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Month: June 2025

Die Linke and the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism

On the fight against antisemitism, definitional power, and the political instrumentalization of academic debate


02/06/2025

On May 9 and 10, Die Linke held its federal party convention in Chemnitz, where one resolution garnered special interest: a motion to adopt a definition for the term “antisemitism.” Titled ”Fight Antisemitism, Repression and Censorship―Adopt the Jerusalem Declaration, create a tenable foundation,” the resolution aligned the party with the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA) and distanced it from the Working Definition of Antisemitism by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), prevalent in German discourse. So what about it? What is the rationale of the resolution, what criticism has been brought forward, and how can the discussion be situated within the German scientific discourse and political reality?

Accusations of antisemitism have been gaining ground in Germany. The government is firm in its commitment to the illustrious raison d’état (Staatsräson) and continues to provide arms to Israel, deeming accusations of genocide unwarranted while employing the IHRA definition to decry demands for sanctions and boycotts as antisemitic.  If they have not already censored themselves, those who take to the streets in light of the horrors in Gaza, academics who express solidarity with protesting students, or public figures in media and culture are all also accused of antisemitism. The crux of these accusations is the assumption that what is being voiced is criticism not of Israel, but of Jews as a people. The accusers claim that hatred of Israel is hatred of Jews, and that ultimately it is all plain antisemitism. The terms seem freely interchangeable with no delineation between them.

This is due to the prevalent definition of antisemitism in Germany, supported by government officials and agencies, and endorsed by stakeholders such as the Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland (Central Council of Jews in Germany). The IHRA definition does not concern itself with a clear distinction between criticism of Israel and antisemitism; where it offers distinctions, they are generally restrictive. Die Linke’s new resolution seeks to remedy these shortcomings. It is intended to provide a basis for the identification of antisemitism while maintaining the possibility of legitimate criticisms of the state of Israel, responding to the climate of repression and (self-)censorship without giving up on a resolute fight against antisemitism. For this purpose, Die Linke chose the Jerusalem Declaration, one of the most widely used academic definitions, against the more institutional IHRA definition.

Definitional projects

The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism was developed in direct dialogue and response to the IHRA Working Definition and its institutional importance. The latter was designed with the aim of broadening the perspective beyond the scope of the classical antisemitism of the 1800s and the cultural racism of the post-World War II era. It focuses explicitly on including new or Israel-related antisemitism, accounting for political actors beyond the right, especially with regard to the Israel/Palestine conflict. The political conditions which brought about the IHRA definition were heavily influenced by this context, and the definition zeroed in on the positions surrounding the conflict.

In Germany, the adoption of the IHRA definition converged with a discourse that prioritized “structural” antisemitism, or the “left” antisemitism found in globalization criticism. One of the excesses of this definitional shift is the idea of “imported antisemitism,” which both hides the historical crimes of the German right and provides fuel for their neo-fascist rhetoric machine. The IHRA’s insufficiently distinct wording has produced a conflation of criticisms of the state of Israel, criticisms of Zionism as a project, and antisemitism: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”

Foremost, one addition which the German government itself has inserted reinforces this tendency: “Furthermore, the state of Israel, which is understood as a Jewish collective, can also be the target of such attacks.” While not part of the official IHRA phrasing, this addition spells out how the IHRA definition can be used to blur the lines between the state of Israel and Judaism. All the more because of the omission of a subsequent suggested additional passage stating that “criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.”

By contrast, the wording of the JDA―“Antisemitism is discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jewish)”―aims to rectify these ambiguities. The definition is accompanied by a list of 15 Guidelines, divided into “General,” “Israel and Palestine: examples that, on the face of it, are antisemitic,” and “Israel and Palestine: examples that, on the face of it, are not antisemitic.” The guidelines are intended to clarify the definition and act as helpful tools for its application. In its Preamble, the initial signatories, among them known professors and experts such as Omri Boehm, Eva Illouz, Uffa Jensen, Peter Ullrich, Moshe Zimmermann, or Susan Neiman, explicitly criticize the ambiguities, incoherencies, and controversies produced by the IHRA definition, which hinder the fight against antisemitism. The JDA definition was devised in a process spanning more than a year, aiming to find a balance between academic precision and political intervention, rather than pitting them against each other.

