] thinking that lies behind the international terrorism that is threatening our civilization” .

The Vienna meeting was followed up with another conference in Berlin. There, European governments agreed to allocate funds to combat this ‘new’ form of anti-Semitism, effectively leading to a situation in which anti-Semitism training for white Germans was being replaced –in monetary support, number and scope– with state-sponsored civil-society projects and educational programs for youths with a ‘Muslim background’ . It was alluded that anti-Semitism was brought over from unresolved conflicts in the Middle east –primarily the Palestinian liberation struggle– and thriving on the “social frustrations of new minorities established through migration into the many member states of the European Union”.

It is noteworthy, and even profoundly ironic, that in Vienna and in Berlin, birthplaces of the worst modern form of anti-Semitism, Muslim immigrants were accused of bringing anti-Semitism to a Europe imagined to be otherwise free of it.

Similar to the workings of ‘homonationalism’ and ‘femonationalism’, then, in which the alleged sexual freedom of queers and women is juxtaposed to the alleged oppression of these groups among the Muslim Other, the trope of a ‘new anti-Semitism’ has become a convenient way of projecting blame onto the Muslim Other for complex social issues that might blemish the mainstream’s self-image ).

Each charge –the charge of homophobia, of sexism and of anti-Semitism– characterizes Muslims as immoral perpetrators and excludes them from the fold of the ethically normative European/German community, under the banner of the defense of the universal ‘cultural values’ of freedom and equality. This effectively produces “an experience of intimate communal aversion against the barbaric, uneducated, and savage practices that we as a civilized nation cannot allow to occur within our borders”.

By the time that the calls for a ‘war’ on this ‘new’ anti-Semitism were made, however, Germany had already witnessed a decade of racially motivated attacks –including killings and manhunts– targeting other than Jewish minorities. Indeed, Younes shows how the incitements to public policy actually stood in direct contradiction to police and intelligence statistics: between 2001 and 2005, there were around 43.6 anti-Semitic physically violent attacks per year in Germany.

In 2016, there were 30 attacks and in 2017, there were 28 physical attacks, with around 95% of them committed by right-wing white German individuals. In comparison, there were almost 2000 attacks on refugees in 2017 alone, around 900 attacks on German Muslims, along with more than 100 attacks on refugee aid workers. Furthermore, in 2017, there were 205 politically motivated criminal acts against parliamentary politicians and aid-workers who worked to achieve a more egalitarian society. Given the statistics, then, the threat to democracy or Western tolerance and civilization is numerically located in the attacks on refugees, Muslims and people of color, rather than in Muslim anti-Semitism.

I concur with Ozyurek, then, that understanding anti-Semitism as a malignant ideology supposedly ‘brought back’ to Europe by Muslims merely works to produce perpetrators out of marginalized, racialized, and disadvantaged people, while preserving a ‘redeemed’ and ‘innocent’ German identity. The implication is that the origin of, and solution to the marginalization of minorities lies with their ‘failed integration’ and ‘deficient’ cultural values, rather than with racial, social and economic segregation and spatial containment at the hands of German authorities. When it is established that Muslims are anti-Semitic –and worse, refuse to atone for it– it becomes difficult to recognize their position as victims in relation to European racism.

The charge of anti-Semitism, then, is instrumentalized as a way to turn the gaze away from historically informed Orientalist projections and more continuous patterns of violence as it depicts Muslim Germans as dishonorable and undeserving residents (Topolski 2020, 313). In line with the argumentation of Yaspir Puar, then, who argued that the incorporation of queer and gay subjecthood into the biopolitical regime of the nation has been ‘condoned’ by multicultural, liberal societies only in so far as the establishing of the regulatory norm of “queer, liberal secularity” allows for a “parallel process of demarcation from populations targeted for segregation, disposal, or death”, the figure of the Jew has been retrogressively instrumentalized to externalize racialized minorities on the basis of presumed cultural incompatibilities; to erase historical and contemporary racisms; and to subject minority populations to disciplinary securitization.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the outward projection of anti-Semitism to the Other enables the fabrication of an egalitarian, pure and post-racial self-image that stands in direct opposition to the violent and discriminatory actions that it justifies. In Germany, there is a growing confluence between the charge of anti-Semitism and the culturalization of race, in which colonialist racial categories persist, but are disguised in culturalizing rather than in biological terms. This process enables state actors, who embed Jews retrogressively in the European project, to externalize racialized minorities on the basis of presumed cultural incompatibilities; to erase their own historical and contemporary racisms; and to subject minority populations to disciplinary ‘integration’ techniques).

