Palestinians Born in Exile: Diaspora and the Search for a Homeland

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RECENT BOOKS

MAPPING SOCIAL HISTORY

Overthrowing Geography: Jaffa, Tel Aviv, and the Struggle for Palestine 1880–1948, by Mark LeVine. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. xv + 248 pages. Notes to p. 376. Bibliography to p. 416. Index to p. 442. $29.95 paper; $65.00 cloth.

Reviewed by James L. Gelvin

For the past forty years or so, urban histories have been a staple of Middle East historiography. Historians now have available a number of meticulously researched studies of Arab cities during the modern period, including (but not limited to) studies of Acre, Aleppo, Alexandria, Algiers, Beirut, Cairo, and Haifa. However rich these accounts may be, Mark LeVine's smart and provocative history of Jaffa/Tel Aviv takes Arab Middle Eastern urban history to an entirely new level.

The most striking aspect of LeVine's work is the way he incorporates into his study the best of cultural history and social theory, particularly postcolonial theory—tools that were unavailable or shunned as too modish by many of his predecessors. Applying the techniques of cultural history enables LeVine to present the history of Jaffa and Tel Aviv in terms of the lived experience of their planners and inhabitants and to make the cities come alive for readers. His chapter on the meaning of Tel Aviv/Jaffa to its inhabitants is particularly noteworthy in this regard. Drawing on social theory enables LeVine to add a further dimension to his study: rather than just providing a cultural/social history of Jaffa and Tel Aviv during a period of rapid transformation (no mean achievement in itself), LeVine also explains why Jaffa's own "modernity" has been ignored while Tel Aviv has become the apotheosis of modernity.

Raising this question opens the door for LeVine's critique of modernity, particularly the process of modernity's self-mythologizing narrative. For LeVine, modernity in its dominant, European form has both the timelessness of a universalizing ideology and the timeliness associated with specific incarnations of that ideology. In terms of the former, LeVine posits a fourfold matrix that combines an avowal of "the modern," capitalism, colonialism, and nationalism into a single discourse. In terms of the latter, LeVine traces the historic evolution of Zionist modernity through four phases as represented through Tel Aviv's architecture: a "Garden City" phase, a "colonial eclectic" phase, an "international style" phase, and a "postindustrial phase." While much of this interpretive framework is not unique to LeVine's work, his rendering of the modern, his differentiation between an unchanging structuring of modernity and temporal phases within that modernity, and his application of this framework to a particular case are compelling.

In addition to the manner in which LeVine incorporates the methodologies of cultural history and the critical perspective of postcolonial studies, this book is valuable because it demonstrates what can be accomplished through creative use of sources. All too often, histories of Arab provincial cities have been written entirely from Arabic (or Arabic and European) sources. This has had the unfortunate result of severing the connection between provincial Arab society and the Ottoman imperial structure in which it was embedded (and, in the case of Palestinian cities, the society established by Zionist immigrants). As a result, Arab and Ottoman societies have been treated as separate entities that only intersected in imperial fiat and in the persons of upwardly mobile notables. LeVine avoids this problem by drawing on Ottoman Turkish, Arabic, Hebrew, and European sources. The result is a history that transcends the nationalist historiography that is still the bane of the field. And by looking at all the players involved and their interaction, LeVine is able to pinpoint one of the reasons why the Zionist/Palestinian conflict has been so difficult to resolve: Not only did the Zionist and Palestinian communities define their "other," but also they were defined by their interaction with the other. In addition, by drawing on a variety of sources, including *sijill* (court) records,

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contemporaneous newspaper accounts, official documents, poetry, fiction, and oral histories, LeVine is able to round out his history and avoid the pitfalls to which histories that rely on a single genre of source (such as *sijill*s) are prone.

This is not to say the LeVine's approach is without problems. His differentiation between a "bad" European colonial modernity and a "good" Palestinian noncolonial modernity seems more than a bit romantic. It also might be argued that the selection of discourses LeVine associates with "Western" modernity is idiosyncratic, if not tendentious, as is his decision to grant those discourses equivalence. Finally, skeptics may well complain that LeVine stacks the deck unfairly by comparing the attributes of an avowedly nationalist and arguably colonialist movement (Zionism) with the attributes present in the general public sphere of late nineteenth-century Arab Jaffa. But while all this may be true, it is undeniable that LeVine's book is the product of a vibrant historical imagination. It is, without doubt, a *tour de force* in the true meaning of the phrase.

MAP AND GRAB

A Survey of Palestine under the British Mandate, 1920–1948, by Dov Gavish. London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005. xviii + 264 pages. Appendices to p. 283. Notes to p. 315. Bibliography to p. 326. Index to p. 337. $115.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Salman Abu Sitta

The Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917 promised to establish in Palestine a "national home" for the Jews contrary to the right of self-determination of the Palestinian national majority. At the time, Jews, mostly Ottoman subjects, owned no more than 2 percent of the country. The Zionists managed to incorporate the Balfour Declaration in the Mandate terms. Its articles called for facilitating Jewish immigration to Palestine and "close settlement by Jews on the land."

During the British military administration (1917–1920), the Zionists prepared for the eventual takeover of territory in Palestine. Chaim Weizmann headed the newly formed Zionist Commission for Palestine and appointed Herbert Samuel, the Jewish future High Commissioner, as the head of its Advisory Committee. Weizmann urged the British to close Land Registry books to prevent a rise in land prices and called for forming a Land Commission to examine land status in Palestine. The most urgent task was to own as much land as possible, particularly the "state land, waste land," and uncultivated land, whose definition was left to interpretation. The land was held under Islamic law for centuries. The meaning of state or waste land was defined by the latest Ottoman Land Code of 1858 and its amendments.

When Samuel took his post as High Commissioner of Palestine, he changed all that. During his tenure (1920–1925) he issued dozens of ordinances changing or modifying land laws in order to enable Jews to own land. He formed a Land Commission to evaluate available land for Jewish settlements. Most of the legislation he initiated was legally flawed, because he had no authority to legislate under the mandate before Turkey signed the peace agreement in 1924.

Contrary to general practice in which country surveys started with topographical maps to describe the earth surface, there was a great rush to produce cadastral maps. The aim was to undertake "legal examination of the validity of all land title deeds in Palestine," in Weizmann's words. Thus, the extent and identity of private land ownership would be determined. All else would be "state or waste land," open for Jewish settlement.

A survey department hastily was established using the services of highly experienced British colonial officials, particularly from Egypt. The haste and lack of direction to define land ownership wasted almost 8 years. Finally the Australian Torrens system was adopted and the necessary ordinances were promulgated in 1928. The Torrens system describes the land in terms of blocks that are divided into parcels, all defined by geographical or other coordinates. This replaced the Ottoman system of descriptive title deeds. Application of the Torrens system required a cadastral survey to define the property and Land Settlement procedure to settle disputes and verify the identity of the legal owner. This meant that the mandate government effectively held all land in Palestine under its control and released only those lots for which the owner provided absolute proof of ownership. Since much land was held by Custom Law—by long-term recognition of ownership—or held

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in common ownership or used for grazing or woods, this system, and particularly the Zionist motives behind it, was resisted by the Palestinians, to the extent of chasing the surveyors away or destroying their equipment.

The cadastral survey proceeded in fits and starts, through the Great Revolt of 1936–1939 and World War II. By the end of the mandate, the land title was "settled" in less than 20 percent of Palestine, primarily in areas where Jewish colonies were established, such as in the coastal plain, the Marj Ibn Amer valley, and north of Lake Tiberias by the Jordan River. The topographical maps were completed for all of Palestine, excluding the lower Negev. These were very valuable for military purposes during World War II. Despite all the difficulties and political motives, the survey of Palestine produced valuable data that documented Palestinian patrimony and immeasurably helped the new Israeli state.