It has become clear that the development process of both definitions was contingent upon their political conditions and that both definitions have an explicitly political dimension. Amos Goldberg, one of the initial signatories of the JDA, has pointedly called the IHRA definition Israel’s “diplomatic Iron Dome,” an instrument of defense for Israel’s political interests. The focus on “left” antisemitism, in conjunction with the partial silencing of criticism of the state of Israel and political Zionism, has been a crucial part of the academic debate surrounding these definitional projects. At the same time, both definitions have been subject to criticisms that the focus on the conflict in the Middle East threatens to lose sight of right-wing antisemitism. These frictions and ambiguities have become more and more clear to the public’s eye ever since the genocide against the Palestinians in Gaza started.

A resolution against German discourse

Die Linke’s resolution to adopt the JDA definition has been the latest instance where this debate has found public attention. Statements by the Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland, the WerteInitiative, or the Jüdische Forum für Demokratie und gegen Antisemitismus (The Jewish Forum for Democracy and against Antisemitism) have had a significant media impact. Apart from a few positive reactions, the direction has been clear: Die Linke has forsaken the fight against antisemitism, will give hatred of Israel free rein, and has turned its back on the Jews (who, as far as one could tell by the statements, are monolithic in their support of the IHRA definition). This monolithic picture does not hold water, however. In an interview with nd, historian Amos Goldberg said:

“Mr. Schuster [Chairman of the Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland] and the German political discourse apparently differentiate between ‘good Jews,’ such as Mr. Schuster, and ‘bad Jews,’ such as me―that is, between legitimate expressions of Jewishness and wrongful, illegitimate expressions. I can, however, tell you as a Jew and Israeli―a country in which I have lived all my life―that I find my Jewish identity to be reflected in the values of the Jerusalem Declaration and that I am not alone in this.”

And alone, indeed, he is not. Alongside renowned academics, among them Jews and Israelis, there have also been Jewish organizations, such as the Jewish Voice for Just Peace in the Middle East, which have welcomed the resolution. Die Linke’s decision has also been encouraged by Hadash, the left-wing electoral alliance in Israel, which invited the European Left to follow its example. Those very same organizations that appear to manufacture a monolithic Jewish community in Germany have not shied away from accusing Jews and Israelis of antisemitism, concealing the reality of a plurality of opinions within the Jewish community. The primary goal of the recent criticisms appears to be, in keeping with the history of the IHRA definition, supporting the politics of the state of Israel and its German raison d’état counterpart, rather than an honest attempt to act as a representative of Jewish people and their positions. It can then not elicit much surprise to witness the continuing volatile, ambiguous and interchangeable use of “Israel-hater” and “antisemite” when criticism of Die Linke is made.

To put it plainly: The party’s resolution adopting the JDA is not levelled against Jews, in Germany or anywhere else. Rather, one of its core desires is to protect the Jewish community, not least from the danger of being held responsible (explicitly or implicitly) for the war crimes committed by the state of Israel, a danger posed by the vanishing distinction between Judaism and the state of Israel in public discourse. The resolution is levelled against the established direction of German politics. It is an explicit response to the antisemitism resolutions adopted by the  Bundestag (the federal parliament): “Nie wieder ist jetzt―Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland schützen, bewahren und stärken” (“Never again―Protect, preserve and strengthen Jewish life in Germany”) and “Antisemitismus und Israelfeindlichkeit an Schulen und Hochschulen” (“Antisemitism and hatred of Israel in schools and universities”).

Those resolutions can be seen as one of the multiple signs of an ongoing advance of authoritarian and anti-migrant rhetoric in Germany, covered and justified by rampant accusations of antisemitism. While the resolutions aim at restricting freedom of expression in art and academia and explicitly target calls for sanctions or boycott, the Ministry of the Interior adopts the rhetoric of “Israel-hater” and “imported antisemitism” when presenting figures on political violence. Using this pretext, politicians then call for harsher sentences against and more deportations of migrants and inconvenient activists, such as the Berlin4. Thus, the vague handling of the term antisemitism facilitated by the adoption of the IHRA definition becomes a gateway for increasing authoritarian tendencies in social discourse right up to government circles. Combating this direction of discourse and active state intervention, as well as combating arbitrary detainment, bans on assembly, and censorship and self-censorship, requires the establishment of the JDA.

