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Can You Simply Ban Fascism?

The Romanian election debacle shows why the judiciary cannot stop the rise of the far right


16/04/2025

In Europe and the US, courts have become the terrain where lost electoral battles are refought. Populist politicians and parties, more and more successful in the polls, find themselves on the defensive in lawsuits that aim to take them out of political and public life because of their misdeeds. Sometimes it works, as in the case of Marine Le Pen’s condemnation for misusing European funds. Sometimes it fails miserably, as in the case of Donald Trump, whose near absolute immunity was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Either way, the issue in such cases is fairly straightforward: your local far-right lunatic is or is not guilty of breaking the law. Of course, there are political questions about the abuse of courts or the facile transformation of politicians into victims and martyrs, but the matter is ultimately one of legality. It gets thornier, however, when we turn to legal consequences based on political opinions. Can and should far-right politicians and parties be banned simply because they are far-right?

While Germans of all political shades fret over banning the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Romania has taken the lead and decided that yes—they can and they should. The Romanian Constitutional Court (CCR) annulled the December presidential elections won by a far-right dark horse candidate, causing an international commotion. Now that the initial winner, Călin Georgescu, has also been banned from running in the elections that will be re-run in May, we are witnessing a natural experiment that will answer a burning question: does banning a popular far-right politician work?

Judiciary militant democracy

To answer this question, we must first figure out what “working” means. The most grandiose interpretation is the protection of democracy. Georgescu, an ultranationalist, mystical fascist who ran an intransparent campaign allegedly financed by Russian money, is, undoubtedly, a threat to democracy. But is a court decision against him actually more democratic?

By engaging in “militant democracy,” the CCR chose to invalidate the votes of millions of Romanians who had already expressed their wish to have Georgescu as their president. That might indeed be justified if there was a clear case of fraud or external interference, but the decision was muddled at best. Allegations of external financing were vague, and the technical legality of the CCR taking ruling over the validity of the elections in the way it did is dubious. Nevertheless, this is still a question of facts and jurisprudence. What is more worrying is that the Court went beyond that and started judging politics as well.

The CCR had already started its political rulings in October 2024, when it banned Romanian MEP Diana Șoșoacă from running for president due to her anti-constitutional opinions. More specifically, according to the Court’s ruling, Șoșoacă’s “intentions to remove Romania from NATO and from the EU (RoExit)” were contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.

That we should not want Șoșoacă as president is made obvious by her reaction to the ban, in which she blamed Jews and Khazars. Nevertheless, the decision proved highly controversial, including among other politicians who vied for the presidency. Even if none of them would describe themselves as “pro-Russian,” certainly not to the explicit extent to which Șoșoacă has, the enshrinement of some constitutional issues as unquestionable struck many as a step too far.

It was, however, only the first step. Georgescu’s attempt to run again in the May elections was first refused by Romania’s Central Electoral Bureau (BEC), a decision then upheld by the CCR. Both rulings were justified based on the previous CCR decisions that annulled the elections and banned Șoșoacă. As the CCR had already established its capacity to ban candidates on political grounds, and as it had also already established Georgescu’s political misdeeds, the Court declared it obvious that he could not run for president (again).

The thicket of self-referential reasonings becomes difficult to follow at this point, but the CCR’s decision comes down to a simple line of thought. Georgescu, it had found in December, ran his campaign with the help of unnamed external (Russian) interferences – an allegation that is, to repeat, yet unproven. This shows that he does not respect constitutional democratic values and therefore does not fulfill the basic requirements for becoming Romanian President. This then allows BEC to disqualify him from participating in the 2025 elections due to the precedent set by the Șoșoacă decision.

This decision then is also, at best, muddled. The passing of the ball from the CCR to the BEC and back makes for an opaque institutional setting in which there is little accountability for momentous decisions. Perhaps even more worrying is the CCR’s overreach. As neither Georgescu nor Șoșoacă fell short of any of the formal requirements for the candidacy, the CCR took it upon itself to assess their political opinions, which they found to be contrary to Romania’s constitutional values even if they had not yet manifested in the form of any illegal act condemned by a court of law.

Now, it might make sense that candidates with fundamentally anti-democratic intentions, such as banning categories of citizens from voting, may not run. But the CCR went way beyond that, referring to the constitutional values of Romania’s orientation towards Europe and NATO and framing the elections’ stakes as a geopolitical choice. By using Russia as a foil and a scarecrow, the CCR virtually ruled that questioning the geopolitical status quo disqualifies you from being the country’s president. Democracy was strengthened by situating some issues outside of what can be legitimately debated and changed.

The far right is everywhere

Perhaps, however, the CCR’s ban worked in a different sense, and it successfully cut short the growth of the far right. It is true that the ban was followed by some infighting in the sovereigntist camp, infighting that still continues. It is also true that the reaction to Georgescu’s ban was violent, but ultimately minor, showing at least that the far-right’s electoral success cannot be transformed into an organized social basis. Not yet, at least.

But none of this means that the coming elections will not be won by someone with similar views. The leading sovereigntist politician before Georgescu’s meteoric apparition, George Simion, is still allowed to run and leading in all the polls. Even if Simion loses the election’s second round, the other choices are almost as abysmal. As we know from Germany, far-right success causes the center to imitate and follow, not to resist and move toward the left.