In its nine chapters, the book goes into detail describing the problems of establishing the survey department, the selected survey system, the difficulties in land title settlement, and the final topographical maps. The author had an unparalleled opportunity to document this unknown history. Not only did he review what is left of the Mandate archives in the United Kingdom, but also he had access to all the Survey Department documents, maps, and even printing plates and Royal Air Force aerial surveys seized by the Israelis in 1948. Lorries sent by the British, destined for the "Arab state" and carrying their share of maps, also were diverted back to Tel Aviv. All these documents now are housed primarily in the Survey of Israel offices, the Ministry of Agriculture in Tel Aviv, Haganah and Ministry of Defense archives, and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

It is therefore disappointing to surveyors and geographers to find much of the book to be anecdotal, describing squabbles and conflicts within the department and elsewhere. Little substantive material is waiting for the specialist who would be the expected reader. Further, there is very little information about land ownership (5.5 percent Jewish) or about the important British aerial survey. Three tables are informative. Only 13 percent of the figures are significant; the rest illustrate surveying scenes. Chapter 9 is an exception. It contains useful data about the 1:100,000 topographical series.

The references are not always rigorous. A quotation of the Royal Commission on "the primitive indigenous population and the progressive immigrants" (p. 186) cannot be found in the cited report. The Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry is confused with the UN Special Committee on Palestine (pp. 198–99). The UN General Assembly Resolution 181 for the partition of Palestine was attributed to the Security Council (p. 248). The author's reference to Arab "armed gangs" (p. 184), Arab "terrorism" (p. 192), and Arab claims of ownership being "false" (p. 172) or "marginal and petty" (p. 173) and his expanded description of the contribution of Jewish surveyors undermines the scholarly nature of the subject and leans toward propagandistic Zionist themes.

The book, originally a doctoral dissertation at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, was first published in Hebrew in 1991 under the title *Land and Map* and was 297 pages. Compared with the English edition, some chapter titles are changed, some appendices are replaced by others, and color plates are replaced by black and white.

LINKS TO ITALIAN FASCISM

The Jewish Radical Right: Revisionist Zionism and Its Ideological Legacy, by Eran Kaplan. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005. xix + 177 pages. Notes to p. 212. Bibliography to p. 224. Index to p. 234. $35.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Lenni Brenner

The Jewish Radical Right is nothing more than an in-house study of Vladimir Jabotinsky's Revisionist Zionist movement by an assistant professor of Judaic Studies and a grandchild on both sides of Revisionist veterans. It is Eran Kaplan's personal effort to come to terms with the reality that, by the mid-1930s, Jabotinsky and Revisionism had become a fifth wheel on Benito Mussolini's imperial chariot. Little more can be said as to purpose regarding a work that repeatedly launches into opaque discussions of what this means in light of the ideas of postmodernist obscurantists Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Jean-François Lyotard.

Lenni Brenner is the author of *Zionism in the Age of the Dictators* (Croom Helm, 1983) and *The Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism from Jabotinsky to Shamir* (Zed Books, 1984), and the editor of *51 Documents: Zionist Collaboration with the Nazis* (Barricade Books, 2002).

Jabotinsky had been a leader of the "Jewish Legion," organized by Britain to help it conquer Ottoman Palestine. By the late-1920s, he realized that London merely was using Zionism as a cat's-paw against the Arabs. He had been a student in pre-Mussolini Italy and liked the regime Il Duce overthrew. Mussolini was a "head buffalo." But he looked for a substitute League of Nations mandatory, and the buffalo was handy.

Inevitably, for many youthful followers Fascism and Revisionism were look-alikes. Fascists wore black shirts, Revisionists wore brown. Fascism was pro-capitalist, Revisionists broke labor Zionist strikes. And both used terror against their Arab enemies. Open fascists thronged into Jabotinsky's Beitar youth group and his Irgun underground.

Although Kaplan gives numerous quoted snippets from Abba Achimeir and other such "maximalists," he never provides enough text to enable readers to get an in-depth picture of them in their own words. Hebrew-speaking scholars would do English readers a service by translating some of the documents cited in the book's bibliography.

For all his glaring stylistic and scholarly weaknesses, Kaplan gives us enough material to confirm further what serious students of Revisionism already knew. In a chapter bizarrely titled "The State of Pleasure: Revisionist Aesthetics," we get a singular passage: "Much like their Italian counterparts in the Balilla, members of Beitar were called upon to exhibit their knowledge in public marches. The Revisionist daily *Hazit ha-Am* described such a march in Tel Aviv in April 1933. . . . As they marched . . . members of the socialist youth . . . yelled at them 'Vladimir Hitler.' In reaction, whenever they heard the name Jabotinsky, the Beitarists saluted with a gesture that looked exactly like the 'Nazi Heil' " (p. 102).

As 2005 was the 70th anniversary of Mussolini's poison gas conquest of Ethiopia, the most important factoid from the book deals with the Beitar squadron that Mussolini established at his Maritime School in 1935. "The Revisionist leadership was well aware of the potential implications of opening a school in fascist Italy, as this would provide the Revisionists' opponents with propaganda material. Revisionist leaders wanted the cadets to keep away from any involvement in local politics. . . . Nonetheless, the Beitar cadets were very involved in local politics. In his *History of Hebrew Seamanship*, Halperin wrote that the cadets, despite opposition from their superiors, expressed public support for Mussolini's regime. During the Italian campaign in Ethiopia, the Beitarist cadets marched alongside Italian soldiers in a demonstration in support of the war, and it was brought to Halperin's attention that they collected metal scraps and sent them to the Italian weapons industry" (p. 156).

By 1937, Mussolini realized that he needed Hitler as an ally against the left in the Spanish Civil War. He instituted anti-Semitic laws and expelled Beitar from his school. Jabotinsky slunk back into a pro-British position with the outbreak of war in 1939. But some maximalists, in particular "the Stern Gang" (Britain's name for them), led by Avraham Stern until 1942 and then by Yitzhak Shamir, continued to seek an alliance with Mussolini and Hitler. However, there is only one mention of Stern, in a back note, and one of Shamir in the text, and neither are listed in the index (a Freudian slip?).

Naturally their pro-Fascism and Nazism isn't discussed. As Shamir became Israel's prime minister (1983–1984, 1986–1992), and is still a Likud party elder statesman, a book that claims to be a study of Revisionism's ideological legacy but doesn't deal with him is like *Macbeth* without the king of Scotland. Specialists in Revisionist history have no choice but to read Kaplan, with his failings. But, beyond the two quotes above, general readers will miss nothing by not reading him.

FATE OF DISPLACED JEWS

In the Shadow of the Holocaust: The Struggle between Jews and Zionists in the Aftermath of World War II, by Yosef Grodzinsky. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004. xvi + 231 pages. References to p. 240. Notes to p. 273. Index to p. 279. $19.95 paper.

Reviewed by Mark Chmiel

In this English version of an earlier work published in Hebrew, Yosef Grodzinsky shows how early on, Zionist politics collided with the needs of Holocaust survivors, those Jews who were gathered in Displaced Persons (DP) camps after World War II in

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Germany, Austria, and Italy. For the author, a professor at Tel Aviv University, this is not simply a detached work of scholarship; rather, it is a personal response to and revision of the way he was raised as a youth in Israel: "We were told that virtually all the survivor DPs immigrated to Palestine/Israel, after a courageous struggle against the British. Those who joined the army, we were told, registered for the draft upon their arrival in Palestine; we were also told that refugees and survivors arrived in Palestine eagerly, ready to join the forming Israeli society and assist in the war effort. But the real story was kept from us" (p. 231).

In the early chapters, Grodzinsky gives meticulous attention to the process of how the survivors of the Nazi extermination machinery came to be concentrated in Displaced Persons camps under Allied administration and organize themselves. Throughout, one sees clearly the author's compassion for what the survivors had experienced, both during the war and during the chaos and poverty they faced afterward.

What David Ben-Gurion and other Zionists needed for the project of statehood was, in their expression, "good human material" (Hebrew, *chomer 'enoshi tov*), meaning persons able to fight for the Zionists against the British and the Arabs. By the end of the war, the Zionists turned to this physically weak, yet numerically strong concentration of the "Surviving Remnant" of the Holocaust (Hebrew, *She'erith ha-pleyta*).