There have also been voices within the party who are critical of the resolution. One argument, made by chairman Jan van Aken in the preceding debate and, in a less eloquent way, by Bodo Ramelow, claims that the party congress must not dismiss academic discourse. This is a position that may have worth if it were made in a context where academic debates are decoupled from reality. But, even if this were the case, one would need to be consistent: If adoption of the JDA should be rejected due to the ongoing debate in antisemitism studies, so would the adoption of the IHRA definition that has crept into public discourse and even government bodies.

This, however, has not been the reality in Germany. Those who now fear a premature dismissal of academic debate failed to campaign against the IHRA definition while it was established by the German state and by various political parties and organizations. The argument is also indefensible in light of the political circumstances. Terror attacks such as the one in Halle in 2019 have shown that there is a grave danger of antisemitism in Germany. And that, in order to fight this danger, one requires a means to identify antisemitism. There simply is an irrefutable need for a definition of antisemitism for political praxis. This is why the resolution does not just refute the IHRA definition, but constructively supplants it with the JDA.

Die Linke as vanguard?

In the end, the question remains why such flimsy excuses of an argument can reach the highest echelons of the party and take root there. Other motives might be at play in rejecting the resolution. Die Linke has placed itself into the vanguard by establishing the JDA as a means to identify antisemitism. A considerable feat in a country where, after 19 months of bombardments and intentional starvation of the civilian population, weapons are still supplied to the perpetrator. Die Linke has renounced some of the established pathways of German politics. Finally, some might say. This is true, but it also means that the party is fortifying its place in the opposition, something that does not necessarily accord with the career management of some politicians.

The resolution signifies progress in German discourse. Or, at least, within Die Linke. Still, it is just the start, an attempt to create and defend spaces that are uncompromising in their commitment to humanity. Spaces for the protection of all people, no matter if Jews, Palestinians, or citizens critical of their government in Germany. The path to material improvements for the people in Gaza, however, appears to be long and winding. There is much left to do to change the German course of complicity and to counteract authoritarian tendencies. This path needs people who become active according to their ability, who take to the streets or take positions in political and social debates, always with a sensibility for a productive and non-instrumentalized use of the term antisemitism.

Statement: Not in Our Name TU on TU Berlin’s Response to Genocide

How the Technical University Berlin abandoned academic freedom for political obedience


The destruction of Gaza’s education system is not collateral damage—it is intentional. It is systematic. And the Technical University of Berlin (TU Berlin), despite its claims of neutrality and academic freedom, has chosen silence over solidarity, complicity over conscience, and political obedience over even the most minimal moral and ethical duty.

Over six months ago, we submitted a detailed report to TU Berlin’s leadership. It documented how the university is deeply complicit in the Genocide unfolding in Palestine, be it indirectly through continuing its cooperation with institutions involved in the Israeli military apparatus, or directly by allowing exchange programs to illegally stolen land. We demanded an investigation based on the evidence we provided, and to cut ties, as it has done with Russia, when our findings were confirmed. Not only did the university refuse to act, it refused even to look.

As part of our demands that were sent along with that report, we urged administration to take a basic moral stance and publicly condemn the complete destruction of Gaza’s education system. Every single university has been bombed. Over 95% of schools were damaged. Over 720,000 students had their education completely interrupted. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Education, 13,419 students and 651 educators have been killed and 21,653 injured in what can only be described as a systematic campaign to destroy the very possibility of knowledge in Gaza. We called this what it is: scholasticide—the deliberate erasure of a people’s right to learn, teach, and exist. 

In response, TU Berlin spoke proudly of its commitment to anti-discrimination, academic freedom, and historical role as a university that fights injustice. They write of awareness teams, consultation offices, and the importance of peaceful protest all while refusing to name the people whose lives were erased.