All other candidates who seem to stand a chance are newcomers who have not run in the annulled elections. That does not mean they are in any way breaths of fresh air in Romanian politics. Although the election is run on debates about who is and is not against the “system,” all candidates are deeply embedded in Romanian political and financial networks.

One of them is Victor Ponta, a former Prime Minister who resigned after a nightclub fire that ultimately killed 64 caused massive protests. Ponta chose to make his political comeback on the unsubtle platform: “Romania first.” His self-presentation as a sovereigntist alternative to Simion, however, suffered by his inexplicable recent admission that, as Prime Minister, he accepted the flooding of several Romanian villages on the Danube in order to save Belgrade, a deal that brought him honorary Serbian citizenship.

Another favorite is Crin Antonescu, a prominent politician in the early 2010s who has been lying low for the last 10 years. He made a comeback after Georgescu shook up the Romanian political scene and is the common candidate of the Social Democrats and the Liberals, the two largest parties of Romania, and also the biggest losers of the annulled elections. Both old and new, Antonescu stands a chance, but his win would certainly not be a loss for nationalists. His campaign banks on national identity and moral majorities, coming out strongly against LGBT rights and for traditional values, and explicitly taking Donald Trump as a positive model.

The last strong contender is Nicușor Dan, currently Mayor of Bucharest for the second consecutive term. Dan is the closest this race comes to a (liberal) left-wing candidate. He is one of the founders of the Save Romanian Union (USR), which originated in an anti-corruption activist group. But anti-corruption campaigns have never been critical of neoliberal capitalism in Romania, and both Dan and USR have since shed all traces of liberal progressivism they might have espoused.

Dan left USR when the party still stood for tolerance and individual rights because its members voted to boycott a referendum aimed at introducing a definition of marriage as between a man and a woman in the Romanian Constitution. This was just the highlight of a lifelong series of anti-LGBTQ declarations and measures, which he still embraces as a presidential candidate.

His controversial exit from the party did not stop him from seeking and accepting USR’s endorsement for the May election, in a coup against the party’s initial candidate, Elena Lasconi. Lasconi was the runner-up in the December elections but now barely registers on the polls, so it might make sense for USR to jump ship. But the BEC has already announced that the mid-campaign change is not legal, so the end result is simply more chaos. Together with his refusal to make known the identity of his most generous campaign donors, Dan’s politicking shows that even the most anti-system candidates are, at best, a conservative opportunist.

As one Romanian commentator wrote, the election is now just a “struggle between two forms of self-colonization.” Not only does the center cling onto a local variety of neoliberal Europeanism, but the far-right sovereigntists are part of a European, even global movement, with connections and models throughout the Western world. This intra-elite competition elides the needs of the working class, the needs of the poor in one of Europe’s most unequal countries. It tries to win their votes and loyalty only through scapegoating, conservatism, and crass nationalism. Rather than mitigating the rightward shift, the CCR’s ban was just a move within the political games that are accelerating it.

Who is an extremist?

But what if it had worked? What if Georgescu’s ban was the end of Romanian nationalism? Or what if, in another time and another place, another court banning another far-right candidate might actually stop their ascendancy?

Some positive examples of legal action against the far right do exist. It is, after all, an absolute good that someone doing a Nazi salute can go to prison in Germany. It is also an absolute good that the glorification of the most important Romanian interwar fascist movement, the Legion of the Archangel Michael, is similarly illegal. It would be even better if this was actually enforced. These concessions won from the state, however, are neither neutral instruments nor a political strategy.

Just look at what courts are doing right now. In the US, they are allowing the deportation of anti-genocide activists. In Germany, they might do the same. In states that are founded on capitalism and colonialism, courts and laws are bloody instruments for the protection of capitalist and colonialist interests.

Trying to redirect these instruments and make them work against the far right might be efficient if the conditions allow it – examples like US desegregation do exist. But the Romanian case is illustrative of why this strategy is not only inefficient but also self-defeating. Șoșoacă and Georgescu were banned from running for president because of their anti-EU, anti-NATO politics. The exact same criteria could be used to ban a radical socialist candidate.If the courts can decide that “extremist” political opinions threatening the status quo exclude one from the democratic process, then those decisions will inevitably also come against those who see the status quo as unequal, as unfair, as criminal. In the eyes of the law, the left and the right are both disruptive and illegitimate. Banning the far right can be a legislative victory. But if it is not accompanied by social and political victories, it only strengthens the force that will soon come down against the left.

A Taiwanese Perspective on Oppression and solidarity

Of course Taiwanese people support Palestine. We have our own history of oppression


15/04/2025

My friends often tell me they admire my compassion and empathy for Palestinians. But I often wonder—how could one not feel for them? Observing their responses to my opinions, I realized that we see the world through different lenses, and I cannot blame them for that.

I was born and raised in Taiwan, a country that has experienced over a century of foreign domination and authoritarian rule. In 1895, following the First Sino-Japanese War, the Qing dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Japan ruled Taiwan until 1945, introducing modernization efforts such as infrastructure development and education systems. However, these advancements came with cultural suppression and exploitation, including forced assimilation policies and economic control [Cultural assimilation under Japanese rule – Roy, Denny. Taiwan: A Political History, Cornell University Press, 2003].

After Japan’s defeat in World War II, the Republic of China (ROC) assumed control of Taiwan. The Kuomintang (KMT), led by Chiang Kai-shek, retreated to Taiwan after losing the Chinese Civil War. Initially seen as liberators, the KMT soon imposed authoritarian rule. In 1947, the 228 Incident occurred when government forces violently suppressed civilian protests, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 18,000 to 28,000 people.

