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A Warning for Poland

The far-right victory in the recent presidential elections shows that the left’s fight is a difficult one


09/06/2025

On the evening of June 1st, a sliver of hope appeared among those who wished for a president backed by a party other than Law and Justice (PiS), as the exit polls initially showed a narrow 0.6% win for the Civic Coalition (KO) candidate. The final results, however, revealed a different story: the conservative Karol Nawrocki won the election with 50.89% of the votes, beating his rival Rafał Trzaskowski, the liberal Warsaw mayor backed by the KO, by a difference of 369,591 votes.

The presidential elections, and in particular the second round, shed light on the ongoing political duopole in Polish politics. Over the past two decades, voters have usually faced the choice between the center-right and the far-right. PiS or KO. Many feel not represented, but defeated, discouraged by the “lesser evil” rhetoric. Passing big reforms will remain difficult due to the president’s right to veto governmental legislations. Having an ideologically opposed president in office has already impeded the centre-right government elected in 2023.

On one hand, the new president-elect is a conservative historian who has presided over the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) since 2021. The institute had been criticized for its alignment with a right-wing political narrative. Its one-sidedness amounts to the glorification of nationalist figures and sentiments, simultaneously erasing left-wing antifascist historical movements under the guise of “fighting communism.” His rival, on the other hand, although liberally aligned and with the experience of holding an important position as the capital’s mayor, did not refrain from using exclusionary talking points. Trzaskowski expressed support for the wall built on the Polish-Belarussian border keeping refugees from entering the country, opposed same-sex couples having the right to adopt—Poland is yet to see any legislation regarding same-sex marriage or civil unions, despite the topic being used in previous KO campaigns as early as 2011—and prioritized real estate developers over addressing the social housing issues in Warsaw.

As expected, European right-wing populists expressed their support for the emerging leader. Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian illiberal prime minister, congratulated Nawrocki on his “fantastic victory” and announced he is looking forward to working with him. For Marine Le Pen, the leader of the French far-right National Rally, Nawrocki’s win signifies a “disavowal of the Brussels oligarchy” and is thus good news. Backed by Trump and the MAGA movement, Nawrocki possibly opens the door for the Trump administration to influence Polish politics in times of uncertainty. These nascent cooperations might have a negative impact on Poland’s recently strengthened position within the EU and beyond.

Not only did Karol Nawrocki’s campaign center conservative Catholic values, anti-immigration, and anti-climate policy stances, but his opposition to Ukraine’s entry into the EU bloc could also impact the support for Ukrainian independence. Although the Russian aggression on Ukraine seemed to unite Poles in their support, recent months have shown a surge in xenophobic, anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. This poses a chance for far-right politicians like Nawrocki to harvest these sentiments and channel them into deepening exclusionary narratives, swaying the EU’s pro-Ukrainian position in the long run.

What is worrying is the fact that, in the first round of the presidential elections, ultra-conservative far-right candidates (excluding Nawrocki) received over 20% of the votes combined. One of them, Sławomir Mentzen from the libertarian party Konfederacja, received 15% of the votes. Although he did not officially encourage his sympathizers to vote for Nawrocki in the election’s second round, polls show that 90% of those who voted for him gave their vote to Nawrocki in the run-off. Without a doubt, Nawrocki’s anti-Ukrainian rhetoric echoed Mentzen’s postulates and helped him win over Mentzen’s voter base, which mostly consists of younger men.

In 2017, Nawrocki, then director of the Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk, reportedly vouched for Grzegorz Horodko, a neo-Nazi skinhead, after he was arrested in Denmark for allegedly attacking police after a Poland-Denmark football match. Horodko, associated with the illegal organization Blood & Honour, sports convictions for assault and visible Nazi tattoos. Nawrocki’s spokeswoman did not deny the report, and Nawrocki himself stated during a press conference that “Every citizen of the Polish state who is beaten by the police will be able to count on the help of President Karol Nawrocki.”

Exposures of Nawrocki’s connections with the criminal world were an important element of the campaign. The media discovered, among other things, that the candidate, under the pseudonym Tadeusz Batyr, published a book about Nikodem Skotarczak, known by the pseudonym “Nikoś,” a gangster in the Tri-City on the Baltic Sea (Gdańsk, Gdynia, and Sopot). Wyborcza also reported that at least three people from Karol Nawrocki’s social circle were connected to the activities of the most famous escort agency in the Tri-City. They were accused of such crimes as profiting from someone else’s sex work, drug trafficking and extortion—one of them is the same individual for whom Nawrocki was supposed to vouch after the Poland-Denmark match. In the final stages of the presidential campaign, Wyborcza published an article revealing how Karol Nawrocki helped a sex offender and took over his apartment, which he did not pay for in full and in the end donated to an NGO.

The now reinvigorated far-right movement threatens to further entrench conservative values and potentially isolate Poland from its European allies. As Karol Nawrocki assumes the presidency, Poland stands at a crossroads, potentially facing significant internal shifts towards increased conservatism and a re-evaluation of its external alliances. The support Nawrocki garnered across the European far-right, combined with his contentious past, suggests a future where Poland’s role in the EU will face increasing pressure. His ties to far-right elements, coupled with a history of leveraging state institutions for a nationalist narrative, indicate a challenging road ahead for democratic norms.

For those hoping for a progressive path, Nawrocki’s victory signals a critical need for sustained resistance and vigilance in defending fundamental rights and a pluralistic society. Especially women, as well as LGBTQIA+ people, especially trans people, will face further repressions. This is partly due to PiS’s anti-genderist policymaking, including the de-facto abortion ban in October 2020 backed by a party-aligned Constitutional Tribunal, and partly due to the current government under PM Donald Tusk not showing any effort to protect the vulnerable groups.