Both Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish groups came to the camps to assist the survivors. Given their mission of establishing a Jewish state, the Zionist organizers worked assiduously to try to bring the survivors over to their side. Drawing on new archival records, the author points out that not all Jews in the DP camps were convinced of the personal need to go to Palestine. In fact, he refers to Bundist Jews who had other conceptions and convictions of Jewish identity than those of the Zionists.

Grodzinsky highlights two crises that reveal the priority of Zionist ideology over the needs of the survivors. One involved the opportunity to get Jewish children out of the camps and into Britain and France where they would be cared for. Because of Zionist pressure, particularly that applied by Ben-Gurion, the children remained in the camps. The author then concludes that the "value of human suffering for political bargaining was very clear to Ben-Gurion, who was quite willing to use it years before Arab leaders used the 1948 refugee problem in a similar vein" (pp. 97–98).

The second crisis occurred after the UN Partition Plan of 29 November 1947. The Haganah began to mobilize and needed all the person power it could get. The Zionist envoys and the leaders in the DP camps started a voluntary conscription drive. But when the numbers signing up proved to be disappointing, a compulsory draft was initiated. Intimidation, threats, and physical violence were used to impress upon survivors their duty to the Jewish people. One Bundist paper, *Unser Shtime* (Our Voice), commented how unbelievable it was "that Jews, the standard victims of Fascism and terrorism, would be capable of the kinds of violence Zionists in the camps exercise toward their Bundist and other non-Zionist political rivals" (p. 207). The compulsory draft thus brought to Palestine/Israel men and youth who didn't necessarily desire to come to Palestine, but ultimately had no choice. They became fighters in the first battles of the State of Israel.

In the Shadow of the Holocaust is part of the ongoing project by Israelis and others to subject the Zionist movement and Israeli policies to demystification. Grodzinsky's book shows how the Zionists subscribed to "might makes right" in the transcendent cause for Jewish statehood in Palestine. With Holocaust survivors, children and adults, treated in such a fashion, one might not be too surprised at the treatment to be meted out to the indigenous Palestinians.

JUSTICE UNDER OCCUPATION

Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza, by Lisa Hajjar. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. xxiii + 252 pages. Appendices to p. 258. Notes to p. 299. Index to p. 312. $24.95 paper.

Reviewed by Raja Shehadeh

The facts are staggering: half a million (out of the 3.6 million) Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been prosecuted in military courts since 1967. Some 90 to 95 percent of Palestinians who are

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charged with crimes are convicted. Ninety-seven percent of the cases are resolved through plea bargaining. One lawyer was quoted as saying that in fifteen years of practice before the military courts he succeeded in winning only three acquittals. The obvious question that comes to mind, which Lisa Hajjar, the author of *Courting Conflict*, also asks is whether "this really [is] a legal system." She follows this with another question: "what possibly could be learned [from conducting a research of this kind] that wasn't already obvious: that the Israeli state has the power to punish Palestinians and that punishment is what they get" (p. 188)?

On one level the book is about the Israeli military court system in the West Bank and Gaza. As such it presents the reader with a fair, comprehensive account of the system, the prosecutors, judges, defense lawyers, even the Druze translators. In covering this subject, the author leaves no stone unturned. It is the best I've read, surpassing reports on the subject by al-Haq and the International Commission of Jurists. But the book is about much more than what the subtitle suggests.

Throughout the study the author successfully makes the linkage between the narrow subject with which she is dealing and much broader questions related to occupation in general, how Israel conducts it, how the Palestinians resist it, and the effect all this has on each side. She aptly calls the military court system "a central setting for the conflict" (p. 235). Toward the middle of the book Hajjar introduces the concept of prison (the beginning and most often the end process of Israeli military trials) to describe the state of the general Palestinian population under occupation. She uses the term *carceralism*, which to her

> captures the fact that they [the Palestinian people under occupation] are treated collectively as suspected and punishable and are imprisoned, literally in that thousands or tens of thousands are in prison at any given time, and equally literally in that, like prisoners, they are "unfree." The military court system is an institution centerpiece of this carceralism, part of a broader array of governing institutions and practices in which Palestinians are enmeshed and tracked in grids of surveillance, subjected to restrictive codes of conduct and interaction, physically immobilized through the use of permits, closures, curfews, checkpoints and walls, and incarcerated in huge numbers. (p. 186)

In the face of this injustice, the Palestinian does not stand idle. Hajjar writes: "acknowledging that Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza are empowered social actors is crucial for understanding their experiences and perspective on the military court system. This acknowledgment also serves as a rejoinder to accounts and analyses that would flatten people into two-dimensional figures, whether as irrational hate-driven terrorists or helpless victims" (p. 187).

Reading Hajjar's description of the stages in which a half-million Palestinians have passed through the Israeli military court system, I was reminded of the way Israel conducted its negotiations with the Palestinians. Israeli leaders must have had the military court system in mind when they approached the negotiations. Just as arrest is followed by interrogation, the Israeli government began by sending the PLO a list of questions, like an interrogatory, to which they expected answers before proceeding any further with the negotiations. To the surprise of the Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, Israel received answers to all its questions without getting a similar list from the Palestinian side. Palestinian leaders acted no differently from detainees in Israeli prisons who are forced to respond to their interrogators' questions and do not believe they are in a position to put any question to them.

As Hajjar shows, most convictions in military courts are based on confessions. She also shows how once transported to the military court, the "the Palestinian defendants are transformed from political subjects into objects of the legal process, handled, discussed, and treated as 'cases' or 'files' " (p. 188). The analogy with the negotiations remains apt in that whereas in Palestinian national discourse the prison (which can be compared to the life of Palestinians in the confinement of the territories under occupation) "occupies a prominent position in analyses and narratives of the Israeli occupation. . . . In contrast, the military court system . . . is a silence in this discourse" (p. 188). Likewise, the negotiations have not been the subject within the occupied territories of any critical analysis, and no one in the Palestinian leadership has ever had to answer for any failures for their poor conduct of these negotiations.

The analogy continues. Hajjar points out how "since 1967 very little political attention has been devoted to the legal processes that occur within the military court system. Neither Palestinian political factions nor anti-occupation groups within Israel have made the legal process part of their

agendas or articulated resistance strategies for the military court system, aside from statements of solidarity and support for political prisoners" (p. 232). She believes that had there been a collective ban on plea bargaining, for example, the political consequences could be dramatic. When she puts this to the lawyers who work in these courts, one reason given for inaction is that "plea bargaining is an appropriately 'dirty' reflection of the military court system and the military occupation" (p. 234). Thus it is better, so the reasoning goes, to end the case before the full trial and avoid the implication that there is a system that is capable of according the Palestinian justice. This sounds to me like the oft-repeated refrain that any negotiation with Israel is a waste of time. And so why waste more time using the services of lawyers and going into the details? Surely, once the decision is not to boycott the military court trial or the negotiation table, then those engaged should proceed with the best possible preparation rather than rely on the comfort that it is always possible to blame the other side for the bad results.

After the passive stage which Hajjar describes as "the objectification of defendants" (p. 189), they reemerge in prison as political subjects. The prison that Hajjar describes as "a society within a society" (p. 207) becomes the arena where the political struggle is resumed; the defendant reemerges as a political actor. But neither during prison nor after it (for those to whom this is possible) have ex-prisoners shown any interest in mobilizing a common political response to what goes on at the military court stage. Hajjar concludes that "the history and analysis of the Israeli military court system presented in this book provides a basis for understanding the effects of the conflict on the lives and relations among people in Israel/Palestine. The roots of the second Intifada are entwined in the military court system, which has been a central setting for the conflict" (p. 235). How true this is of the peace negotiations as well.

Learning about the injustice of the Israeli military court system provides many insights into the nature of the Israeli occupation and the future to which it dooms the inhabitants of Palestine. When an entire nation, as is the case with Palestine, is presumed to be criminal and guilty; when it is denied its land, water, and basic rights; and when its powerful neighbor proceeds to punish it using what appears to be legal process, a strong response can only be expected. In the face of oppression, nations resist. There is a more universal lesson in this as the world proceeds to treat as criminal and guilty certain groups and religions.