Following this, Taiwan entered the “White Terror” period, lasting from 1949 to 1992. During this time, the KMT government enforced martial law, suppressing political dissent through imprisonment, torture, and executions. Estimates suggest that at least 3,000 to 4,000 people were executed, and over 140,000 were imprisoned.

Even today, Taiwan faces international challenges, notably from the People’s Republic of China, which seeks to limit Taiwan’s participation in global organizations.

Because of this history, we have fought tirelessly for our freedom of speech, human rights, and recognition from the world—just as Palestinians do today. That is why I feel such a deep connection to their struggle.

Some of my European friends do not seem to share the same level of empathy. I have come to understand that their perspective is shaped by history. For the past 500 years, many European nations expanded their influence through conquest, domination, and colonization, shaping their worldview differently [European colonial legacy – Osterhammel, Jürgen. Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005]. Growing up, their history books and cultural narratives often centered on power and expansion, rather than the experiences of those who were oppressed. This may explain why it is harder for some to fully grasp the suffering of those who live under occupation and systemic oppression.

When people say that Palestinians do not want peace, it frustrates me deeply. Peace cannot exist unless the oppressed have the same rights as the oppressor. True peace means equality—where Palestinians, like people in Europe or anywhere else, can live freely with full rights, dignity, and security. Until then, we cannot say that the world is truly at peace.

When Protest Becomes the Punchline

The Art of Humiliating Elon Musk


13/04/2025

When it comes to satirical dissent, London is not, and never has been shy. It’s a city where nappy-wearing Donald Trump inflatables fly over Parliament, where people dress as turds to protest a council that can’t clean up its own shit, and where a clown convinced half the UK to leave Europe, oh wait, that wasn’t satire. Buffoonery aside, if there’s one thing London does consistently well, it’s mockery as a civil tradition.

Lately, though, the city has surpassed itself, graduating from headline grabbing high-jinks to calculated, viral comedy gold. Not because the issues are any less serious, on the contrary, but because the target—one Elon Musk—is begging to be ridiculed.

Over the past few weeks—and in direct response to Musk’s increasingly desperate lurch to the far right, his fascist salute photo-op, DOGE, and his ongoing display of slimy billionaire entitlement—activists have launched a series of polished stunts aimed squarely at his most visible asset, Tesla.

As well as the appearance of “Swasticar” stickers and “Musk-B-Gone” air fresheners, London bus stops and Tube carriages have been hijacked with high-gloss, high-punching mock-ads strapped with lines like “Now With White Power Steering” and “The Fast and the Führer”. Groups like Led By Donkeys, Takedown Tesla, and Everyone Hates Elon are executing increasingly coordinated actions, with the latter even inviting the public to smash a second-hand Tesla in the name of art (and catharsis). It’s guerrilla meme-fare for the man who once profoundly declared “I am meme”. 

But while the targets—electric cars and a Mars-obsessed CEO—are relatively new, fascism, notably, is not. And neither are the activists’ tactics. Satirical dissent has long been an important force in revealing truth and engaging an apathetic public in politics and debate around the world.

The Situationist International (SI), an international organisation of social revolutionaries, called it détournement, or the hijacking of the symbols of dominant culture by twisting them into critique. Turn the ad into an attack, the brand into a punchline and use public space as a stage for dissent.

It’s a spirit that has surfaced again and again. In the UK, Space Hijackers, a group of self-described “anarchitects” once attempted to bring a tank to a G20 protest and on another occasion listed the London Olympics on eBay. And in Paris, Jeudi-Noir turned squatting into protest performance, occupying luxury flats and holding press conferences from balconies to spotlight the absurdity of housing injustice in a city with thousands of empty high-end properties.

More notably, it’s a philosophy seen through the actions of the Yippies in the 1960s, a famous group of activists who also treated politics like street theatre. Knowing shouting wasn’t enough, they made protest impossible to ignore. They levitated the Pentagon (or tried to) and nominated a pig for president as a kind of pre-internet shitpost. 

Which brings us neatly back to a man who has, in recent months, become more famous for his shitposting than his rockets to Mars—rockets which, like Tesla stock, have been in freefall. According to the Financial Times, Tesla has just recorded its worst quarter since 2022, with vehicle deliveries down 13%. It’s the sharpest decline in the company’s history and analysts aren’t just blaming market competition or supply chain issues, they’re pointing to the increasingly radioactive brand of Elon Musk himself.

This shows the cultural and financial unravelling hasn’t happened in isolation. It’s been accelerated by the new wave of activist groups who’ve realised that in an age when power is performative, sometimes protest has to be too. Some might argue satirical activism makes reality and the struggles we face feel unserious—but when a 53-year old billionaire CEO can tank his company’s stock with a meme, desperately pretend to be good at video games, tweet fascist dog-whistles and conspiracy theories, and still be treated as a visionary, it’s not the protest that’s absurd, it’s the context. In that landscape, satire isn’t a sideshow, it’s a translation. A form of dissent that meets chaos with clarity and spreads faster than investor panic at a Tesla earnings call.

Note: one of the actions mentioned in the article – the smashing of the Tesla – is scheduled to take place on April 10th.