This election, propelled by a worrying surge in far-right sentiment and a willingness to appeal to divisive rhetoric, serves as a stark warning: it demands a clear-eyed assessment of the challenges ahead and a determined effort to safeguard progressive values. For the left in Poland and across Europe, this outcome underscores the urgent need to counter rising fascism with a unified vision of robust resistance.

Italy at the Crossroad of Democratic Erosion and Authoritarian Resurgence

Referendum 2025

A Democratic Litmus Test

On 8–9 June 2025, Italians will vote on five referendums poised to reshape core tenets of labor rights, citizenship, and social justice. 

Initiated by CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro), i.e. the largest Italian trade unions federation, four of the five referendums are aimed at getting rid of a neoliberal mantra. That flexibility in the job market is essential to ensure infinite growth and health for everyone. In fact, flexibility on the Italian job market has made the Italian working class poorer than ever. Unlike every other OSCE (Organizzazione per la Sicurezza e la Cooperazione in Europa) country, where wages have risen, Italian real wages are lower than 30 years ago.

The fifth referendum was initiated by CGIL and +Europa (a pro-European Union (EU) liberal party) and concerns applications for Italian citizenship. Today, non-EU citizens living and working in Italy can apply after 10 years, even though many applicants wait approximately 3 years for application processing. Over the course of ten years, losing your job or spending any significant amount of time abroad would mean having to start all over again. Thus, desperately keeping a job – regardless of the working conditions – is the reality of many non-EU citizens, who are even more exploited than their Italian colleagues.

Thus the referendum offers a huge democratic potential—and yet, rather than igniting public debate, the process has been met with a deafening institutional silence.

Public broadcasters, whether paralyzed by political pressure or complicit through omission, have abdicated their duty to inform. AGCOM, the media regulator, has issued formal warnings to RAI (the public Italian broadcaster) and other networks—a failure that reveals not mere oversight but systemic democratic decay. In a nation where civic engagement hinges on awareness, such negligence risks reducing the referendums to hollow formalities, dictated less by popular will than by engineered apathy.

This malaise mirrors a broader European pattern. Political forces – often nationalist or conservative – increasingly deploy calculated strategies to control narratives, suppress dissent, and marginalize deliberation. Italy’s vote thus becomes a continental reckoning: a test of whether party tactics can eclipse democratic principles and whether institutions can resist orchestrated disengagement.

A European Reckoning

As briefly described above, democratic decay does not occur in isolation. It is part of a wider European drift, in which nationalist and conservative forces deploy increasingly sophisticated strategies to monopolize narrative control, suppress dissent, and delegitimize public deliberation. European trumpists like Spanish VOX, British Reform UK, Slovakian Hnutie Slovensko, Italian FdI, Polish PiS, etc. all use the same strategy, which we experience daily. The Italian June referendums thus transcend national politics; they are a European stress test, exposing the fragility of representative government institutions when faced with orchestrated disengagement.

The proposed repeals—targeting safeguards against arbitrary dismissal, institutionalizing labor precarity, and delaying pathways to citizenship—have mobilized some progressive alliances, including Alleanza Verdi Sinistra (Left-Green Alliance) (AVS), Partito Democratico (PD) (centre/centre-left party), : Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) (leftist party), and +Europa. Yet public awareness remains dangerously low. The AGCOM affair epitomizes a tactic familiar to observers of Hungary and Poland: the quiet co-optation of public media to disarm democratic opposition and manufacture apathy.

This is not just negligence—it is a calculated strategy. Italy’s institutional machinery is being repurposed to undermine the very processes it should uphold. The question is no longer whether democracy is under threat. The real question is whether democratic mechanisms are being deliberately hollowed out from within.

Institutional Sabotage as Strategy

Nowhere is this clearer than in the explicit sabotage by senior officeholders. Senate President Ignazio La Russa’s of Meloni’s party Fratelli d’Italia public appeal to abstain from voting marks an unprecedented breach of democratic decorum. The Republic’s second-highest institutional figure (La Russa) would call for civic disengagement  while openly venerating fascist iconography. President La Russa has openly admitted that he has a bust of Mussolini at home. This all reveals not a gaffe, but a political posture: contempt for democratic participation cloaked in institutional legitimacy.

La Russa is not alone. Agriculture Minister Francesco Lollobrigida (also from Meloni’s party) has dismissed the referendums as “instrumental provocations”. This is a rhetorical maneuver that reframes civic engagement as subversive noise. Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini (of the Lega party), meanwhile, has actively delegitimized the referendum —further reinforcing a strategy of attrition through mockery, distraction, and procedural stonewalling.

What emerges is not a collection of isolated statements, but a coordinated project of a democratic rollback: participation is not merely discouraged—it is systematically devalued.

Germany’s Illiberal Turn: A Cautionary Tale

Germany—long seen as Europe’s constitutional anchor—is experiencing a quieter, but no less consequential, shift under Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Under his leadership, the country has enacted a spate of exclusionary policies: border rejections have surged 45% in a year; reforms to the “Bürgergeld” welfare system have tightened eligibility; and proposals to erode daily and weekly working hours limit protections threaten long-standing cultural norms around labor dignity.

Presented as pragmatic governance, these reforms function as instruments of ideological consolidation. Germany’s largest trade union, the DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund), has denounced them as a “coordinated dismantling” of the postwar social contract. Some “Bundestag” opposition parties such as DieLinke and Bündnis90/Die Grüne warn of technocratic over-reach and legislative opacity, particularly on labor and migration.

