Rise and Fall of Podemos
Reasons for the goodbye
by Manuel Garí for Anticapitalistas
The creation of Podemos in the Spanish State was an important attempt to build an anti-neo-liberal and pluralist mass party to the left of social-liberalism. That experience, which started very well, has finally ended very badly. Perhaps for this last reason, the title of this article could have been "The glow and decline of Podemos ... as an emancipatory political project." This article explains why it was necessary to create it and why it was necessary to abandon it. This has also meant a stock-taking exercise and a reflection on the lessons that can be drawn from the actions of the Anti-capitalist Left, today 'Anti-capitalists' 1.
Podemos could arise because the social democratic and Eurocommunist left were at a dead end after the crisis of 2008. The eruption of the indignados/outraged of 15M in 2011, was the catalyst for the emergence of new political expectations. The framework was characterized by the unstoppable advance of the right-wing Popular Party (PP) against the socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Izquierda Unida (IU) proved incapable of facing neo-liberal policies, and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) was one of its executors. Both parties bore the heavy legacy of having contributed to the creation of the political regime of the Transition, through the political pact with the forces from the Franco regime embodied in the Spanish Constitution of 1978 (EC). Both parties were part of that regime and, in the case of the PSOE, it was one of its main pillars.
On the other hand, there was widespread apathy and social demobilization caused in the first place by the wrong strategy of social pact at all costs (social concertation) of the majority unions, CC OO and UGT. This was coupled with the inability of the minorities to build a new hegemony within the labor movement, except for the LAB and ELA class unions in the Basque Country. This made the reform of 'Article 135' of the EC possible. This in turn made the payment of the public debt a priority of the General State Budgets and the imposition of two regressive labor reforms. The first, was approved by the socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, but was later worsened by the legislation of the government of the Popular Party (PP), chaired by Mariano Rajoy. Rajoy attacked collective labor bargaining, curtailed the role of unions in companies and attacked or annulled important rights of the working class. All this produced a large wage devaluation, increase in inequality, greater weight of capital income than wage income in the gross domestic product (GDP), increase in job insecurity and extension of poverty. All this fell heaviest on the youth, practically expelled from the Work market.
As a result of all this, the 15M movement emerged as a protest against the deterioration of the social situation and against the political swamp. This opened a window of opportunity to substantially modify the political map in the Spanish State. Podemos came to fill the void indicated. It was presented as the tool to create a new correlation of forces in the political sphere. If this had been consolidated, it could have helped encourage a strengthening of the organization and social mobilization.
In this panorama, it is worth pointing out the importance of the mass mobilizations of the Diadas (TN: September 11th, Catalonias National Day)- or the days and challenges of 2014. Also October 1 and 3, 2017 in Catalonia, which expressed national aspirations and the requirement of the right of self-determination of an entire people, generating the largest known crack in the fabric of the 78 regime until it became its main factor of crisis. These were moments in which the political left - including Podemos and its allies in Catalonia - missed a golden opportunity to lead the largest democratic mass popular movement of the last decades in the Spanish State and dispute the political hegemony and leadership of the other actors.
But Podemos quickly aged to decrepitude, because it accepted the discursive framework and the limits of the 1978 EC; the market economy; and the European Union - as the only possible horizon. This has meant a failure of the Podemos project and a defeat for the left that promoted it. And yet it was inescapable to try. And convenient.
The 15M (strengths and weaknesses) in the genealogy and reason for being of Podemos
The eruption of the indignados movement of May 15, 2011 in the squares and streets of Madrid, immediately spread to all the populations of the whole of the Spanish State, including Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia. It led to the appearance in the scene of the social mobilization of a new generation that did not identify with the parliamentary parties (“they do not represent us”). That generation was especially affected by austerity policies (“we did not pay for this crisis”). They faced financial elitist beneficiaries of state aid to rescue banks ("this is not a crisis, it is a scam") and denounced the limits of the political regime ("they call it democracy and it is not").