“Institutions Need Aestheticised Dissent to Maintain Legitimacy”

A conversation with badnām on cultural institutions, cinema, and dissent

As in much of the global South, the Goethe-Institut (GI) in India — also locally known as the Max Mueller Bhavan, after the Orientalist philologist Max Müller — plays a key strategic role in maintaining German soft power in the country. A particularly useful tool to reinforce this soft power has historically been the strategic use of cultural funding, to assimilate academics, artists and cultural workers into the fold. Ultimately, this is one of many tools that serve to construct Western hegemony: where (some) subjects in the global South accede to Western dominance willingly, rather than having to be coerced into it.

Since the start of the Israeli genocide in Gaza, the contradictions between the desire to maintain this hegemony in the global South, and unconditional solidarity with the State of Israel, have been stretched to absolute breaking point. This is particularly true in Germany — where the cynical use of the Staatsräson has led to deportations, clampdowns on protests, the suppression of academic and artistic freedoms, and the systematic withdrawal of state support from organisations that refuse to toe the German line on Israel. This has applied to organisations both within and outside Germany.

On December 8, 2024, a small collective of queer filmmakers and activists disrupted the closing screening at EXPERIMENTA 2024, a film festival organised at the GI in Bangalore, with a guerilla recording of their conversation with the institute’s director about the GI’s “red lines” on the genocide. The collective — now called badnām (बदनाम/بدنام) [infamous] — are going to be organising their own film festival in Bangalore, from 24–26 April. You can find a longer statement about this action on their Instagram. What follows is our conversation with badnām.

The many absurdities of the German positioning on Palestine are extremely visible to those of us who live here, as are recent actions against it, like Strike Germany. How did this end up on your radar in India?

We are connected to the internet the same way most of the world is. It’s difficult not to be aware — which is exactly what we’ve been trying to say to those who continue to liaise with the GI (GI), pretending they have no idea what’s happening in Germany, or even in Gaza. For those who’ve somehow managed to become ascetics like that, who still haven’t noticed there’s an ongoing genocide being livestreamed 24/7 while they post “outfit of the day” stories or repost invitations to their next event at the Goethe Institut, our disruption was hopefully informative. But beyond that, there’s a very real political mirroring between the German state’s Islamophobia and the Hindutva state’s crackdown on dissent in India. The mechanisms of censorship, surveillance, and cultural policing are deeply familiar to us. German cultural institutions, in this context, position themselves as benevolent actors working in an “illiberal context” — while conveniently erasing their own violent complicity in Palestine.

Your film “masturbation is easy, finding the video is hard” begins with a guerilla recording of your conversation with the GI director in Bangalore on the institute’s “red lines” on Gaza. Has this resulted in any legal threats?

Not directly, but we wouldn’t be surprised if it eventually does. Institutions like the GI operate through reputational management. They don’t want public legal battles because that would draw more attention to the issue. Instead, their PR strategy is institutional memory-holing: ignoring and infantilising our work, and quietly excluding certain filmmakers or activists from future opportunities. It’s more about slow erasure than immediate confrontation.

The GI did attempt to retrospectively declare that the meeting recorded in the film was confidential and expressed “disappointment” with us. The question of consent is often raised when guerrilla recordings are involved, and curiously, it was Indian programmers and artists — who were most insistent on this point. Many of them, despite years of engaging in feminist and queer programming, suddenly and conveniently forgot the hierarchy of power between the GI (with its 151 offices worldwide) and a few individuals questioning how such an institute exercises its influence.

Ultimately, there was nothing in the guerrilla recording that had not already been publicly stated by the GI and more locally, also repeated by their director at events in Bangalore. So where does the discomfort come from? Why does listening to this conversation, one just like so many they have been part of since October 7 when trying to negotiate with this institute cause such unease?

What kind of reactions did you get from the Goethe-Institut organisers, or from participants at Experimenta?

In the time following our disruption, we wrote to the GI, attempting to further engage with the questions we were raising. Our emails were met with silence. Even when we took this to social media, their eventual response was laughably predictable: bureaucratic, paternalistic, and ultimately defensive. What felt more telling, though, was the disengagement — and in some cases, outright justifications — from within the Indian cultural milieu. People who privately expressed solidarity but refused to say anything publicly out of fear of losing future funding or festival opportunities. 

This is precisely the culture of complicity and self-censorship we were trying to confront: the way German (and Western) institutions breed the illusion of being “neutral platforms” while actively policing Palestinian solidarity. What’s worse is how they get local cultural partners to do the dirty work of manufacturing consent for them. It’s tricky, because a “progressive” institution like the GI wants to do a certain amount of queer programming every year. You can rest assured that some heterosexual, cisgendered, very well-meaning progressive will arrive at the Institut to do this “work” for them. In fact, queer and marginalised dissenters are likely to be disinvited from GI-sponsored queer “soirees” with horrible watered-down alcohol, by cisgendered and straight “friends of the institute”, who find your politics “too aggressive”, even “misplaced, no matter how urgent or relevant”. 

What is most offensive, of course, is that they imagine we’d even want to be there.

India, like a lot of the global South, relies to some extent on culture/arts funding from the global North. Though this was always the case, German anxieties around Israel have really underscored that this support comes at a price. How do you think artists can work around these institutional limitations?

Not sure we believe in “workarounds” anymore. As conflict-oriented as it might sound, we have to work despite — and even against — these structures, not around them. What workaround can there be when your very humanity is at odds with imperialism, colonialism, racism, capitalism? When you want to turn the lens on the very system that once celebrated your “political”, “radical” work — so long as it absolved and sanctified them?