What is unfolding is not merely administrative reform, but a redefinition of democratic space. This is proceduralism wielded as a tool of exclusion, and legal formalism repurposed to silence opposition. As Merz centralizes executive authority behind a veil of bureaucratic efficiency, Germany begins to resemble not a beacon of stability, but a cautionary tale of how democracy erodes without any spectacle, in silence.

Conclusion: Democracy as Action

These converging dynamics lay bare a corrosive trend: citizenship reduced to a legal formality, severed from any participatory core. As Angela Merkel once warned, when belonging is defined by exclusion, democracy becomes a hollow performance.

This is the context, in which to consider that a referendum in Italy is only valid if voter turnout exceeds 50%. Hence defending participatory democracy in these Italian referendums is not only a national imperative, it is also an imperative facing many other European states.  Abstention is not neutrality, it is complicity. Participation, by contrast, is resistance. And it demands more than a vote: it calls for a revitalized civic discourse, media pluralism, and the elevation of marginalized voices.

What lies ahead is not simply a procedural choice, but a civilizational one. Between resignation and resistance, only one path renews the democratic promise. Europe must decide.

Where Abandonment is the Order of the Day, the Far Right Vote is a Call for Help

What can the Portuguese left do instead of disappearing?


07/06/2025

“If the people want to go to hell, that is where we will go.” This quote flooded Portuguese social media in the aftermath of the 18 May electoral night. It originates in a 1974 interview by Salgueiro Maia, one of the army rebels of the Carnation Revolution, where he defended that the military’s role was only to create the conditions for the people to choose who they want to represent them freely, independently of their choices. 

Back to 2025, the underlying tone of defeat can be traced back to two major election outcomes: the first one is that the left obtained its worst legislative results ever (a total of 32,61% amongst the four parties), with a particularly disastrous result from the Socialist Party (PS), which led to its leader, Pedro Nuno Santos’ immediate resignation. Beyond PS, the left suffered a resounding defeat: the Left Bloc (BE) dropped from five MPs to just one, whereas the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) lost one, holding on to three elected representatives. There is one exception: Livre—a newcomer party founded in 2014 that first elected an MP in 2019—was able to capitalise on some centre-left voters by positioning itself closer to PS. Now spearheading the left in the parliament with six elected deputies, Livre has defended the increase in spending for armament during the campaign and is associated with pro-EU positions (where they sit in the Greens/EFA group), whilst the PCP and the BE are more euro-sceptic and against european integration based on neoliberal policies. 

Portugal’s head of government Antonio Costa (left) and the Socialist candidate for his succession, Pedro Nuno Santos, at an election campaign round. Photo by Pedro Nunes/Reuters.

The second election outcome is that the far-right party Chega (Enough) secured its best result to date, being virtually tied with the socialists (at 58 seats each), brawling for a second place until the diaspora vote was counted. Ten days later, Chega’s win over the PS was indeed confirmed, increasing to 60 MPs. In 51 years of democracy, it’s the first time any party has come this close to the traditional PS-PSD (Socialist Party – Social Democratic Party) axis—and it just so happens to be a far-right one. Mostly, people are shaken by Chega’s seemingly unstoppable growth: from a single MP in 2019, when it first entered the political scene, to bulldozing its way into third place with 12 deputies in 2022, and then quadrupling its parliamentary seats to 50 last year, leaving quite some room to wonder how close to power would they reach in a future election. 

Although the incumbent Democratic Alliance (a centre-right coalition composed of the Social Democratic Party/PSD and the People’s Party/CDS-PP) was the night’s winner, at 32,10%, they fall short of a majority—even if they partner up with their preferred ally, the market-fundamentalist Liberal Initiative (IL), which only achieved 5,53% of the vote. 

Election campaign billboard showing incumbent prime minister and leader of the centre-right Social Democratic Party, Luis Montenegro in Lisbon. Photo by Armando Franca/AP Photo.

Despite the prime minister’s denial of a potential coalition with Chega, the right-wing parties now hold two-thirds of the national assembly, surpassing the threshold to make a revision to the Constitution—a pledge immediately made by IL, even before the new parliament takes office. One of the aims of IL’s proposal is to replace the expression “paving the way for a socialist society” from the Constitution’s preamble with a “liberal democracy”. But a horizon of socialism is not the only thing under threat in the right-wing’s hands: beyond the ideological change, there are material motivations behind IL’s project, which clearly states that they want to reduce the central role of the State in the economy. The hell where we will go is one where social security, free education and universal access to a national, public health service—all promises that the April revolution started to erect—might no longer be guaranteed.

From Europe’s Success Story to Another Wake-up Call

Ten years ago, portugal was spreading hope across Europe with its left-wing ruling arrangement (the so-called geringonça), headed by the PS, and successfully reverting austerity measures imposed by the EU and the IMF. Some factors might explain how the country transformed into yet another example of Europe’s antidemocratic surge.