Injustice is not ameliorated by providing a semblance of legality. In the case of Israel one of the most salient and fundamental attributes of the occupation is its concern with legalism. It is regrettable that Hajjar's book did not also cover those military Objection Committees that look at objections to declarations by the Israeli military of what Israel calls "public" land that is then given to the exclusive use of Jewish settlers. Hajjar's study would have been enriched further by the inclusion of these tribunals in her valuable book.

There are very few errors in the book. One of them appears on p. 59, where it is stated that "the IDF has never published a comprehensive compendium of orders in force in the territories." In fact it was one of the early successes of al-Haq to have forced the Israeli army to do so. Despite minor errors, the book is thoroughly researched and rich with insight about the conflict. It is highly recommended for anyone wishing to understand the Israeli military court system that has been in operation in the occupied Palestinian territories since 1967 and indeed beyond this to the very workings of the occupation and the way Israel relates to Palestinians as individuals and as a national group. As Hajjar's book shows, this brutal occupation, to which no end seems to be in sight, is guilty of acts that no nation at war with another should permit because, in the words of Immanuel Kant, who is quoted at the outset of the conclusion, such acts "shall make mutual trust impossible during some future time of peace" (p. 235).

IMAGINING PALESTINE

Building a Successful Palestinian State, by the RAND Palestinian State Study Team. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 2005. xliv + 394 pages. Index to p. 407. $35.00 paper.

The Arc: A Formal Structure for a Palestinian State, by Doug Suisman, Steven N. Simon, Glenn E. Robinson, C. Ross Anthony, and Michael Schoenbaum. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 2005. xi + 91 pages. Figure Credits to p. 93. $32.50 paper.

Reviewed by Jamil Hilal

Building a Successful Palestinian State focuses on "how can an independent Palestinian state be made successful" (p. 1). The answer to the question is articulated through the joint effort of twenty-three RAND experts, who cover fields that include good governance, internal security, demography, economics, water, health, and education. The book is illustrated with 4 maps, includes 64 tables and 28 figures, and gives estimates of the costs (in billions of dollars) of creating what it defines as "a viable Palestinian state." It provides "options" for the kind of institutions deeded in creating a "successful" (used interchangeably with viable) Palestinian state, but explicitly refuses to examine how an independent state might be created and does not explore the necessary terms of settlement for its establishment. From the Palestinian point of view the nature of such terms determines the possibility or otherwise of the viability and independence of their future state. The RAND publication, perhaps understandably, avoids tackling this crucial issue. The issues that are given strategic importance are: security, good governance, establishing a growing economy, and providing basic services to a growing population (particularly health and education). Housing, transportation, and energy are relegated to a first companion study entitled *The Arc*; it is assessed later in this review. A second companion study will deal with security issues.

The thematic rationale of the book is inspired by U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 which, according to the RAND researchers, have shown a need for "detailed consideration of governance, security, economic development, health, education, and natural resources, among other factors" (p. 2). Hence the judgment that the "true challenge for a Palestinian state is not that it exists, but that it succeeds" (p. 2). According to the book, a failure of a Palestinian state spells perils in the Middle East and beyond, while its success "could influence the course of political and social reform in the Greater Middle East" (p. 4).

"Success" in statehood is defined as requiring an "independent, democratic state with an effective government under the rule of law . . . that provides for economic development and supports adequate housing, food, education, health, and public services for its people" (p. 3). Thus, a "successful" Palestinian state needs to acquire four basic features. First, it needs to have the ability to improve security for Palestinians and Israelis. Second, it needs to have effective and legitimate government. Third, it needs to have economic viability, and, fourth, it needs to have the capability to provide for the well-being of its citizens (food, clothing, education, health, and social security). I do not think that many Palestinians will quarrel with such a vision of a Palestinian state apart from the task to guarding the security of Israelis (unconditionally, it seems), but most Palestinians and others want to know whether the rights of Palestinian refugees would be addressed and in what form and manner; whether East Jerusalem would be the capital of the Palestinian state; whether Israeli colonies would be removed; and whether the state would have full control over its borders, natural resources, and territorial waters and skies.

The RAND publication considers that security needs to be established even before Palestinian independence. Establishing an "effective internal security system" needs to be done with the support and involvement of the United States and the international community, as the Palestinians will not be able to do it on their own (chapter three). The overall cost of such security is estimated at $600 million per year or $7.7 billion over ten years (p. 34). Security involves monitoring and managing who and what enters Palestine, as well as cracking down on "violent extremists." The whole discussion of the security issue ignores the present and past colonial situation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the highly tilted imbalance of power in favor of Israel. It is the Palestinian state, in fact, that needs to have its security guaranteed, given the possibilities of Israeli incursions, interventions, and unilateral measures. What is envisaged as forming Palestinian "extremism" is contingent largely on the kind of political settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The chapter on governance (chapter two) does acknowledge that good governance, which includes commitment to democracy, the rule of law and the elimination of corruption, depends on the Palestinian state's legitimacy in the eyes of Palestinians, and as such it is determined by "the size of the state, the contiguity of its lands, and the nature of

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its presence in Jerusalem" (p. 13). It does not mention the right of return for Palestinians in accordance with international law and UN resolutions, nor does it mention the Israeli colonial settlements in the West Bank. Both these issues are crucial to the legitimacy of a new Palestinian state. Only the possible return of Palestinian refugees to the West Bank is taken into account in the deliberations of the book (p. 18).

Much of what we find—in terms of description or recommendations—in the chapters on demography (chapter four), economics (chapter five), and water (chapter six) is found in publications by Palestinian research institutions, academics, and international bodies. Nevertheless, the book does collect useful data that highlights the significance of geographic contiguity, the permeability of borders, and the availability of clean and sufficient water to the viability of any future Palestinian state.

The chapter on health is one of the longest chapters and provides a detailed and useful discussion on many aspects of health prevailing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip but adds little to what is already available. In the education chapter (chapter eight), the Palestinian state is presented as a possible strong player in the region's knowledge economy; the RAND team recommends focusing on maintaining current high levels of access to education, building quality, and improving delivery. The book estimates that the education system will need $1 billion to $1.5 billion per year in financing over the first decade of independence (p. 310).

The Arc is designed to complement *Building a Successful Palestinian State.* It focuses on strengthening the physical infrastructure (transport and housing) of a Palestinian state necessary "to foster the physical and economic well-being of Palestine's current and rapidly growing population" (p. 89). The title refers to the shape of the principal Palestinian urban centers that run from Jenin to Hebron (the first in the north, and the second in the southern West Bank), and then southwest to Gaza. The arc as a broad planning concept for future Palestinian infrastructure deployment is set to deal with the expected population needs (current and ongoing) of the Palestinian state. It envisages using a quarter of the estimated $33 billion dollars needed as capital investment in the first decade of Palestinian independence.

The two publications have a useful descriptive value of the current situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but not much policy value. The prospect of a viable and independent Palestinian state that would have substantive Palestinian legitimacy remains extremely hypothetical given the separation wall and continuing colonial expansion in the West Bank, and the tight control of borders and natural resources by Israel. The Israeli unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip probably has made a sovereign Palestinian state more elusive than ever.

LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY POLITICS

Words and Stones: The Politics of Language and Identity in Israel, by Daniel Lefkowitz. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. xiv + 272 pages. Notes to p. 297. References to p. 308. Index to p. 316. $55.00 cloth.

A War of Words: Language and Conflict in the Middle East, by Yasir Suleiman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xiii + 230 pages. Appendices to p. 233. References to p. 254. Index to p. 270. $27.00 paper.

Reviewed by William O. Beeman

The study of identity politics in the Middle East typically focuses on religion and on construction of ethnicity. It is less frequent that commentators and researchers engage in the serious study of the role of language in the formation and negotiation of identity, although this is frequently the most prominent hallmark of any individual's membership in a particular community.