Therefore, it was a movement with an anti-regime bent, configured around democratic-radical demands that called into question the imperfect bipartisan model. That model was embodied by the PSOE and the PP, but also the turnismo (TN: system of turn of political parties) in the state government alternately socialist, then conservative, and the electoral model. It was also an anti-austerity movement facing predatory economic and social policies contrary to popular sovereignty. This was especially after the reform of Article 135 of the EC and the bailouts of Spanish banks. This represented a public investment currently estimated at 65,000 million of euros by the Bank of Spain. For this reason, the 15M in an elementary way, demanded another economy, another model of society and a new Constitution. That was its great contribution and the proof of its creative energy based on the activity of mass sectors. The 15M came to have the sympathy of the majority of the population fed up with the austerity period that began in 2008 and the political sclerosis of the system.
The 15M meant an amendment to all the parties and unions in the system. It opened the way for a popular mobilization sustained by various sectors (the so-called tides of education, health, public service workers, etc.). This was relatively outside the bureaucracies and with new forms of organization and coordination. The 15M movement generated forms of disobedient mass struggle of a new type, based on the assembly as the organizing matrix, which very soon overwhelmed the traditional organizations. The 15M was joined by environmental and feminist activists and youth sectors who were making their first experience.
It should be noted very especially that the 15M, thanks to its criticism of the 78 regime, made possible the debate on the need for a democratic breakdown and the opening of a constituent process. With the passage of time, this led to 'Anticapitalistas' and others sectors to speak in the plural, since a set of coordinate constituent processes was needed that took into account the existence of the national question and not only the general dimension of the Spanish State.
But the 15M also showed the limits of a social movement without a political expression and, specifically, an electoral representation. In 2013, the political situation was blocked. Very soon, among the most advanced sectors of activism, the debate began on the need for a political tool. Although all of them agreed that no political force that could be created could claim the representation of the 15M movement, there is no doubt that Podemos was the beneficiary of the spirit of the outraged.
The dilemmas of Anticapitalistas
In the months prior to the launch of Podemos, within Anticapitalistas - the debate on what to do was structured around three positions.
The first defended the formation of a left front or a tactical alliance with IU, which had the disadvantage of the recent history of subordination of this organization to the Socialist Party (in pre-electoral agreements at the state level and in the experience of co-government in Andalusia and many municipalities). It also had the growing discredit among left-wing youth.
The second advocated promoting a front of radical left organizations, all of them small except in the Basque Country and partially in Catalonia, scarcely established and with sectarian features, which precisely would have meant for Anticapitalistas to stand outside the broad current of massive radicalization that emerged the 15M.
A third, defended by the leadership, proposed to promote some type of initiative of a new type, since the existing left structures at that time were incapable of being useful to take a leap that would take the social struggle to the political plane. This last option turned out to be the majority. In the heart of Anticapitalistas, and its previous 'Espacio Alternativo', the debate was on the need to support the birth of democratic anti-neo-liberal organizations of the masses, with the capacity to fight electoral battles. For this reason, when conceiving Podemos, great importance was given to the idea of a party-movement structured from the base in what we later called circles.
Unlike other sectors of the left, Anticapitalistas was not only one of the few organizations that did not reject 15M, it was also the first to consider the need and possibility of a political leap. Because it considered that this political initiative was not going to be a brake on the mobilization. That was already showing exhaustion from the state blockade and the initiatives by the parties of the regime that were emerging from their confusion and initial paralysis. Anticapitalistas considered that it was urgent and possible to channel all the energy after 15M towards a new battle. This was to unlock a political panorama. Anticapitalistas had the great success and tactical audacity to promote the Podemos initiative, whose scope and nature were such that they would put all the forces and capacities of the organization to the test.