#1: The Erosion of Democracy 

This national election was the third one the portuguese have seen in four years. This time, elections followed a vote of confidence lost by the prime minister, Luis Montenegro, after allegations of being involved in a conflict of interest case surrounding his family’s business. The previous election, in 2024, was also triggered by a corruption scandal involving the prime minister at the time, from PS. Two years before, portugal also had snap elections—forced by a Socialist Party looking for an absolute majority

All in all, people are tired of heading to the polls year after year, whilst improvements in their living conditions, despite promises by the PSD and PS, are nowhere to be seen. The results suggest that public trust in the establishment is eroding, and people are looking for alternatives. On the right, that shift materialises in Chega and its (false) anti-system appeal, which campaigned under the slogan of “give me an opportunity to govern”, riding the wave of the worn-out image of the traditional parties. On the left, though much less significantly, that search for alternatives can perhaps be seen in the fact that only the newcomer Livre managed to grow its support. Both BE and PCP have seen a decrease in voting in recent years for two opposing reasons. On one hand, their more radical base was critical of the cooperation with PS during the geringonça government. On the other hand, their centre-left electorate blamed them for causing a political crisis by dropping support for that same government. 

#2: Two Lies and a Truth

Chega’s success has to be read within the context of the European trend of far-right parties holding the second or third place in their political contexts. The party’s president, André Ventura, follows the same playbook as other authoritarian leaders such as Donald Trump or Jair Bolsonaro: not only did he also fall ill in the last days of the electoral campaign, he also frequently resorts to a Machiavellian approach of spreading misinformation, often related to migrants, to advance his xenophobic narrative and political goals. In fact, most of his campaign revolved around migration. Part of the issue is that journalists and media outlets, instead of debunking Ventura’s lies, give him extra airtime in the name of bigger audiences, serving as his “armed wing”, as investigative journalist Miguel Carvalho denounces. Between the last two elections, Ventura was interviewed 108% more than the current prime minister on the main private channels. Furthermore, a CNN investigation shows that 58% of Chega’s followers on X are fake. The comments made by these fake accounts were both on Chega’s accounts, to artificially amplify nationalist views, but also on the accounts of the Socialist and Social Democratic parties to discredit them. 

It’s not exactly fair game—but the democratic right-wing, instead of holding their ground, is pandering to the far right and echoing their talking points. One example is the prime minister’s (PSD) announcement of plans to expel a large number of migrants in irregular situations from the country, and an overall toughening of immigration policy, paving the way for a further radicalisation of the right.

Chega’s growth also triggers a domino effect, with verbal, physical and symbolic violence on the rise. One example happened on election day itself, when the president of a Lisbon parish council was attacked by a man shouting “Vote Chega”. After the 2024 election, several MPs reported that the party’s presence in the assembly has fundamentally changed the dynamics of what was once a formal, immaculate institution—through racist and misogynistic attacks toward fellow deputies. The European Network Against Racism (ENAR) has also denounced an increase in cases of racism, tracing them back to Chega’s arrival in parliament. These are not isolated incidents, but rather reflect a broader sense of validation due to the party’s bully attitude—if they can freely spread hate in the house of democracy, its voters will feel justified in acting on it in the streets. What were once fringe and socially unacceptable behaviours are now increasingly seen as legitimate.

#3: The Myth of the Anti-Fascist Country

When the far-right started to gain ground all across Europe in the last decade, there was some sort of idealism present—either due to the strong values of the Carnation Revolution that overthrew the dictatorial regime, or because of the successes of the 2015 left-wing agreement which was being called Europe’s beacon of social democracy—creating the myth that portugal was an exception, that reactionary ideas wouldn’t come knocking back on its door. 

Contrary to that idea, portugal is indeed a conservative, racist and sexist country: already in 2007, the former dictator Salazar was voted “the greatest Portuguese who ever lived”, in a public broadcast, with 41% support. Despite the country’s reluctance to open up conversations about its colonial past—namely by refusing to collect ethnic/racial data, against the UN’s advice—systemic racism is a reality that has been denounced by different groups and international organisations. The European Social Survey from 2018 shows that 62% of portuguese people manifest (biological and cultural) racism, with racism and discrimination affecting racialised people, the Roma (the only recognised minority in the country) and immigrants, with consequences in access to employment, education, health and housing. In fact, Ventura rose to fame on national television due to his anti-Roma stances, and resorted to them again this time around. 

That portugal is an anti-fascist country, is nothing but a myth. It took only one “strongman” figure with airtime to tap into people’s prejudices and dismantle long-held leftist bastions (and attract votes from previous abstentionists). The geographical distribution of votes reflects this shift: in the North, traditionally dominated by the PSD, the party mostly maintained its lead, with Chega placing third. In the South, however, Chega made significant headway into historically strongholds of the left, such as the districts of Setúbal, Beja, or Portalegre—a phenomenon, once again, mirroring other countries. These populations have been affected by tourism spikes, sided with the maintenance of their precarious labour conditions. Their vote shift shows the PS and PSD’s failure in tackling people’s problems throughout the years. 

Three Tasks for the Left–Beyond the Optimism of the Will

Chega manipulates public opinion by exploring people’s fears, tapping into hostility towards migrants and scapegoating them as the source of a lack of access to housing, precarious living conditions, or crime. In a country with a rampant housing crisis and one of the worst salary levels in the EU, this kind of narrative finds fertile ground—turns out it’s easier to think about others when you have food on your plate. 

In this new political panorama, the immediate task is to show up, and to protect. Those who are already in vulnerable situations will be the first ones under threat—not only will they continue to be the primary targets of violent and false rhetoric, but their material conditions will deteriorate further under a right-wing majority. The constitutional revision proposal suggests that we are no longer talking about the next right to be conquered, but to defend those that were once secured (such as abortion). 