For instance — the film Sab changa si [All Was Good], about the student protests against the Indian Citizenship Amendment Act, premiered at the Berlinale Forum Expanded and won the Peace Film Prize (awarded by the Heinrich Böll Institut) in 2022. Fast forward to 2023, the same institute pulls out of a conference where Masha Gessen was invited and continues to toe the peculiar German line on the genocide. It makes any validation or recognition of our struggles from these institutions feel absolutely meaningless. So yes — we are okay with making the films we want to make with what we can afford, storing them on our hard drives, or sharing them with communities organising outside of these spaces. At least then the work remains honest. If it means having a day job to pay the bills while you continue your artistic work, then that’s how. 

Until something changes. And something will change if enough people demand it. What’s amazing is how short our memories are as a newly independent country. Many Indian cultural workers who resisted censorship in the ‘90s and the early 2000s turned to Western institutions for funding, particularly when India’s economy opened up during globalisation. Institutions like the GI, the Ford Foundation, British Council, and European film funds became alternative sources of support as independent filmmakers found it nearly impossible to work within the structures of state or corporate financing. But the point can’t then be to cling to another system that is equally violent and restrictive for artistic freedom — a system that, in fact, shapes what is allowed as liberty within our local cultural industries. 

This isn’t unique to India. Filmmakers across Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East have faced similar contradictions. From when cultural funding was used as a soft power strategy during the Cold War, to today’s festival circuits that double as geopolitical gatekeepers, the pattern remains the same. If your work doesn’t absolve your funders, you will find yourselves on the outside. So what good is that freedom? What interesting work can you produce if you’re bound by these red lines? Our simple observation — subjectively of course — is that a lot of the art that emerges out of these “diplomatic negotiations” with institutions is frankly just bad. We’d say: don’t work around it. Spare us.

I’m reminded of the recent cancellation of the DJ Leila Moon in Switzerland, where a crowdfunding campaign ended up replacing the prize she was meant to be awarded. Do you think this sort of solidarity-as-praxis can be a viable stop-gap strategy for artists in the global South?

Alternative infrastructures are necessary but not a structural solution. As we understood with the Leila Moon incident, such instances perhaps highlight the fragility of institutional support but certainly do not dismantle its monopoly. The real question is whether we can build systems that don’t require institutional validation at all. Otherwise, we’re still playing the same game on harder difficulty settings.

For us, if there is a way forward, it isn’t through the fantasy that we can continue to navigate these spaces without compromise. It’s through real acts of refusal which will certainly risk exclusion and have to determinedly refuse to play by the rules of these institutions which are designed to absorb and neutralise dissent. Anything else would be purely self-serving.

The synergy between Hindutva and Zionism is easy to understand, given their shared hatred for Muslims. Yet these “outright justifications” emerge from the culture scene, from people who are (at least not openly) Hindu nationalist. Do you think this is purely cynical materialism, or is there an ideological component to it as well?

Zionism and Hindutva aren’t just about religion or nationalism; they are capitalist projects that use religious identity as a tool for mass mobilisation. Their ideological justifications — whether the “Jewish homeland” or “Akhand Bharat” [undivided India] — serve as convenient covers for resource extraction, real-estate expansion, labour exploitation, and militarisation. Religion is the language they use, but the machine itself is deeply capitalist. In Palestine, Israeli settlements are profit-driven enterprises, with multinational companies funding displacement and profiting from surveillance, arms manufacturing, and resource extraction. In India, Hindutva is aligned with crony capitalists like Adani and Ambani, whose wealth depends on land grabs, labour deregulation, and state-backed monopolies. The 2002 anti-Muslim pogroms in Gujarat were followed by a massive real estate boom — displaced Muslim neighbourhoods became prime land for developers. Ethnic cleansing isn’t just ideological; it’s profitable.

The capitalist machinery also manufactures the illusion that participation in Zionism or Hindutva offers a path to economic and social mobility. The majority are kept invested in a system that ultimately benefits only the elite, and promised that by becoming a better Zionist, a better sanghi [Hindu nationalist; pejorative], they can access power otherwise denied to them. In reality, their conditions remain the same (or worsen) while the ruling class consolidates power, using aspirational nationalism as both carrot and stick. The Hindutva/Israel alliance is often framed as being purely about Islamophobia, but in India for example, Christian institutions are frequently attacked because they provide services that challenge upper-caste and state control, like education and social work. The dominant narrative centres on a “Muslim vs. Hindu”, or “Muslim vs. Jewish” conflict because it is easier to sell.

Ultimately, this violence isn’t just about identity, but about restructuring economies in ways that concentrate power among the elite. The real challenge is disrupting the economic engines that make these pogroms profitable.

So when cultural figures and institutions justify or remain silent about Zionist and Hindutva violence, it’s because they are invested in the system that sustains them. The material stakes for people the West calls “artists at risk” are obvious: grants, residencies, film festivals, institutional support. These institutions also don’t just fund art; they shape what is considered acceptable discourse, and the longer one engages with them, the more their limits become internalised. Certain words become unspeakable and certain solidarities become untenable. A genocide can be framed as a tragedy, a war, a “complicated issue,” but never as an explicit colonial project. You can critique right-wing authoritarianism while maintaining a pragmatic silence on the industries that enable it. You can wear a keffiyeh, sign an open letter, and call a genocide a genocide (only) in private conversations or in closed rooms, to strategically maintain political credibility while staying within the safe bounds of institutional approval. In India, elite cultural spaces will programme anti-caste, queer, and feminist work — so long as it remains within digestible, upper-caste frameworks. Anything that directly implicates the institutions funding these spaces or calls out capital as the central force behind oppression is pushed to the margins. 