Daniel Lefkowitz and Yasir Suleiman have gone some distance in filling this important lacuna in the literature of the Middle East. Both deal with language and identity issues in the Israeli-Palestinian interface. Suleiman goes somewhat farther in dealing with these issues in a broader Middle East context, with special attention to differentiation in the varieties of Arabic found throughout the region.

Both studies are a much-needed corrective to the myth of linguistic monolithic structures in the Middle East. The idea that somehow all Arab communities speak a

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uniform variety of Arabic is one of those perpetual points of ignorance seen in the West, even among international policy makers who should know better. Even more important is the exploration that both books make of the relative hierarchy established between languages and speech varieties, with implications for the social relations between the communities that embody these speech forms.

Both authors see language use as inextricably embedded within the cultural practices of the communities they study. Lefkowitz, dealing with Arab Palestinians living in Israel, explores the paradox of people who are bi- and trilingual but who claim to speak only Arabic in their home and community. This is a paradox because they could not acquire a second or third language if their use were exclusively monolingual. Lefkowitz quickly shows that there is a mediating community, the Mizrahi Israeli—the Oriental Jewish community, whom some have called Arab Jews, who mediate between the identities marked by speaking exclusively Hebrew or Arabic. Then we discover that there are still further ramifications to identity—the Druze, the Christians, all of whom must make choices about how to mark their identities in the public display of their language behavior.

Lefkowitz is led naturally to the exploration of "linguistic negotiations of identity" through his ethnographic investigations of the Israeli landscape. Names and places are changed, or "reinscribed," in Lefkowitz's term to reflect the "Jewish" vs. Arab identities for physical locations. He points out that although this renaming can be seen as humorous, it actually "generates material consequences for relations of power," making the alternation between toponymic structures both "playful and serious" (p. 73). Because nationality and ethnicity are both subject to negotiation, he insightfully points out that they are in fact metaphorical structures rather than objective social attributes.

Lefkowitz's narrative becomes potent when he details the encounters that take place between individuals establishing their metaphorical identities as Arabs by speaking Arabic, and Jews establishing their metaphoric identities by speaking Hebrew. This is all the more poignant because neither "language" is exactly what conventional wisdom declares it to be. Arabic is not a single variety, and Hebrew is a constructed modern language. Both Hebrew speakers and Arabic speakers are also diglossic, in that they maintain a vernacular and a ritual form of their speech varieties.

These encounters are noteworthy because of their relative rarity. Lefkowitz makes an amusing but insightful observation that the one place where these interchanges regularly occur is in the criminal world—not surprising from an anthropological standpoint because of its liminal nature.

Still, children are educated in both Arabic and Hebrew in Israel, and the experience of learning each language is different depending on what is spoken in the home. The mutual stigmatization of each language is part of the symbolic dynamic of negotiation.

Lefkowitz is to be praised especially for his realization of the role of pronunciation and intonation in identity formation. Often dismissed as "accent," both pronunciation and intonation can be extremely powerful in marking members of speech communities, both for the reinforcement of solidarity of members of those communities among themselves, and for distinguishing people from members of other communities. Mizrahi Hebrew and Ashkenazi Hebrew pronunciations of key phonemes, such as /r/, are distinctive indicators of membership in Oriental or European Jewish communities. By using distinctive Israeli intonational contours, Palestinian Israelis can subtly assert their Israeli identity without identifying as Jewish, and this is a fundamental process of identity negotiation through a very subtle language usage.

Yasir Suleiman expresses the concept of identity negotiation through language in much stronger terms, characterizing it as outright conflict. Suleiman declares in the first chapter of his book that he refuses to use Arabic (his native language) with Israeli Jewish and Druze soldiers as a form of protest against what he considers to be an illegal occupation, so that his language would never be "sullied" in his interactions with them (p. 9).

However, Suleiman's own strategic choices in language use are then mirrored in numerous other examples throughout the book of communities trying to assert and reinforce their identity through deliberate language usage. Turkish, Arabic, and Kurdish in Iraq all come into conflict with each other in social and political situations. Different varieties of Arabic are likewise in conflict with each other. The end result is both a rich descriptive palate of the mosaic of language patterns in the region, and a

marvelously textured analysis of the strategies individual communities use to protect themselves symbolically from being subsumed by the linguistic practices of dominant communities in the asymmetric power relations that are the hallmark of so much of Middle Eastern life.

One can get a view of Suleiman's analysis by viewing his chapter titles: "When Languages and Dialects Collide," "When Dialects Collide," "When Languages Collide." Though this is a dramatic presentation, Suleiman does make a fine, well-reasoned, and yet passionate case for the emotion and commitment with which language communities defend their language use. Some of these communities have been more successful than others in sustaining their own language usage in the face of pressures from a dominant speech community. A highlight of the book is his fascinating analysis of the implications of the specific language forms used on multilingual street signs in Jerusalem—a seemingly minor matter for outsiders, but not at all trivial for either Arabs or Jews in that city.

In the end, language conflicts are conflicts of potent symbolic identification. Both of these studies provide rich examples of the ways that these dynamics function, whether characterized as negotiations, as Lefkowitz asserts, or as outright conflicts as Suleiman presents them in his study. In doing so, both authors deliver the important message that language issues are an essential component in the analysis of intercommunity dynamics throughout the region. These excellent studies belong on the bookshelves of all who take the study of the cultures of the Middle East seriously.

SUICIDE AS POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, by Robert A. Pape. New York: Random House, 2005. viii + 250 pages. Acknowledgements to p. 252. Appendices to p. 278. Notes to p. 316. Index to p. 335. $25.95 cloth.

Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, by Mia Bloom. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. xvii + 192 pages. Appendix to p. 201. Notes to p. 238. Index to p. 251. $24.95 cloth.

The Road to Martyrs' Square: A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber, by Anne Marie Oliver and Paul F. Steinberg. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. xiii + 181 pages. Glossary to p. 189. Notes to p. 198. Index to p. 214. $26.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Lori A. Allen

The July bombings in London provoked another wave of debate, punditry, and polemic. Explanations and condemnations littered the pages of the mainstream press in the United States and Britain, where Islam regularly is blamed for the terrorist attacks. *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman made the racist remark that it is a "civilizational problem" "when al-Qa'ida-like bombings come to the London Underground," urging "the Muslim world" to wake up to the "jihadist death cult in its midst" ("If It's a Muslim Problem, It Needs a Muslim Solution," *New York Times*, 8 July 2005). William Tucker of the right-wing think tank American Enterprise Institute went even further, blaming polygamy in Islam as the root of the problem ("How Polygamy Fuels Terrorism," *Northjersey.com*, 26 July 2005). Others reasserted the dangerous notion that even attempting to understand and explain such attacks is incendiary or un-American or that it gives the terrorists too much credit.

In this climate of ideologically hidebound discourse, it is a relief to discover Robert Pape's rational and careful analysis in *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. This book is directed largely toward a U.S. policy audience that is asking why there has been a rise in suicide terrorism around the world and how it can be stopped. Based on data compiled from regional news media and other sources covering the 315 suicide attacks that occurred between 1980 and 2003, Pape argues that suicide terrorism is a response by weaker actors against foreign occupation by democratic states. Democracies are the most likely targets of suicide terrorism, he claims, because their "publics have low thresholds of cost tolerance and high ability to affect state policy" (p. 44). With broad brushstrokes Pape defines democracies as states with elected chief executives and legislatures in multiparty systems with "at least one peaceful transfer of power" (p. 45), thereby allowing Russia and Israel to fall within the framework of his theory. Avoiding discussion of the ideological uses of the term, he defines

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terrorism as "the use of violence by an organization other than a national government to intimidate or frighten a target audience . . . to gain supporters and to coerce opponents" (p. 9). Pape acknowledges that the definition of "terrorism" could be broadened to include governmental actions, but he limits his analysis to non-state actors, which is the subject policy-makers are most interested in (p. 280, n2). He argues that terrorism's enactment "makes strategic sense," usually as a last resort when crucial nationalist interests are at stake (p. 42). His succinct conclusion is that suicide terrorism is growing because terrorists have made the "quite reasonable" assessment that "it works" (p. 61).