Local, mutual aid action will be needed in a context where the state will fail us—not by default, but by design. With very diminished parliamentary representation, the majority of the work needs to shift to the streets—an objective that should never have been abandoned in detriment of parliamentary politics. That’s the second imperative: to reflect. Openly, critically and broadly. While the Socialist Party has become comfortable simply managing inequalities, instead of addressing their root causes, the parties to its left have systematically failed to build alliances and sustain a grassroots presence, especially outside urban areas, which might explain why former leftist strongholds in the South have turned to Chega—these communities have been left to their own devices. While the far-right vote is indeed a protest vote of the conservative factions, for the communities where abandonment is the order of business, it is a cry for help. 

That’s why task number three is to rebuild. Not because our programs and principles are wrong, but because we were unable to use them as convincing tools for a viable alternative. Being correct in theory is enough only if we’re speaking to ourselves. And while local support networks are necessary and appealing, they are far from being the only resource—a broader movement is the only way forward. Even if some Chega voters fully endorse its xenophobic agenda—as it offers some sort of collective feeling—many are misled, misinformed and just afraid of the end of the month. They are not to be ridiculed or alienated, but heard. The only viable option for a just society remains one where free education, public healthcare, housing for all and a dignified cost of living are a reality. But if that project is left unattended, not reachable, we will continue to lose to individualistic ideas—and decide on hell. 

The silver lining is that there are around three million people who did not vote—those three million people still need to be reached, and convinced that a good life is attainable. Holding on to the optimism of the will, despite the setbacks, will be essential to face the months to come—but hope cannot just be a feeling, it needs a plan. In the meantime, while we build the realities we seek to manifest, no one lets go of anyone’s hand. 

Red Flag: “From the River to the Sea” Isn’t Banned After All (Maybe?)

In his weekly column, Nathaniel Flakin examines recent court decisions that question the legal foundation of the police violence in Berlin


05/06/2025

Resistance Demo

For the last 19 months, Berlin has seen a wave of unprecedented police violence against pro-Palestinian protests, as documented by human rights organizations. The legal basis for this is complicated. Germany’s Basic Law does not allow cops to beat up people for expressing disagreement with government policy. Instead, they often accuse Palestinians and their allies of violating Paragraph 86 of the German Criminal Code: “spreading propaganda material of anti-constitutional and terrorist organizations.”

This is the law used to prohibit swastikas and other Nazi symbols. Since November 2, 2023, Germany’s Interior Minister has claimed that this applies to a popular English-language slogan: “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free.” Supposedly, this is an unmistakable symbol of Hamas.

As I’ve written before, this is ridiculous. The slogan is not banned in any other country, including Israel. How can a slogan dating back to the 1970s, used by myriad factions in different countries, be a clear marker of an organization founded in 1987?

In the last few months, Berlin courts have started to agree. Cargo Vargas, a student at the Free University and a member of the student council’s BIPoC department, was arrested at International Women’s Day in 2024 and charged with supporting a terrorist organization. In November of that year, the Tiergarten District Court in Berlin acquitted her, ruling that the slogan she shouted “is not exclusively a Hamas slogan,” and went further, declaring that even if it had been used specifically as a Hamas slogan, “this would be covered by the basic right to freedom of speech” in the concrete case.

The prosecutor’s office appealed, and in April, the Berlin Regional Court confirmed that, “in light of the fact that the phrase is an ongoing part of an international and heterogeneous protest movement against the actions of the Israeli armed forces and government in Gaza,” it is “doubtful” that it is a “hallmark of Hamas.” They added: “not every use of this phrase by a banned political organization can lead to the phrase being a characteristic object of identification” for said organization. This phrase is used by “various political actors to criticize Israel’s actions in Gaza.” (I am not a lawyer, and I’m translating these rulings freely.)

Put simply: Even though Nazis sing the German national anthem, the German national anthem is not banned as a Nazi symbol.

In practice, the entire legal framework of the anti-Palestinian repression is even more ridiculous than the courts are making it sound. The first activist convicted for using this slogan in August of last year was from a family of exiled Iranian communists. In court, she called for a democratic Palestine with equal rights for all. Is this seriously supposed to be a Hamas member? Does Hamas even use slogans in English as in-group signifiers? 

Two weeks ago, the Tiergarten District Court again ruled in favor of someone arrested for shouting the slogan “From the river to the sea…” at a protest at the Free University a year previously. This was reported extensively in the Irish Times. Once again, the prosecutor’s office is appealing. Lawyer Benjamin Düsberg says that although the written ruling has not yet been published, he expects this case will be a “game changer,” as the court spent three full days listening to evidence from experts and could produce a lengthy and precise ruling that “will convince other courts.”

At the moment, German courts have not ruled consistently—some are convicting, and others are acquitting. Ultimately, the Federal Court will have to decide.

So far, the court decisions have had no noticeable impact on Berlin police, who continue meting out unhinged violence against peaceful protestors. Even if they are eventually instructed that they can no longer use Paragraph 86, they will just try other laws, like Paragraph 140 or Paragraph 130. Politicians, especially Berlin mayor Kai Wegner, have been cheering for every beating.

At the moment, Israel is committing genocide in order to establish complete control of all territories between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. In Germany, there are no legal restrictions on Zionists advocating ethnic cleansing. Yet demanding democracy, human rights, and equality “from the river to the sea” (in the form of a single socialist Palestine, for example) can justify state violence. 

We are in the middle of the Great German Reputation Laundering of 2025, when politicians and journalists who stridently defended the genocide are claiming they suddenly noticed the suffering of the Palestinian people. Even as the discourse shifts, however, these same politicians intend to continue shipping weapons to Israel—and they will keep beating up anything that disagrees.