Not once did it acknowledge even a single murdered Palestinian student or scholar. Not Nada Al-Hasayna, the pharmacy student who carried her name tag every day so her body could be identified if she was killed. Not Sha’ban al-Dalou, a 19-year-old software engineering student at Al-Azhar University, who was burned alive while still attached to an IV alongside his mother. Not Professor Dr. Sufyan Tayeh, president of the Islamic University of Gaza and one of the world’s top scientists, killed with his family. Not Professor Refaat Al-Areer, poet and literature lecturer, who wrote “If I Must Die” before being bombed to death with his brother and sister alongside four of her children.

And yet, in every public statement made by TU Berlin and the Center for Research on Antisemitism (ZfA), one thing remains consistent: they carefully avoid using the word Palestinian. Not once do they acknowledge the people being killed, displaced, starved, and erased. They speak of “violence,” of “conflict,” of “victims” in vague terms—but never name those who are suffering most. They have expressed solidarity with Israeli academics, reaffirmed partnerships with Israeli institutions, and condemned attacks against Israel. But they have never condemned the killing of Palestinian scholars, or the destruction of every single university in Gaza. They have never shown even the most basic empathy for Palestinian life—they have never even once used the word Palestine or Palestinian.

This silence is not neutrality, it is complicity, it is political obedience. 

It is even more appalling when viewed in the context of Israeli academia’s open incitement to hate. We can name the Tel Aviv University professor Uzy Raby who said on a radio interview: “Anyone who stays [in northern Gaza] will be judged… as a terrorist and will go through either a process of starvation or a process of extermination”. Another lecturer at the same university, Dr. Harel Chorev, declared that he would “sign with both hands” a military plan that called for the forced removal of civilians from Gaza. And at the Institute for National Security Studies, a think tank affiliated with Tel Aviv University, researchers openly proposed turning Gaza into a “modernized” area emptied of Palestinians through “voluntary emigration,” enforced by “sustained military pressure”, a thinly veiled ethnic cleansing proposal.

The few who dissent, mostly Palestinians, face severe repression. Professor Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, a prominent Palestinian scholar at Hebrew University, was suspended, publicly denounced by her institution, and later arrested for calling for a ceasefire and criticizing Zionism. Over 160 Palestinian students in Israeli universities have faced disciplinary measures for minor expressions of grief or solidarity. Some have had their home addresses and photos circulated online. Others were expelled. Threatened. Silenced. And while those who advocate justice are punished, those who advocate atrocity are platformed, funded, and celebrated.

In the midst of this, TU Berlin dares to speak of “academic freedom.” But what we are witnessing is its complete collapse. Academic freedom does not mean cooperating with warmongers. It does not mean partnering with institutions that help build drone systems used to flatten homes, or produce white papers about ethnic cleansing. It does not mean turning away while your academic counterparts are starved, bombed, and executed. Academic freedom means having the right to say: we refuse. 

We refuse to be complicit.

We refuse to normalize genocide. 

We refuse to treat apartheid as just another academic perspective.

If Israeli Academia insists on staying corrupted to its core, then in the name of academic freedom, TU Berlin has the duty to cut ties. Its refusal is not grounded in academic principles, its loyalty is not to truth, not to justice and not its stated mission, but to fear. Germany’s history is invoked to silence critics, but the real lesson of that history, of where blind obedience to power leads, is ignored.

TU Berlin once served a fascist state. Today, it serves a state taking part in a genocide.One might think an institution that once served under and supported a fascist state would understand the dangers of “just following orders”. But instead, the TU Berlin Kanzler, a sitting SPD politician, proudly oversees this cowardice. Unwilling to challenge the political tide, unwilling to take a stance, unwilling to say, ‘‘enough.’’

A Warning to Other Despots

Former Philippine President Duterte’s Trial in ICC Opens New Frontier for Filipinos’ Struggle for Justice


01/06/2025

March 11, 2025 was a momentous day for victims of Former President Rodrigo Duterte’s (FPRD) bloody fake war on drugs.  It was when Duterte’s bluster ended as he was arrested by the Philippine National Police (PNP) by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC), and was flown to the Hague, Netherlands.

This was poetic justice for the Filipino people who suffered from state-instigated terrorism under Duterte’s presidency. FPRD’s trial in the ICC opens a new frontier for Filipinos’ struggle for justice and serves as a warning for other despots.