Pape emphasizes the inaccuracies of other analyses that draw connections between Islam and terrorism. He likewise points out the pitfalls of investigations that focus on supposed psychological and personal factors that drive individual attackers. After reviewing the facts of these 315 cases, Pape concludes that neither religious motivations nor any single religion fuels these attacks. Suicide terrorism is not irrational, random, or pathological, but rather political, organized, and directed toward specific, secular goals. Proving this point are examples from the conflict in Sri Lanka, where the secular Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) bear the dubious distinction of having carried out the largest number of suicide terrorism attacks of any group. There it is the mainly Hindu Tamils' understanding of Sinhala "encroachment on Tamil culture and resources" that spurred the increase in Tamil militancy (p. 141). According to Pape, even Islamic al-Qa'ida must be understood as reacting to the U.S. military occupation of Muslim countries rather than acting out of any kind of unified Islamic ideological motivation (p. 103).

Pape's discussion of the Palestinian Hamas further helps to disabuse readers of the notion that religion, Islam, or some ill-defined "jihadist death cult" is to blame for suicide terrorism. This group is motivated primarily by the (political) goal of ending foreign military occupation rather than by religious concerns. The author's characterization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, however, is sometimes rather bland and understated, such as when he explains that one "factor that probably did contribute significantly to the rise and persistence of the Palestinian rebellion was the increasing encroachment of Jewish settlers on Palestinian land" (p. 48). This is not just a probable factor but an overwhelming cause.

Pape's reasoning and argumentation can be overly mechanistic and occasionally somewhat simplistic as well. For example, he dismisses the hypothesis that suicide terrorism is a product of the severity of the occupier's policies by comparing the "level of deaths in the occupied community to the number of suicide terrorists and see if there is a consistent relationship between the two" (p. 60). Regardless of the veracity of such a premise, casualty rates are not a sufficient measure of the Israeli occupation's severity. One need merely consider the range of policies and practices that constitute the occupation in Palestine—including hundreds of roadblocks and checkpoints, torture, imprisonment without trial, ongoing land appropriation, and economic suffocation—to understand that there are multiple modalities by which an occupation can oppress a society.

Given the tendency of other observers to see the actions of suicide terrorists as inexplicably demonic and fanatical, Pape's strict "rational actor" approach is productive. Much of this book goes a long way toward de-exoticizing this form of militancy, explaining why suicide attacks make sense within a strategic logic and from the perspective of the perpetrators and their communities, rather than condemning them from a decontextualized moralistic position. But Pape's narrow methodological individualism also places a disproportionate emphasis on the role of instrumentalism over other social factors. Most problematic in this regard is his analysis of the significance of interactions between members of resistance groups and other social institutions. He describes suicide terrorist organizations' efforts "to become deeply embedded" in schools, charities, and religious groups to achieve community support as being driven by their recruitment requirements, as well as their need to avoid detection by their enemies' security forces (p. 81). This cynical interpretation obscures the fact that resistance groups are products of the mores, history, and culture of their larger society, that they reflect the collective aspirations of their members as much as they influence them.

Pape's understanding of "martyrdom" is likewise partially corrective of popular misconceptions but also confined by the disciplinary strictures of political science. On the one hand, he recognizes martyrdom as a "social construct" and not purely a religious

concept. This is as evident among secular groups, including the LTTE, as it is among more religiously affiliated groups such as Hamas. Martyrdom is a label of honor for those who have died for the sake of their community (p. 82). On the other hand, Pape insists that martyrdom "is religious in origin and remains primarily a religious concept even today" (p. 91). He refers to the visual culture and rituals that commemorate martyrdom everywhere from Sri Lanka to Lebanon as "propaganda," just another element of terrorist groups' efforts "to persuade the local community to re-define acts of suicide and murder as acts of martyrdom on behalf of the community" (p. 83). While political persuasion and competition are no doubt one aspect of this dynamic, Pape's reading implies a clear analytic distinction between the religious and political, just as it presumes a rigid top-down relationship between the militants and their communities that is not accurate.

Despite these limitations, *Dying to Win* is a generally well-reasoned book that hopefully will inject some much-needed equanimity and rationality into popular debates and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and beyond. An interesting if uneven supplement to this book appears in Mia Bloom's *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*. Perhaps the most significant message emphasized by both authors is that there are no military solutions to terrorism. Bloom especially cautions governments away from harsh militaristic counterterrorist tactics that tend to encourage continued violent resistance. Only political solutions can resolve the fundamentally political problem of suicide terror. Like Pape, Bloom explains the rational motivations behind suicide terrorism as a strategy to end foreign occupation; she demonstrates the unnecessary connection between Islam and violence and provides a fascinating, brief survey of some historical antecedents of suicide terror, ranging from the Hindu Thugs, the Muslim Assassins, and the Jewish Zealots and Sicarii, to Japan's Kamikaze pilots. In addition to the Palestinian case, from which she draws a great deal of her material, Bloom focuses on Sri Lanka, the PKK in Turkey, gender issues related to suicide terror, and how terrorist groups learn from each other (or what she calls the "transnational contagion" of suicide bombing).

Unlike Pape, Bloom emphasizes the ways in which internal competition among political groups fuels terror campaigns, as when Hamas has used bombers to spoil gains achieved by the Palestinian Authority (p. 20). She also contextualizes why bombings gained support among Palestinians during the second intifada, in response to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's harsh tactics (p. 26) and "the disappearance of any potential peace dividend." These factors, she writes, convinced many Palestinians that "military operations are the only way to wear down the Israeli resolve" and leave the occupied territories (p. 28).

Bloom's analysis, which draws heavily from the press, existing scholarship, and interviews with academics and government officials, accepts as fact some prevalent misconceptions about the protracted Palestinian-Zionist conflict. Such problems lead to her frequent misreading of the social and political contexts of suicide attacks. She claims, for example, that in Palestine "[v]iolence has become *the* source of all honor" (p. 29, emphasis in original), ignoring the greater value attributed to anti-occupation resistance (of all kinds) and expressions of nationalist solidarity. Similarly, her account of female suicide bombers in Palestine (chapter 7) indicates a lack of familiarity with the political and military involvement of Palestinian women throughout the history of the nationalist movement. Finally, Bloom also contrasts the "varied and nuanced" attitudes about violence among Tamils to the implied uniformity of Palestinian opinion (p. 66), frequently referring to their "cult of martyrdom" (an ideologically loaded term that she fails to define), and their supposed increasing support for extremism (p. 75). She thus contradicts her own acknowledgement of the contingency of this form of violence behind which there is ultimately "a complexity of motivation" (p. 90). Despite her frequent citations of this reviewer's work (see my "There Are Many Reasons Why: Suicide Bombers and Martyrs in Palestine," in *Middle East Report* no. 223, Summer 2002), Bloom ignores its main argument of Palestinians' many diverse and fluctuating opinions about violent resistance.

While one of Bloom's goals is to devise a theory of why suicide terror becomes popular in some cases and is rejected in others, her attempts to explain this across contexts often seem rather tautological or inconclusive, such as when she writes that the "larger population will either support the tactic of suicide terror or reject it and make distinctions between the targets" (p. 91). She does make the reasonable generalization

that suicide bombings gain popularity when states deploy helicopter gunships to execute "targeted assassinations," in part because of the high civilian casualty rate associated with such attacks.

Both *Dying to Win* and *Dying to Kill* would have benefited from a more holistic approach to the conflicts they analyze. By focusing on suicide attacks as a distinct and distinctly analyzable phenomenon comparable across widely divergent political and social contexts, Pape and Bloom lose a great deal of the cultural and historical specificity that would help to explain the variable dynamics of nationalist conflict in these different situations. However, the broad scope of these studies does enable their authors to make the case that heavy-handed military retaliation against insurgents tends to inflame—not stop—the violence of these resistance movements, from Palestine to Kurdistan.

Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg's *The Road to Martyrs' Square* is neither an academic text nor a work of pure fiction. Instead, it is an extended anti-Palestinian rant dressed up as a colorful travelogue written in the style of a bad thriller. An example of their stylistic garishness occurs in an account of their interview with Hamas leader Ahmad Yasin. The authors describe the shaykh as having "a face both cruel and faerie at once" with a "voice like a Talking Barbie" (p. 15). Strewn with anti-Arab stereotypes and Orientalist clichés, this text portrays Palestinians as backwards, dirty, murderous and sadistic, offering no account of the history or presence of Israeli occupation. In light of the authors' apparent lack of rapport with their subjects, and the absence of revelation about where they obtained some of the more sensitive material they discuss, the reader is left wondering what purpose these authors intended to serve. Ultimately, their account of martyrdom and its meaning in Palestinian society is egregiously inaccurate. This book is useful only as an example of one of the ways in which the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is nefariously reflected in the United States.

THE PALESTINIAN "OTHER"

Palestinian Identity in Jordan and Israel: The Necessary "Other" in the Making of a Nation, by Riad M. Nasser. New York and London: Routledge, 2005. Middle East Studies: History, Politics, and Law Series. xi + 252 pages. Index to p. 271. $90.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Betty S. Anderson

Riad M. Nasser, of Farleigh[9] Dickinson University, provides in *Palestinian Identity in Jordan and Israel* an examination of how Jordan and Israel have utilized the "other" to better solidify their own national, social, geographic, and political identities. As his primary sources, he uses the history textbooks published between 1948 and 1967 for both countries' public schools. The book is useful for anyone interested in countering the many charges of bias targeted against the new Palestinian textbooks.

Over the last few years, textbooks in general and those used in the Middle East in particular have come under scrutiny from government officials and scholars alike. Palestinian textbooks have received the most attention, with the Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace (CMIP) declaring that the texts demonized the Israelis, while the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) and others have refuted this charge through their own studies. Nasser joins this discussion by tracing how the Israeli and Jordanian governments have written histories for their students that frequently use an "other" as a way to describe how "we" can be identified. After going over theoretical studies about identity and nationalism, he details the different historical "others" that are counterpoised against the Israeli and Jordanian narratives in earlier historical periods. He then focuses his attention on the position of the Palestinians in the twentieth century. The Jordanians, among other tactics, make the Palestinians invisible by subsuming their identity under the umbrella of pan-Arabism and by redrawing the map of the country to expand Jordan's borders all the way to the Mediterranean. The Israeli texts describe the Arab "others" as destructive and aggressive, in pointed contrast to the Israeli builders and pioneers. At the same time, the land of Palestine is depicted as empty or, when inhabited, so abused by the people that they have no legitimate right to it. The construction of Israeli national identity has necessitated the negation and denigration of the Palestinian national narrative. In addition to documenting this fact with the

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textbooks he examines, Nasser also provides an overview of other studies that have been undertaken of Israeli historical textbooks. Their findings concerning the Israeli depiction of the Palestinians parallel his own.

Detracting from the value of this book is the apparent failure to subject it to a thorough editing process to eliminate the large number of grammatical errors throughout the text and to fix the sentences with missing words. A typical example of these problems appears on p. 66, when the author writes: "While I do make reference to the whole history textbooks in Jordan and analyze all textbooks, I use primary textbooks to cover the topics as specified before." This example illustrates a sentence awkwardly constructed and missing words, while another example, on p. 73, contains a typographical error: "Further, not only is identification with a larger whole is encouraged. . . . " Additionally, the word "determinant" should be "determined" on p. 54, and the word "perused" should be "perceived" on p. 135. While readers, unfortunately, have come to expect a certain number of editing mistakes in new books, because of the penchant of publishers to limit pre-press costs, the enormous number that appear in this book present a larger problem than just one of editing. The reader continually must re-read sentences throughout the text in order to ascertain the meaning the author wishes to impart.

CONTRASTING PALESTINIAN DIASPORAS

Palestinians Born in Exile: Diaspora and the Search for a Homeland, by Juliane Hammer. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005. xiii + 225 pages. Appendix to p. 228. Notes to p. 238. Bibliography to p. 259. Index to p. 271. $55.00 cloth; $22.95 paper.

Reviewed by Randa Farah

Juliane Hammer's book is a welcome addition to the relatively meager literature on Palestinians who were born in exile and "returned" to Palestine, most of them following the Oslo agreements in the 1990s. Hammer, an assistant professor of religious studies at Elon University in North Carolina and co-author, with Helena Lindholm Schulz, of *Palestinians in the Diaspora: Formation of Identities and Politics of Homeland* (Routledge, 2003), explores the heterogeneous experiences of middle class Palestinians between the ages of sixteen and thirty-five in the Ramallah/Jerusalem area in the West Bank as they confront the "real" Palestine as place and society. Inevitably, it is also a book about the reproduction of Palestinian identity, as returnees cross real and metaphorical boundaries traveling between home and homeland, the national and transnational, and the spaces in between. By targeting returnees born in exile, the author proposes that her work goes beyond the usual focus on Palestinian refugees, to include other patterns of Palestinian "migration." However, Hammer's avoidance of the term "refugee" has political and legal ramifications, and it diminishes from the fact that many of the returnees are also refugees.

The author's main conceptual arguments hinge on distinctions made between the "Amrikan" and the "Aideen": Palestinians born in western and Arab host countries respectively. She posits that in general, for the Aideen, Palestine is *al-watan*—the national homeland, implying a "political" sense of belonging. For the Amrikan, Palestine is *al-balad*—the "cultural" homeland. The author examines selected spaces that facilitate integration with the "locals," such as schools and cafes, but these were limited. Sometimes, her distinctions seem arbitrary and loom larger than the pervasive divisions created by the Israeli policies that literally have shredded the West Bank and Gaza into isolated cantons.

Hammer creatively draws on anthropologists Arnold Van Gennep and Victor Turner, outlining five chronological steps during which returnees "rewrite" their identities. She then looks at the political, cultural, and religious/traditional dimensions of identity under separate subtitles to examine what had changed in the process of return. Despite her awareness of the "fluidity" of identity, she leaves an impression, albeit unintended, that it is divided into discrete parts and found "within every individual" (p. 220). Her drive for clarification through classification forces her to reduce the definition of culture to what is essentially folklore (weddings, food, music, etc.) and to draw boundaries around interwoven concepts and processes.

The author concludes that the return resulted in strengthening Palestinian identity, even when the process involved a mutual

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adjustment between locals and returnees and replaced the idealized image with a more complex understanding of Palestinian society. Her study points to the need to incorporate and understand the different experiences of Palestinians into present and future national policies.

Hammer also discusses various literary sources that helped carve the imagined Palestinian homeland and its landscape, including poetry of exile. Here she makes an ambiguous observation that "Arabic is a language that is closely linked to the Qur'an and thus to Islam" (p. 60). This of course is only partially or inversely true, in that the Arabic language spread with the Islamic conquest beginning in the seventh century, but Arabic as a language appeared many centuries before Islam.

The author should have given a more nuanced attention to the concept of "return": Under what conditions and to where? For example, most studies on Palestinian refugees from 1948 indicate that they conceive of "return" as to their original homes and villages and not to the West Bank or Gaza Strip. The context in which studies on "returnees" are carried out influences not only the methodology of the research but also the interpretations and conclusions. Furthermore, research on the topic would be fundamentally different if the West Bank and Gaza could boast of being a sovereign state and refugees obtained their right of return. Nonetheless, the author has provided readers with a bit of everything on the Palestinian displacement, for example, the debates surrounding diaspora and exile, and the Palestinian national narrative. Her work is a reminder that it is essential to look at socioeconomic and cultural factors when planning for repatriation.

SHORTER NOTICES

Orientalism and the Jews, edited by Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar. Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England for Brandeis University Press, 2005. xl + 221 pages. Notes to p. 266. Contributors to p. 269. Index to p. 285. $60.00 cloth; $26.00 paper.