These court decisions are a reflection of the fact that in polls, up to 80 percent of people in Germany don’t agree with the government’s unconditional support for Israel. We need to transform this passive support into action on the streets—that’s the only way to stop the repression.

Red Flag is a weekly column on Berlin politics that Nathaniel Flakin has been writing since 2020. After moving through different homes, it now appears at The Left Berlin.

Letter to RSF International by 30+ Media Workers

Open letter signed by over 30 journalists to Reporters sans frontière regarding the RSF Germany report on press freedom


04/06/2025

A journalist is grabbed by a police officer

— Deutsch unten —

To RSF International,

It is with great dismay and disappointment that we have read the 2025 report from RSF in Germany (Reporter Ohne Grenzen) about the attacks on press freedoms. The report does not question German institutions for their wrongdoings – imposing censorship and media bias – while it proposes one main, distorted from the reality, conclusion: that pro-Palestine protesters are posing a threat to the freedom of the press in Germany.

We find that the methodology/approach used to conduct the report and the consequent outcomes that were derived from it do not align with RSF’s stated mission to “Act for the freedom, pluralism and independence of journalism and defend those who embody these ideals.” 

On one side, RSF in Germany centres its report against pro-Palestinian protesters without investigating the political context – that is to say, taking into account the consequences on the media reporting of Germany’s Staatsräson – intentionally avoiding to name the responsibility of the state in violations against press freedom.

On the other side, the report has neglected the reporting of violations of independent journalists covering the anti-genocide and pro-Palestine demonstrations while prioritising those coming from journalists abiding by the Staatsräson policies, who consider apriori antisemitic all protests against genocide, and therefore smear the protesters.

What is worse, it havely uses the reporting from journalists who are known to have violated journalistic ethics and that work for media organizations that display biased editorial policies motivated by their economic investments in the illegal settlements of the occupied West Bank, a condition that is in direct conflict with media independence and qualifies as media capture.

Despite many of us sending RSF Germany information and critique, now, with great frustration, we do not see our experiences reflected authentically in the final report. RSF shifted the responsibility to under-resourced journalists systematically discriminated against by the German state and institutions to fulfil RSF’s mission.  This shows that RSF while failing to offer consistent protection to the weakest among the journalists who are independent, risks to fail its mandate.

The main thrust of RSF Germany’s argument to dismiss the incidents is that those people are media activists and not journalists. Yet even in the case of Ignacio Rosaslanda, at that time an employee for the Berliner Zeitung, when they mention his assault by the police, it’s quickly followed uncritically by the police statement and justifications.

Indeed, RSF Germany’s criteria for who they pick as a journalist is not clear and in any case their definition of a journalist does not match Germany’s definition, but at a time when the traditional press has become either aligned with the government’s policies or journalists are too threatened to lose their job when they speak out (which is ironically the same Reporter Ohne Grenzen conclusion), how does excluding independent reporters who are constantly assaulted and threatened make sense in fulfilling RSF’s mission?

RSF Germany’s response to continued protests from many colleagues resulted in sending out a public call asking who they consider media activists to send in evidence of police aggression against press freedoms in November 2024. RSF Germany’s response to the grievances set forth here has been that they will not collect the data that is out there in abundance but it is up to every journalist to send it in to RSF Germany. That approach was not disclosed in their report.

Absent from the report is the state bias against non-Staatsräson reporters on the ground. For example, the police always stall to file reports of assault or press hinderance when they come from non Staatsräson journalists, but often approach those more aligned with their Staatsräson to file complaints.

RSF has also completely ignored that the German governments regularly select which journalists can have access to sites. As an example, in a private event called the Palestina Kongress, German police insisted on attending the event with journalists loyal to the state, creating tensions between the events’ organisers. This was a direct interference from the government which journalists should have ethically avoided, as according to the Munich Charter, “the journalist recognises, in professional matters, the jurisdiction of his colleagues only; he excludes every kind of interference by governments or others.”.

This kind of state -sponsored suppression of press freedoms are common among many independent journalists covering and documenting the protests as well as police violations. Recent cases have been widely circulating on social networks recently as well as over the past year and a half. However, RSF Germany ended up sidelining those incidents coming from independent journalists. 

The RSF mission page also states: “Our mandate is in the spirit of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and of the major declarations and charters relating to journalistic ethics, notably the Munich Declaration of the Duties and Rights of Journalists.”

However it should also be noted that the bulk of the complaints on which RSF Germany bases its report come from two journalists in Berlin. One is photojournalist Yalcin Askin reporting for Jüdisches Forum für Demokratie und gegen Antisemitismus; an association that demands that Israel criticism be equated to antisemitism. The other is Iman Sefati working for Axel-Springer, who has demonstrably violated the Munich Charter – for example “Not to use unfair methods to obtain news, photographs or documents.” – as he published a video without credits and deliberately removed the audio while misinforming his audience in a now infamous deleted tweet. 

15 months after constant violence against protesters and numerous assaults against individuals documenting events, with plenty of NGOs falling short of their responsibility to speak out against such violations in the country, trust had been lost and for good reason.

The letter can be signed here.


An RSF International,

mit großer Bestürzung und Enttäuschung haben wir den RSF Deutschland Bericht 2025 über Angriffe auf die Pressefreiheit gelesen. Der Bericht hinterfragt nicht deutsche Institutionen hinsichtlich ihrer strukturellen Verfehlungen – wie etwa (Selbst)Zensur und Voreingenommenheit – und zieht stattdessen eine zentrale, jedoch verzerrte Schlussfolgerung: dass nämlich vor allem pro-palästinensische Demonstrierende eine Bedrohung für die Pressefreiheit in Deutschland darstellen würden.