ICC jurisdiction over Duterte

The ICC’s decision to pursue the investigation into Duterte’s war on drugs is not only lawful—it is essential for upholding human rights and international accountability.  Duterte is the first Asian leader to be tried at the ICC. 

Under Philippine laws, the President is immune from civil, criminal, and administrative suits while holding office. This immunity covers both official and personal acts, as long as the President remains in office. However, after leaving office, the individual no longer enjoys this privilege. In line with developments in international law, certain crimes, such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, may not be covered by presidential immunity. Although the Philippines does not have a specific ruling addressing this directly, international tribunals, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), have held that heads of state are not immune from prosecution for international crimes.

The ICC’s jurisdiction over the Philippines has been a topic of heated debate, especially since the country officially withdrew from the Rome Statute in 2019. Duterte and his allies argue that this withdrawal nullifies any ICC investigation.

Feeling threatened by the ICC investigation, Duterte while still in office withdrew from the ICC on March 17,2018 which took effect on March 17, 2018. The Philippines signed the Rome Statute on December 28,2000 and was accepted as member of the ICC on August 30,2011.  

 This matter was brought to the Philippine Supreme Court (SC) for decision. On March 16, 2021 the high tribunal ruled that: President Duterte cannot evade investigation by the ICC prosecutor on the charge that he committed the “crime against humanity of murder” in his “war on drugs” by invoking the country’s withdrawal from the court, which he ordered in March 2018, taking effect a year later.

“Withdrawing from the Rome Statute does not discharge a state party from the obligations as a member,” the ruling says.

“Consequently, liability for the alleged summary killings and other atrocities committed in the course of the war on drugs is not nullified or negated…” the SC declared.

It must be noted that the Philippines has enacted REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9851 titled “AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, ORGANIZING JURISDICTION, DESIGNATING SPECIAL COURTS, AND FOR RELATED PURPOSES” on December 11, 2009. Basically it is a mirror copy of the Rome Statute applied to national context.  This legislation predates Philippine membership in the ICC.

No less that the current Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Remulla testified in the Senate hearing concerning the legality of Duterte’s turn-over to the ICC, that no serious effort at investigation, m against Duterte  in Philippine courts after he was replaced by now President Marcos Jr..

Philippine presidents serve only a six year term without reelection.  Duterte’s term started on June 30, 2016 and ended on June 30,2022.

The principle of complementarity governs the exercise of the ICC jurisdiction.  The Statute recognizes that States have the first responsibility and right to prosecute international crimes. The ICC may only exercise jurisdiction where national legal systems fail to do so, including where they purport to act but in reality are unwilling or unable to  genuinely carry out proceedings. The principle of complementarity is based both on respect for the primary jurisdiction of States and on considerations of efficiency and effectiveness, since States will generally have the best access to evidence and witnesses and the resources to carry out proceedings. Moreover, there are limits on the number of prosecutions the ICC, a single institution, can feasibly conduct.

Duterte’s crime against humanity

A review of President Rodrigo Duterte’s fourth year in office included a damning UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) report on widespread extrajudicial killings, the passage of a widely contested anti-terrorism legislation and a bungled response to the coronavirus pandemic. 

According to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, between 1 July 2016 and 31 January 2020 the police killed 5,601 people.  Various government agencies have put out conflicting figures and have proved reluctant to disclose documents relating to the killings to the Supreme Court and the Commission on Human Rights. 

There are also reports of widespread drug-related killings perpetrated by unidentified “vigilantes”. Duterte administration’s 2017 year-end report mentions 16,355 “homicide cases under investigation” as accomplishments in the fight against illegal drugs. This prompted the Supreme Court to raise the possibility that the killings were State-sponsored. Noting that drugs operations by the police and homicides perpetrated by unidentified persons resulted in 20,322 deaths from July 1, 2016 to November 27, 2017, the Supreme Court demanded an explanation for the staggering average of nearly 40 deaths per day. In March 2019, the police claimed that although 29,000 deaths were labelled as “deaths under inquiry” between July 1,2016 and February 4,2019, only 3,062 (9.47 per cent) were drug-related. A previous study, however, had found that the police severely underreported the percentage of drug-related killings among homicides.