Racism is projected outward onto immigrant and primarily Muslim populations who are depicted as never having learned the right lessons from the Holocaust and thus remain external to the post-Second-World War ‘Judeo-Christian’ civilization, while the significance of German racist crimes is effectively played down in the fantasy of multicultural societies as tolerant, hospitable, open-minded and innocent. This is the effect of the collusion between the figuration of the Holocaust as the monumentalized and standardized object lesson in intolerance with the disabled and disavowed history of colonialism and (continued) colonial violence.

I agree with Romeyn that if the Holocaust should continue to provide the moral compass of the ‘new’ Europe, its lessons need to be universalized and extended beyond the specificity of Jewish suffering to include all forms of exclusion, discrimination and intolerance. What we need is an emancipatory move that redirects attention from Muslim anti-Semitism to anti-Muslim xenophobia and to the exclusivist (white, Christian) strains within Europe’s dominant ‘secular’ and ‘inclusive’ self-image, subsequently providing an immanent and vital challenge to the core of European self-understanding as ‘tolerant’, ‘raceless’ and ‘colorblind’.

Further Reading

  • Brown, W. 2006. Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire. New Jersey: Princeton University Press
  • Césaire, A. 1972. Discourse on Colonialism. Trans. Joan Pinkham. New York: Monthly Review Press
  • El-Tayeb, F. 2011. European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Post-national Europe. University of Minnesota Press
  • Lewicki, A. & Schoolman, Y. 2020. “Building a new nation: anti-Muslim racism in post-unification Germany.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 28
  • Mbembe, Achille. 2017. Critique of Black Reason. Durham: Duke University Press.
  • Wekker, G. 2016. White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race. Durham: Duke University Press
  • Bashir, B and A. Goldberg. 2019. The Holocaust and the Nakba: A New Grammar of Trauma and History. New York: Columbia University Press
  • Ozyurek, E. 2016. “Export-Import Theory and the Racialization of Anti-Semitism: Turkish- and Arab-Only Prevention Programs in Germany.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 58(1)
  • Ozyurek, E. 2019. “Muslim Minorities as Germany’s Past Future: Islam Critics, Holocaust Memory, and Immigrant Integration” Memory Studies 15(1)
  • Puar, J.K. 2007. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. London: Duke University Press.
  • Romeyn, E. 2014. “Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Spectro-politics and Immigration.” Theory, Culture and Society 31
  • Romeyn, E. 2016. “Liberal tolerance and its hauntings: Moral compasses, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.” European Journal of Cultural Studies
  • Romeyn, E. 2020. “(Anti) ‘new antisemitism’ as a transnational field of racial governance.” Patterns of Prejudice 54
  • Topolski, A. 2020. “Rejecting Judeo-Christian Privilege: The First Step Towards Semitic Solidarity.” Jewish Studies Quarterly 27
  • Younes, A. 2020. “Fighting Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Germany.” Islamophobia Studies Journal 5(2)

Solidarity with migrant hunger strikers in Belgium

Statement read out at the rally outside the Belgian embassy in Berlin on 10th July


12/07/2021


by Legalisierung Jetzt

German, French and Spanish versions follow

Today, 10 July 2021, we have called together as a legalisation campaign to stand in solidarity with the illegalised migrant who since 23rd May have been demanding from the Belgian state in their legitimate exercise of resistance and protest, in a hunger strike, their right to residence in order to have access to a dignified life, which has been denied even more during the pandemic.

Secondly, to demand that the Belgian state urgently respond to the demands of the compañeres (comrades) for their regularisation and that they be immediately granted medical services in view of their deteriorated state of health, only under the consent and conditions that the hunger strikers agree to.

Thirdly, to call on organisations, migrant collectives, anti-racist groups and any group sensitised to this situation, to mobilise in solidarity with the comrades to make visible the political act of resistance of the strikers in Brussels, as well as the situation of the illegalised community in their territories.

Down with the Belgian colonial capitalist state, down with borders, the European Union and the xenophobic policies of death.

Long live the strikers, long live their resistance and dignity.

Life, love and rebellion

#LegalisierungJetzt!