Wir sind der Ansicht, dass die verwendete Methodik bzw. Herangehensweise bei der Erstellung des Berichts und die daraus gezogenen Schlüsse nicht mit der erklärten Mission von RSF übereinstimmen, nämlich „für die Freiheit, Pluralität und Unabhängigkeit des Journalismus einzutreten und jene zu verteidigen, die diese Ideale verkörpern.“

Einerseits stellt RSF Deutschland pro-palästinensische Protestierende in den Mittelpunkt der Kritik, ohne den politischen Kontext zu untersuchen – das heißt, ohne die Auswirkungen der deutschen “Staatsräson” auf die mediale Berichterstattung zu berücksichtigen. Er vermeidet es gezielt, die Verantwortung staatlicher Institutionen für Verstöße gegen die Pressefreiheit zu benennen.

Andererseits ignoriert der Bericht die Dokumentation von Übergriffen gegen freie Journalist*innen, die über anti-genozidale und pro-palästinensische Demonstrationen berichten, und räumt stattdessen jenen Vorrang ein, die im Einklang mit der Staatsräson und im Sinne der Polizei berichten – Journalist*innen also, die Proteste gegen den Genozid von vornherein als antisemitisch einstufen und somit die Demonstrierenden pauschal diffamieren.

Noch gravierender ist, dass der Bericht sich stark auf Berichterstattung von Journalist*innen stützt, die bekannt dafür sind, gegen journalistische Ethik verstoßen zu haben und für Medienhäuser arbeiten, deren redaktionelle Linie durch wirtschaftliche Investitionen in die illegalen Siedlungen im besetzten Westjordanland motiviert ist – ein Umstand, der in direktem Widerspruch zur Unabhängigkeit der Medien steht.

Trotz zahlreicher Hinweise und kritischer Rückmeldungen, die viele von uns an RSF Deutschland geschickt haben, sehen wir unsere Erfahrungen im finalen Bericht nicht authentisch wiedergegeben. Das frustriert uns zutiefst. RSF hat die Verantwortung auf unterversorgte, systematisch vom deutschen Staat und seinen Institutionen diskriminierte Journalist*innen abgewälzt, um seiner eigenen Mission gerecht zu werden. Damit läuft RSF Gefahr, seinen eigenen Auftrag zu verfehlen, indem es gerade jene am wenigsten schützt, die am dringendsten Schutz benötigen – unabhängige, freie Journalistinnen.

Das Hauptargument von RSF Deutschland, um Vorfälle zurückzuweisen, ist, dass es sich bei den Betroffenen angeblich um Medienaktivist*innen und nicht um Journalist*innen handle. Doch selbst im Fall von Ignacio Rosaslanda, der zum damaligen Zeitpunkt für die Berliner Zeitung arbeitete, wird seine Misshandlung durch die Polizei zwar erwähnt, jedoch unmittelbar danach unkritisch mit der Stellungnahme und Rechtfertigung der Polizei relativiert.

Tatsächlich ist nicht ersichtlich, nach welchen Kriterien RSF Deutschland entscheidet, wer als Journalist*in gilt. Ihre Definition entspricht jedenfalls nicht der in Deutschland geltenden. In einer Zeit, in der viele Redaktionen entweder auf Regierungslinie gebracht wurden oder Journalist*innen aus Angst um ihren Arbeitsplatz schweigen – was RSF ironischerweise auch selbst in seinem Bericht feststellt –, wie kann es da Sinn ergeben, ausgerechnet jene freie Reporter*innen auszuschließen, die konstant bedroht und angegriffen werden?

Die Reaktion von RSF Deutschland auf den wiederholten Protest von Kolleg*innen bestand darin, im November 2024 öffentlich dazu aufzurufen, dass sich jene, die von RSF als Medienaktivist*innen eingestuft werden, mit Belegen zu Polizeigewalt gegen die Pressefreiheit bei RSF melden sollten. RSF Deutschland erklärte damals auf entsprechende Beschwerden hin, dass sie keine Daten sammeln würden, obwohl diese in Hülle und Fülle vorhanden sind – vielmehr sei es die Aufgabe jedes/jeder Einzelnen, diese selbst einzureichen. Diese Herangehensweise wurde im Bericht zudem nicht transparent gemacht.

Im Bericht fehlt jeglicher Hinweis auf die strukturelle Voreingenommenheit staatlicher Institutionen gegenüber nicht-staatsräsonkonformen Reporter*innen. So zögern Polizei und Justiz regelmäßig, Anzeigen wegen Übergriffen oder Behinderung der Pressearbeit aufzunehmen, wenn sie von solchen Journalist*innen stammen, während sie gleichzeitig staatsräsonkonforme Medienvertreter*innen aktiv zur Anzeige ermutigen.

RSF ignoriert zudem völlig, dass staatliche Stellen systematisch auswählen, welche Journalist*innen Zugang zu bestimmten Orten erhalten. Ein Beispiel: Bei einer privaten Veranstaltung, dem Palästina-Kongress, bestand die Polizei darauf, gemeinsam mit staatstreuen Journalist*innen anwesend zu sein – was zu Spannungen mit den Veranstalter*innen führte. Diese staatliche Einflussnahme widerspricht dem journalistischen Ethos. Denn laut Münchener Erklärung gilt: „Der Journalist erkennt in beruflichen Fragen ausschließlich die Zuständigkeit seiner Berufskollegen an; er weist jede Einmischung von Regierungen oder anderen zurück.“

Diese Form staatlich unterstützter Unterdrückung der Pressefreiheit ist für viele freie Journalist*innen, die Proteste sowie Polizeiverstöße dokumentieren, Alltag. Zahlreiche aktuelle Vorfälle zirkulieren seit über einem Jahr in sozialen Netzwerken. Dennoch hat RSF Deutschland diese Fälle, die aus unabhängiger Berichterstattung stammen, letztlich marginalisiert.