The noisy well-funded Duterte troll farm creates an illusion that majority of Filipinos don’t agree that Duterte face trial in the ICC.  They impact significantly in the political discourse in the Philippines. Filipinos spend so much time online — they average a staggering 10 hours a day!

However, poll survey on the issue show that majority of Filipinos favor that Duterte to undergo trial for his case of crimes against humanity.  Duterte’s powerful influence in the Philippines make it impossible for victims of his bloody war on drugs to have justice. They support the ICC.

Philippines should rejoin the ICC

It is to the best interest of Filipinos that the Philippines should rejoin the ICC.  The international Tribunal serves as the court of last resort for ordinary Filipinos. The judicial system in the Philippines is heavily skewed in favor of the rich and powerful, justice is denied to those who are economically and politically disadvantaged.  Even the UN OHCHR supports this idea.

Duterte is the second former Philippine president to be tried outside of the country. The first was former Dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr., the father of now president Marcos Jr.. Like Duterte, he was also tried outside the Philippines because  it was impossible to hold him accountable for his crimes against the Filipino people in the country.  Marcos Sr. was tried and convicted in Hawaii District Court in the U.S.A. after he was ousted as martial law dictator in the Philippines.

Today international developments favor the strengthening of international tribunals as courts of last resort for aggrieved peoples and states.  Even powerful states that hold themselves above the so-called “rules based international order” are held to account for their international crimes.

Established in 2002 and based in The Hague, the ICC is a criminal court that can bring cases against individuals for war crimes or crimes against humanity. In October 2024, there were 125 states parties to the Rome Statute.

ICC is different from the ICJ (International Court of Justice) as the latter tries cases involving countries, while the former is a criminal court, which brings cases against individuals for war crimes or crimes against humanity. While the ICJ is an organ of the United Nations, the ICC is legally independent of the UN, although it is endorsed by the General Assembly.

While not all 193 UN Member States are parties to the ICC, it can launch investigations and open cases related to alleged crimes committed on the territory or by a national of a State party to the ICC or of a State that has accepted its jurisdiction.

As war continues in Ukraine and Gaza, the ICC is coming under the spotlight, due to actions such as its issuing of an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2023.

Recently it issued a request for arrest warrant  for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Yoav Gallant and three leaders of Hamas, the de facto authorities in Gaza.

In the midst of a world marked by conflict and accountability crises, the conspicuous absence of major powers like the United States, Russia and China from the ICC casts a long shadow over the ideals of international justice.

Their refusal to sign up to the international court has sparked much heated debate since it was first set up in The Hague, Netherlands more than two decades ago.

Supporters of the International Criminal Court accuse the three global powers of hampering the court’s important investigations into war crimes, while opponents accuse the court of lacking political independence.

On 6 February 2025, United States President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order authorizing sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan. This Executive Order is intended to stop the ICC from undertaking its independent mandate. It also poses a significant threat to the ICC and its staff.  UN experts strongly condemned the move, calling it “an attack on global rule of law” that undermines international justice.

The US sanctions pose a dire threat to the ICC, as well as to the broader international rule of law and its multilateral system. But there is still hope.

Many countries continue to support the ICC. In June 2024, 74 ICC member states affirmed their commitment to fighting impunity. After President Trump’s recent Executive Order, European Union foreign ministers declared their ‘unwavering support’ for the Court.

Top EU diplomat Josep Borrell said all EU countries must carry out arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) as members of the legal institution.

“It is not a political decision. It’s a decision of a court, of a court of justice,” Borrell said while in Amman. “This decision is a binding decision,” he added.

All members of the ICC are legally bound to carry out the decisions of the court, Borrell said. All of the European Union’s 27 member states (except Hungary) are members of the ICC, this includes them as well, he said. 

Some political observers may hold the view that filing cases against perpetrators of heinous crimes in the ICC  is a “hit of miss” thing, but for the marginalized Filipinos, the arrest and trial of former Philippine President Duterte in the ICC is a landmark achievement against impunity of a brutal tyrant who can never be tried effectively in the Philippines.  It is also a strong warning to all despots in other parts of the world.