Institutions, of course, encourage and benefit from this kind of controlled opposition. Institutions need a certain degree of aestheticised dissent to maintain legitimacy. If every artist associated with them were completely silent on Palestine, for example, their neutrality would be too obviously compromised. So they allow for meticulously curated outrage — as long as it remains within the realm of discourse, never crossing into material action or intervention. An artist can make a film about Kashmir; Modi; or even Gaza; but if they call for a boycott of the very institutions screening their work, they will find themselves quietly disinvited from future projects for being too difficult or immature. A festival can programme radical work, but not if it directly implicates the corporations funding it. These aren’t contradictions; they are the ideological scaffolding of cultural power.

The irony is particularly apparent to us in our “independent” film spaces. Among a certain category of cultural workers and filmmakers, there has long been a clear opposition to the Indian state’s censorship, especially when it comes to the violence it inflicts on marginalised groups. Over the past two decades, filmmakers have repeatedly come together to resist state control over films and festival spaces. And yet, there is now a tacit acceptance of the way German and other western cultural institutions define what can and cannot be said in film and art. Apparently, funding — and the meagre benefits of international status in the art and film circuits — has been enough to sway them. That this censorship is not all that different from the Hindutva project (and in fact feeds into it) is something that no one wants to directly acknowledge at this moment.

What lies ahead for badnām, and what can we do to help in Berlin?

After our disruption and everything that followed, we were sitting with thoughts of how it would be possible for us, as filmmakers and artists ourselves, to ever do or distribute any meaningful work in these times. We were informed, very matter-of-factly, that this would be made impossible. Another counter was that we should do “these things” at our own festival — the implication being that putting together a festival (without being complicit with institutions like the GI) was a labour we had never attempted, and so we had no right to demand anything from those who did put in the work the best they could.

This made us truly wonder if it was actually so impossible. We thought we’d find out for ourselves, and remain(ed) open to learning that maybe there’s no way. But we had to try. That’s why we started talking to collectives and groups all over the world, and decided we’d be very ambitious — reaching out to filmmakers, etc., to see if they’d be willing to donate their works for us to screen in Bangalore. We even reached out to the Guerrilla Girls to ask if they’d design our poster — and they wrote back!

The response and enthusiasm from filmmakers who’ve been experiencing similar censorship and gatekeeping was overwhelming, even surprising. We put out a call for films in February and received over 150 submissions from more than 43 countries. We found a venue — an independent bookstore in the city with a screening space that can accommodate 100 people — and we’re now doing this festival from 24–26 April. It’s been a whirlwind, but to answer what we were left wondering, starting from that disruption at GI: is it possible at all to do cultural work that isn’t complicit? We think yes. It’s labour, undoubtedly, but it’s a labour of love.

The isolation and alienation that the system hoped we would feel isn’t really working, because the collaborations we’re building — as people first, with others all around the world — are in a small measure, what restores our hope. They’re what will allow us to return to the film work we actually want to do. We don’t want to forever be reactive to this censorship and its custodians, and carry that energy into our films.

The way we see it — and the films we received for the festival have reminded and humbled us of this again — cinema is about life itself. And life, if it is to mean anything, must be for all. At a fundamental level, what’s happening in Gaza, and in so many places around the world, is completely at odds with the spirit of film work. Of course, we want to feel open and trusting of the world and the people in it — as we inherently do, usually. And we want to be moved to film slow, beautiful, sexy, tender things. 

This festival is us carving out a little space to resolve, address, perhaps even exhaust, the disappointment and anger we’ve been feeling towards the cultural milieu. We’re even scheduling a “disruption slot” into the programme, to cheekily invite dialogue from anybody who wants to show up and have the conversations we’ve been seeking for a long time.

After the festival, we will return to the work we know and love best, which is making films, writing, and just spending time with each other. No matter the fate of our future works, we will at least have proven to ourselves that we are not alone in this. And more importantly, that cinema, as we have known and loved it, is well and alive. 

Inciting Hatred and Slinging Insults: Exploring the Legal Apparatus of the BRD

Part III: Honor – final part of Jason Oberman’s article


12/04/2025

In Part I and Part II of this series, we took a look at the Volksverhetzung and Beleidigung laws, two of the laws most weaponized to repress the anti-genocide movement in Germany. Acting as the root of both these laws we found something rather peculiar: German honor, or Ehre. And it only gets stranger the deeper we look.

In the search to discover more about this peculiar notion of honor, I stumbled upon another German law that was created to protect Ehre: the second of the Nuremberg Race Laws was titled “Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor. This law included prohibitions of Aryan and Jewish intermarriage and sexual relations, employment of young German women by Jewish men, and Jewish people flying the Reich’s flag. It seems that simply being non-Aryan in Germany violates the German Honor Code. And one must be willing to defend even the slightest violation of honor with murder. 

Perhaps the Holocaust itself can be seen through the lens of protection of Ehre. In exploring the German duel, I came across Ehrennotwehr, which, perhaps, could have been an undercurrent of the Nazi genocide.  Ehrennotwehr, emergency self-defence of honor,  was the vicious practice of 19th century Prussian officers; if one’s honor was somehow insulted by a lower class, who was not worthy of the honorable duel, Ehrennotwehr required sudden and extreme violence, even murder, in order to defend one’s higher positionality, avoiding the sometimes lengthy bureaucratic measures of the duel, which usually required a formal invitation, mediation and witnesses. 