Auf seiner Website erklärt RSF zudem: „Unser Mandat steht im Geiste von Artikel 19 der Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte sowie der wichtigsten Erklärungen und Charta zur journalistischen Ethik, insbesondere der Münchener Erklärung der Pflichten und Rechte der Journalist*innen.“

Dabei sei darauf hingewiesen, dass sich ein Großteil der Beschwerden, auf die sich der Bericht von RSF Deutschland stützt, auf lediglich zwei Journalist*innen aus Berlin stützt. Einer davon ist der Fotoreporter Yalcin Askin, der für das Jüdische Forum für Demokratie und gegen Antisemitismus berichtet – ein Verein, der fordert, dass Israelkritik mit Antisemitismus gleichgesetzt wird. Der andere ist Iman Sefati, der für Axel-Springer arbeitet und nachweislich des öfteren gegen die Münchener Charta und journalistische Ethik verstoßen hat („Keine unlauteren Methoden zur Beschaffung von Nachrichten, Fotos oder Dokumenten verwenden.“). Er veröffentlichte ein Video ohne Urhebervermerk, entfernte gezielt den Ton und verbreitete in einem inzwischen gelöschten Tweet Desinformationen.

15 Monate nach anhaltender Gewalt gegen Demonstrierende und zahlreichen Übergriffen auf Menschen, die diese Ereignisse dokumentieren, während viele NGOs ihrer Verantwortung, solche Verstöße öffentlich zu verurteilen, nicht nachkommen, ist das Vertrauen – aus gutem Grund – verloren gegangen.

Der Brief kann hier unterschrieben werden.

Signatories:

Julian Daum, Journalist, Reporter, nd-aktuell u.a.

Shirin Abedi, Photojournalist

Ignacio Rosaslanda, Videojournalist

Wael Eskandar, Independent Journalist

Xénia Gomes Adães, Photojournalist

Nadine Essmat, Photojournalist and Lawyer

James Jackson, Journalist and Podcaster – Mad in Germany

Magdalena Vassileva, Photographer and Media Activist

Abir Kopty, Freelance Journalist

Cosimo Caridi, Journalist

Ralf Pleger, Filmmaker

Enrico De Angelis, Independent Researcher and Journalist

Anonymous, Photojournalist

Esra Gultekin, Photojournalist, Reporter

Jakob Reimann, Freelance Journalist

Alexandre Goudineau, Media Network Co-Director

Alessia Cocca, Photoreporter

Zaira Biagini, Photojournalist

Anonymous, Freelance Journalist

Anonymous, Freelance Journalist

Wu Qin, Freelance Journalist

Nathaniel Flakin, Freelance Journalist

You2mars, Photo Video Reporter

Roser Gari, Independent Journalist

Anonymous, Photojournalist

Žiga Brdnik, Freelance Film Critic and Editor at Prelom, Ljubljana Independent News

Cilia Klinger, Photojournalist

Anonymous, Freelance Journalist

Trifulka, Photographer

Anonymous, Freelance Photojournalist and Podcast Producer

Tariq Suleiman, Independent Editor and Researcher

Vedika Singhania, Freelance journalist

Extra Testimonies:

I have been assaulted several times by police, RSF has ignored my status as a journalist based on content on social media despite having a verified record of the assault.

Ich wurde während meiner Berichterstattung auf Demonstrationen mit palästinasolidarischem Bezug – deutlich als Pressevertreter erkennbar – in fast jedem Fall von Polizeibeamt*innen gestoßen, weggedrängt und an meiner journalistischen Arbeit behindert. In einem Fall im Sommer 2024, rannte ein Beamter, als ich eine Festnahme dokumentieren wollte (auch hier wieder deutlich durch offen um den Hals getragenen Presseausweis erkennbar), auf mich zu und schlug mir mit der Faust in den Magen. Nach langjähriger Erfahrung als Reporter auf Demonstrationen (darunter auch zahlreiche mit rechtsextremistischem Bezug) ist es mir wichtig festzustellen, dass meinen Beobachtungen nach das Ausmaß an unprovozierter Polizeigewalt und Eskalationsstrategien seitens der Polizei auf Veranstaltungen mit Palästinabezug, seit Beginn meiner Karriere als Reporter in Berlin beispiellos ist. Nie habe ich als unabhängiger Berichterstatter ein ähnliches Ausmaß an Polizeigewalt Grundrechtsverletzungen und Willkür erlebt.

I was repeatedly attacked while documenting the protests on the ground, despite clearly wearing my press card around my neck. In most instances, the aggression came from the police — including being pushed, denied access to areas where other journalists were allowed, and subjected to verbal provocations such as “you smell from your mouth.” I was also confronted by individuals from counter-demonstrations. Two of these incidents are documented on my Instagram account.

Berlin police pushed me over and broke two bones of my hand while I was filming a peaceful candellight vigil for the murdered Palestinians in Gaza in Berlin in September 2024. I’m also a victim of public smear campaigns against me as a filmmaker because of my open stance on Palestine.

As a former fellow of Reporters Without Borders in Berlin I see their methodology gravely lacking and the publishing of such defficient report as very unethical and harming to independent journalism