#DignitéPourToutes

#wearebelgiumtoo

German version

Heute, am 10. Juli 2021, haben wir uns als Kampagne “Legalisierung jetzt” versammelt, um uns vor allem zu solidarisieren mit den illegalisierten migrantischen Brüdern und Schwestern, die seit dem 23. Mai in einer legitimen Widerstands- und Protestaktion mittels eines Hungerstreiks vom belgischen Staat ihr Bleiberecht einfordern, um Zugang zu einem menschenwürdigen Leben zu haben, das ihnen während der Pandemie noch mehr verwehrt wurde.

Zweitens, zu fordern, dass der belgische Staat dringend auf die Forderung der Genossen und Genossinnen nach ihrer Regularisierung eingeht und dass sie angesichts ihres verschlechterten Gesundheitszustands sofort von den medizinischen Diensten behandelt werden, und zwar nur mit der Zustimmung und unter den Bedingungen, die die Streikenden festgelegt haben.

Drittens, wir rufen alle Organisationen, Migrantischen kollektive, antirassistische Gruppen oder jede Gruppe, die für diese Situation sensibilisiert ist, auf, sich zu mobilisieren und solidarisieren mit den Genossen und Genossinnen, in der Art und Weise, wie sie es für richtig halten, und den politischen Akt des Widerstands der Streikenden in Brüssel sowie die Situation der illegalisierten Migrant*innen in jede Territorien wo sie sich befinden sichtbar zu machen.

Nieder mit dem belgischen kolonial kapitalistischen Staat, nieder mit den Grenzen, der Europäischen Union und der fremdenfeindlichen Politik des Todes.

Es lebe die Streikenden, es lebe ihr Widerstand und ihre Würde.

Leben, Liebe und Widerstand/Rebellion

#LegalisierungJetzt!

#DignitéPourToutes

#wearebelgiumtoo

French version

Aujourd’hui, 10 juillet 2021, nous nous sommes réunis dans le cadre de la campagne legalizierung jetzt pour, tout d’abord, être solidaires des frères et sœurs migrants en situation irrégulière qui, depuis le 23 mai, réclament à l’État belge, dans leur exercice légitime de résistance et de protestation, par une grève de la faim, leur droit de séjour afin d’avoir accès à une vie digne, ce qui leur a été encore plus refusé pendant la pandémie.

Deuxièmement, exiger que l’Etat belge réponde d’urgence à la demande de régularisation des compagnons et qu’ils soient immédiatement pris en charge par les services médicaux compte tenu de la dégradation de leur état de santé, seulement sous le consentement et les conditions que les compagnons ont fixés.

Troisièmement, appeler les organisations, les collectifs de migrants, les groupes antiracistes ou tout groupe sensibilisé à cette situation, à se mobiliser en solidarité avec les camarades de la manière qui leur convient, en rendant visible l’acte politique de résistance des grévistes de Bruxelles ainsi que la situation de la communauté illégalisée sur leurs territoires.

À bas l’État capitaliste colonial belge, à bas les frontières, l’Union européenne et les politiques xénophobes de la mort.

Vive les grévistes, vive leur résistance et leur dignité.

Vie, amour et rébellion

#LegalisierungJetzt!
#DignitéPourToutes
#wearebelgiumtoo

Spanish version

Hoy 10 de julio del año 2021, nos hemos convocado como campaña legalizierung jetzt para en primer lugar: solidarizarnos con lxs hermanxs migrantes ilegalizadxs que desde el 23 de mayo están exigiendo al estado belga en su legitimo ejercicio de resistencia y protesta, mediante una huelga de hambre, su derecho a la residencia para con ello acceder a una vida digna, la que ha sido negada aún más durante la pandemia.

Segundo, exigir al estado belga se dé respuesta urgente a la demanda de les companeres por su regularización y sean inmediatamente atendidos por los servicios médicos ante su deteriorado estado de salud, solo bajo el consentimiento y condiciones que les huelguistas marquen.

Tercero, llamar a las organizaciones, colectivos migrantes, anti-racistas o cualquier grupo sensibilizado con esta situación, a movilizarse en solidaridad con les compañeres de la forma que crean conveniente, visibilizando el acto político de resistencia de les huelguistas de Bruselas así como la situación de la comunidad ilegalizada en sus territorios.

Abajo el estado capitalista colonial belga, abajo las fronteras, la Unión Europea y las políticas xenófobas de la muerte.

Que vivan los huelguistas, que viva su resistencia y dignidad.

Vida, amor y rebeldía

#LegalisierungJetzt!
#DignitéPourToutes
#wearebelgiumtoo