Although Ehrennotwehr was technically “reserved for those occasions when the physical integrity of the officer had been violated by a member of the unwashed horde who could not render formal satisfaction [a duel] … liberal interpretations led to its indiscriminate use as an effectual method for teaching any upstart his place.” (McAleer 114) As with the duel, Ehrenotwehr illustrates the idea of achieving purity and protecting honor through the annihilation of the other, an ideology embraced by Prussia, the Nazis, and the modern German state today.

So what is this peculiar German honor, or Ehre, exactly? Where does it come from? 

In the words of scholar Kevin McAleer: “In the final analysis, [German] honor was devoid of clearly conceived ethical content” (48). Ehre seems to be rooted in codes of chivalry practiced by Crusading Knights. These honorable men conducted large scale massacres across Europe and the Middle East, including ethnic cleansing of Jews during the Rhineland Massacre

In fact it was only through scapegoating and persecuting Jews that these Crusaders could fabricate honor: “The vices of the knights during the Crusades and their ‘extreme quarrelsomeness and pugnacity, merciless, arrogance and greed, cruelty to the vanquished, lack of a sense of common humanity, faithlessness to those outside the circles of feudal obligation, and frequently impious disregard of religion’ […] could only be transmitted as acts of heroic chivalry on the European mainland, if contrasted to Jewish vices.

The imaginary Feindbild – the Jew, the Communist, the Palestinian – comes into play here; it is only through creating an imagined enemy that is so unfathomably and deeply dishonorable, one could claim any sort of honor while committing mass murder. This false narrative would have been critical in establishing the honorable nature and justification of the Crusaders’ ethnic cleansing of Jews in aforementioned Rhineland massacre, the genocide of Herero and Nama peoples in Namibia, the Holocaust, and the current German funded genocide in Palestine.

Germany’s own Crusading Knights, the honorable Teutonic Order, were  founded in Palestine to “avenge the dishonoring of God and His Cross and to fight so that the Holy Land, which the infidels subjected to their rule, shall belong to the Christians” (Sterns, 204) They hoped to follow in the footsteps of their peculiar reimagining of the Jewish Maccabees as knights who, in the Order’s words, “defeated and exterminated [pagans] so that they cleansed once again the Holy City which the pagans had defiled” (Sterns, 204). After they failed to ethnically cleanse Palestine, they developed their code of honor while committing atrocious wars of extermination and enslavement in north eastern Europe, laying the genocidal path Hitler would later follow through the Eastern Front. 

What’s more, the Teutonic Code of Honor even includes an early form of Beleidigung legislation: the first Book of the Order from 1264 states : “No brother shall call a Christian a traitor or a renegade or an evil smelling bastard, or abuse him in such terms.” (Sterns, 243). Remember this rule of protecting Christians from slander was conceived at a time when the Teutonic Order,  “who for love of honor and the fatherland have exterminated the enemies of the faith with a strong hand” (Sterns, 204). The Order was legislating against verbally insulting Christians while literally attempting ethnic cleansing.

Teutonic Ehre only took on greater heights as time went on. It was so highly esteemed in Germany that both the 2nd Reich (Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Kingdom of Prussia) and the Nazis adopted it: 

By decree of its leader Heinrich Himmler[…], every SS man had ‘the right and duty to defend his honor by force of arms,’ and in a letter to the SS Legal Service in 1938 he outlined the conventional Wilhelmine guidelines for doing so. What is more, Himmler patterned his own cult of honor, like that of his Wilhelmine predecessors, on medieval archetypes. He modeled his ‘new knighthood,’ his ‘sworn liege men,’ on the ‘brutalized chivalry’ of the Teutonic Knights” (McAleer 210)  

But Teutonic Honor didn’t end with the Nazis: the modern Bundeswehr (German Military) gives out a “Badge of Honor” with the Teutonic Order’s Iron Cross. Antisemitism commissioner Uwe Becker is also a lay member of the order, and one must wonder about the role of Ehre in the “war on antisemitism.”

The German conception of honor has an interesting distinction from other honor codes: it is guided by Standesehre, caste honor (McAleer 35), defined as the collective honor of Germany’s elite class; “Its definition also denoted group solidarity over and against the lower orders, for in every ‘affair,’ or Ehrenhandel, the participants were representing not only their own interests but those of their class.” (McAleer 3) 

For elite men, individual honor and caste honor were therefore indistinguishable (McAleer 35). Therefore, the German notion of Ehre is primarily concerned with hierarchies of power — one can only be honorable if one is above those who are not. We could see clearly how this is also tied into the Christian Crusaders’ ethno-religious honor above Jews, and this honor could have evolved into the honor of the Aryan race over all others. 

The other nefarious element of German honor is its entanglement with the duel. It was the duel itself, that is murderous violence, which distinguished and guaranteed honorable positionality: 

The duel drew a strict line of division between “men of honor” (Ehrenmänner) and the rest of society, which enjoyed none of the psychic, social, or legal entitlements of honorable status. Among German males, in order to be considered salonfähig—fit for good society—it was necessary that one also be satisfaktionsfähig— capable of dispensing satisfaction in a duel. Highly dangerous rencontres endowed this term with the real substance of character, and so upper class men of honor also pretended a moral supremacy that bolstered their claim to leadership of the German nation” (McAleer 3-4). 