Inspired by Edward Said's *Orientalism* (Pantheon Books, 1978), the twelve contributors to this book analyze from anthropological, cultural, historical, literary, and religious perspectives how Jews fit into the Western imagining of the Orient, both intellectually and popularly as depicted in Said's now classic work. The image of Jews gradually was transformed, although that of Muslims did not. In what the editors refer to as the Sacran (mid-seventh to mid-fourteenth centuries) and Turkish (late-fourteenth to late eighteenth centuries) periods, Jews and Muslims generally were perceived as the coequal (in cultural terms), exotic Other of the Europeans. During the nineteenth century, however, Jews were "domesticated," at least in Western Europe, although this period also was the time when both anti-Semitism and imperialism emerged. By the mid-twentieth century, Jews in Europe and North America, as well as those in Israel of European ancestry, had become Occidentalized, although the presence of Mizrahi, or Oriental Jews, was a reminder of an unacknowledged common Semitic past with Arabs and a source of embarrassment for some Occidental Jews.

EH

Culture and Customs of the Palestinians, by Samih K. Farsoun. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004. xxvii + 123 pages. Appendix to p. 133. Glossary to p. 139. Bibliography to p. 151. Index to p. 160. $45.00 cloth.

This book by the late Samih Farsoun is an introduction to Palestinian history, culture, and society. The book is aimed at the general reader, not those already knowledgeable about Palestine. It features chapters titled "Context and History"; "Society and Social Customs"; "Gender, Marriage, and Family"; "Traditional Dress and Cuisine"; "Religion and Religious Traditions"; "Literature"; and "Art, Performing Arts, and Cinema." Saddled by the obvious limitations of the format (e.g., attempting to cover the history of Palestine from the seventh century to the al-Aqsa intifada in 20 pages), Farsoun nevertheless succeeds in covering a wide range of subjects. Even the less substantive chapters (e.g., "Traditional Dress and Cuisine") should be interesting to those wholly unfamiliar with Palestinians and the region in general. Also useful for those becoming acquainted with Palestine through this book will be the Chronology, Glossary, and Bibliography.

AW

Our Sacred Land: Voices of the Palestine-Israeli Conflict, by Kenizé Mourad.

Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2004. viii + 237 pages. Chronology to p. 241. Appendices to p. 247. $16.95 paper.

This book is the product of a 2002 journey to Israel and the Palestinian territories made by the Indian-Turkish journalist Kenizé Mourad. Mourad, who long has covered the Middle East for the French magazine *Le Nouvel Observateur*, ended up producing yet another in a long list of recent books that try to get beyond the headlines and into the thoughts, emotions, and experiences of ordinary Israelis and Palestinians. Thankfully, her book stands out from the crowd, in large part because of the probing questions she asked of her interviewees. Mourad's chapters describe well the themes connecting her conversations with Jews and Arabs about how they experience the political traumas in the region on a daily basis: "Daily Life"; "In the Name of God"; "Army Abuses and Conscientious Objectors"; "Suicide Bombings"; "Freedom of Expression"; "Palestinian and Israeli Children"; "Gaza"; "Being an Arab-Israeli"; "Jenin"; "Common Cause"; and the epilogue, "The Ethics of Revenge." An outsider committed to peace between the two peoples, Mourad captures well the raw emotions expressed by each, which eerily resemble each other.

MRF

Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, third edition, by William B. Quandt. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, and Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. xii + 428 pages. Notes to p. 507. Selected bibliography to p. 515. Index to p. 535. $24.95 paper.

This is the third edition of William Quandt's classic work on the history of American involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the June 1967 war. In this edition, he updates the second edition of the book, which appeared in 2001, by adding chapters on the frenetic peacemaking efforts of the waning days of President Bill Clinton's presidency and the presidency of George W. Bush. Quandt also has incorporated new documents released by the State Department, as well as information contained in recent works by diplomats such as Henry Kissinger, Madeleine Albright, and Dennis Ross.

This work remains the standard text on American involvement in the conflict and efforts toward its resolution. Given his stature, Quandt's derision of the current level of American diplomatic efforts in the region is sobering: "If peace is to come, the parties must now tackle the big questions of the shape of a final peace settlement. A strategy based on incrementalism will be a waste of time. . . . The general outline [of a settlement] is widely understood. . . . It is time to get back to business" (pp. x–xi).

MRF

Conflicts in the Greater Middle East and the Transatlantic Relationship, edited by Helmut Hubel and Markus Kaim. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004. 215 pages. About the Authors to p. 216. €32.00 paper.

This book is based on a 2003 conference held in Jena, Germany, at which German and U.S. scholars explored the repercussions of the 11 September 2001 incidents and the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Its thirteen papers include presentations at that conference and papers that the editors solicited later. To highlight differences in policy, editors Helmut Hubel and Markus Kaim strategically pair a U.S. and a German contributor for each of the topics discussed: The Palestinian-Israeli peace process; developments in the Caucasus and Central Asia; the nuclear confrontation in South Asia; global security challenges; the Iraq crisis; and the impact of domestic factors on Middle East policy. The section on the Palestinian-Israeli peace process features contributions by Scott Lasensky of Mount Holyoke College and Kaim of Friedrich Schiller University in Jena. Lasensky anticipates increasing pressure on the United States from the Europeans and from within the region to push the Palestinian and Israeli peace process ahead. Kaim is cognizant of the lack of unity within the European Union (EU) toward the peace process and recommends that the traditional division of labor between the United States and the EU continue: the United States would provide political and diplomatic leadership and the EU would focus on economic incentives in support of U.S. policy. For this strategy to work, notes Kaim, there would have to be a resumption of the peace talks.

NS

Ameen Rihani: Bridging East and West: A Pioneering Call for Arab-American Understanding, edited by Nathan C. Funk

and Betty J. Sitka. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004, for Ameen Rihani Institute, American University Center for Global Peace. xx + 152 pages. Timeline to p. 163. Selected works to p. 166. Index to p. 175. Contributors to p. 181. $30.00 paper.

This book is a collection of thirteen papers presented at a 2002 symposium in Washington, DC, to honor the life and work of Ameen Rihani (1876–1940), a native of Lebanon who immigrated to New York at age 12 with his father and is considered the first Arab-American writer. The essays in the book demonstrate the strong influence on him of American transcendentalist writers such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau (see especially pp. 47–68), and Walt Whitman (pp. 25–33). Their ideas, as well as those of Muslim Sufis, probably contributed to the development of Rihani's own notions of tolerance and intercultural reconciliation, which are important themes in this book's essays. Rihani wrote in Arabic and English, and during the 1920s and 1930s his books in both languages were popular. He spent most of the last decade of his life in Lebanon where he was a strong advocate of independence and the idea of a unified Arab state. He also was among the first Arabs to foresee the potential for unending conflict in Palestine if the Zionist project to create a homeland for the Jews there were to be realized. On reading the 1917 Balfour Declaration, he wrote: "The British Government has either to perform a miracle or let one of its clients go to the devil" (p. 35). Some twenty years later, near the end of his life, Rihani realized that Britain would not pull off a miracle, and the Arabs of Palestine were likely to be sacrificed "to the devil."

EH

History of Printing and Publishing in the Languages and Countries of the Middle East, edited by Philip Sadgrove. Journal of Semitic Studies, Supplement 15. Oxford: Oxford University Press on behalf of the University of Manchester, 2004. vi + 209 pages. Illustrated. £20.00 paper.

The thirteen very scholarly articles in this work stem from an international symposium held at the Gutenberg Museum, part of the first World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies in Mainz, Germany, in September 2002. All deal with the rise of printing and publishing in the Middle East during the 19th and 20th centuries, including in languages such as classical and colloquial Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish, Hebrew, and Judeo-Arabic, in countries and regions including Egypt, Turkistan, Britain, Palestine, Iraq, Malta, Zanzibar, and the Ottoman empire. Of particular note to readers are Ami Aylon's article, "The Beginnings of Publishing in pre-1948 Palestine," and René Wildangel's article "The Emergence of the Public: Arab Palestinian Media in British Mandate Palestine 1929–1945: Arab Palestinian History and the Arab Press as a Neglected Subject." Some of the articles are richly illustrated, although neither of the articles relating to Palestine is illustrated.

MRF

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