One’s ability to duel determined one’s class and power, and it is through the duel that one could uphold one’s class and power positions. During the end of the 19th century and early 20th century, this was strictly limited to elite white Protestant men who made up about 5% of the population. (McAleer 35). 

These elite German males seemed to be so fearful of being insulted and lose their honor that Professor Karl Binding stated that “the eternal Angst of the German that his honor might be robbed of him by any frivolous fellow, his trembling worry that perhaps already through an upturned nose or a derisive word his whole world has gone up in smoke.” 

Binding even came up with the diagnosis “Ehren-nervosität” — a “chronic nervous affliction of the [upper class], usually characterized by acute and persistent hallucinations that someone was trying to trespass their personal integrity by belittling them.” (McAleer 40). I think many of us have met people on the streets and subways of Berlin, often in uniform, who have this condition. 

As a man of honor, it was seen as infinitely worse to quietly take an insult rather than lose one’s life in a petty pistol duel over a small insult against you or a female acquaintance. As McAleer explains, “This was the greatest infamy in a world where the essence of manhood was affectation of a serene scorn for one’s own puny existence. […] It was and is better to die/kill rather than be seen as a weak insulted person.”(McAleer 42) Given this commitment to murder and death, we can further understand the system of “ethics” which is the bedrock of German culture itself. 

Through exploring this strange German Ehre, perhaps we can see another aspect of Germany’s support of Israel. It may be a long shot, but bear with me.  As we learned from evaluation of Volksverhetzung law, human rights in Germany entails applying German notions of “human dignity” or honor to certain populations or persons. These populations, therefore, must also fall into a strict and violent hierarchical code as well. 

Through the lens of German Ehre, the Palestinian people insulted Israel through the October 7 attacks and as the German political elite and mainstream media seems to be unable to distinguish between Israel and Jewish people, Palestine therefore insulted Jews as a whole. Since Jewish people are awarded “human dignity” in modern Germany, so we are told, Jews are therefore required to defend their honor. As the German state and mainstream media, through horrific anti-Palestinian racism and persecution, has implied that Palestinians, as non-Aryan Arabic people, occupy a lower racial positionality compared to white Ashkenazi Jews, Ehrenotwehr, honorable self-defense, or extermination, is an order. It must be quick, extreme, brutal, and absolute.

As the Nuremberg Laws imply, genocide is the way a country defends honor against ‘inferior races’, and it is actually a requirement to uphold the honor of the ethno-nationstate. We should also note that Theodor Herzl, one of the founders of Zionism, valued Ehre enough to suggest that the duel might help the social position of European Jews (Schorske 160). Furthermore, Suad Hanine Shatou-Shehadeh, in her Doctoral Thesis from Columbia University, beautifully articulates in great detail how Honor is one of the fundamental bedrocks of the Zionist movement.

As was previously revealed in the Teutonic Order’s Rule Book of 1264, we discovered that the German white christian elite have long dreamed of a vision of Jews as being honorable through commiting genocide in Palestine; they had viewed the Maccabees as honorable Knights who “exterminated” pagans and “cleansed” the Holy Land (Sterns, 204). Now Zionism has begun to fulfill this vision, and the German ruling class is one of its most voracious supporters.

Because of their close ties, Germany’s honor is bound up in the honor of Israel (recall Israel is Germany’s Staatsräson). This means that Jews who refuse this challenge, who do not defend their Ehre, and oppose Zionism or simply Israeli state policies, are scorned with great hatred and resentment. They have thrown away their honor and insulted the honor of the German state, its Staatsehre one might say, by anointing them with that Ehre and “human dignity” in the first place. They are reduced to the dishonorable class and deserve punishment for insulting more honorable Jews and the German state as a whole

Moreover, given that the notion of “salonfähigkeit”, or being fit for good society, is dependant on one’s ability to support and participate in murderous violence against those who ‘insult’ your honor, we can further understand why only those people who support genocide against ‘dishonorables’ compose the German elite and ruling class. 

And if, as Whitman suggested, honor was democratized to be a privilege and responsibility of all people in Germany (catalyzed through, if you recall, the Nazi expansion of Beleidigung to protect all Aryans), all people in Germany must also follow the German Ehre code, and can therefore only be fit for society when they actively support the extermination of ‘honor insulters’.

Through this three part series, we have therefore discovered that modern Germany not only has laws that are distinctly anti-democratic, but it also has created a legal, ethical, and societal framework to require its population to avidly support genocide and ethnic cleansing of those whos mere existence insults the honor of the state.

© Jason Oberman, all rights reserved, 2025

Works Cited

  • McAleer, Kevin. Dueling: The Cult of Honor in Fin-De-Siecle Germany. Princeton University Press, 1994.
  • Schorske, Carl E. Fin-De-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture. Vintage Books, 1981. 
  • Shatou-Shehadeh, Suad Hanine. The Zionist Quest for Honor: France and Jewish Zionist Ideology and Subjectivity. Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 2021.
  • Sterns, Indrikis. “The Statutes of the Teutonic Knights: A Study of Religious Chivalry“. Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 1969. 

Whitman, James Q. “Enforcing Civility and respect: Three societiesThe Yale Law Journal, vol. 109, 2000, pp. 1279–1398, .