What would have happened if Anticapitalistas hadn't done it? We cannot know. What we do know is that radical left groups not linked to Podemos, committed suicide by sectarianism. Possibly Anticapitalistas would have become politically insignificant, as most of the groups which remained outside. It probably would not have multiplied its militant forces, or enjoyed the wide audience that its public spokes-people achieved. It would not have extended its organization to all the autonomous communities. It would not have organized massive political events, both face-to-face and online, that Anticapitalistas did during the Covid-19 pandemic. None of its proposals on the national question or on social inequality would have had the media impact that they had. It could not have set the political agenda among the avant-garde, nor would it have become an ideological and political reference for activists. It would not have been able to work from local, regional and European institutions - in an anti-austerity and democratic way- for the popular classes. Very soon Pablo Iglesias and his team obstructed, through the abuse of anti-democratic regulations, the possibility of anti-capitalist representation in the state Parliament, in which there was a limited presence and in a single legislature.
But these issues in the Anticapitalistas' credit cannot hide two issues: 1) The Podemos project failed and the Anticapitalistas theses were defeated;
2) Important mistakes have been made by Anticapitalistas that helped the triumph of the positions of Pablo Iglesias.
For this reason, it is convenient to critically reconstruct the story of the history of Podemos and take stock. We need to be able to understand the other great decision: to abandon Podemos and promote Anticapitalistas as a new political subject.
The Podemos phenomenon in all its complexity
The first characteristic of Podemos is that it captured the indignation after the 2008 crisis and the widespread perception that a minority benefited as a majority lost a lot. This social question is closely linked to the democratic question. Pablo Iglesias, on November 22, 2014, at his most radicalized moment, when polls gave Podemos as the first political force - affirmed that: “The fracture line now opposes those who, like us, defend democracy (…) and those who are on the side of the elites, the banks, the market; there are those from below and those from above (…), an elite and the majority ”.
A second unique characteristic of this political formation is the determining role played by a small but active revolutionary Marxist organization, Anticapitalistas, in the first stage of development of Podemos. Both the founding document "Make your move, turn indignation into political change"; and the electoral program for the 2014 European Parliament elections reflect this. The competition of Anticapitalistas in other areas was essential. It gave legitimacy to the electoral proposal before the social left, facilitated the financial means, made its small organizational structure available to the project. Finally it promoted the grassroots affiliative organization - the circles - in almost the entire territory of the Spanish State.
The third characteristic is that Podemos was born as a party extremely open to diverse currents of the social and political left. That soon took shape in the incorporation of sectors in rupture with IU, incapable of getting out of their internal crisis. It offered alternatives to a new generation of activists, and social movements, particularly in political ecology and feminism. And it caught the attention of the twenty-something non-political generation.
Three were the 'sine qua non' conditions for the Podemos project.. That it maintain its discursive radicality; that it establish stable organic ties with the working-class and popular sectors with greater awareness and combativeness; and that it be configured internally in a democratic way to enable deliberatio. A broad ideological plurality and politics encompassed very diverse aspects, broader than that of its three main political components grouped around Pablo Iglesias, Iñigo Errejón and Anticapitalistas. Its whose best-known public spokes-persons were Teresa Rodríguez and Miguel Urbán.
From its origin, Podemos became an internal battlefield between three souls. The one represented by the anti-capitalist current - broader than the organization that animated it; that proclaimed the importance of the program and the organization in the construction of the new party. It promoted self-organization and social mobilization, and that implantation in the working people. It argued for a two-way party-working people relationship.
Faced with this proposal, an alliance was formed between the left-wing populist sector of Iñigo Errejón and Pablo Iglesias, in the first citizen assembly of Podemos. This was known as Vista Alegre I (for the place of its celebration). This alliance was created a bureaucratic clique of two fractions, whose mission was the absolute control of Podemos. The short-term goal of the alliance was to beat revolutionary Marxist positions.
The specific objective of Pablo Iglesias was to establish himself as the undisputed leader with total autonomy, without specifying a project other than to carry out the electoral sorpasso to the Socialist Party; and come to govern quickly. He did not hesitate to radicalize or moderate his speech. He never proposed societal, or government program or a strategy. Nor were the conditions and measures considered to face the attacks of capital. Nor were the lessons learned from the Troika's intervention in the Greek case of Syriza. The old reformist confusion between accessing Government and having power was repeated. Yes, with radical speeches to connect with the impeachment spirit of the moment. All his political action was with a more or less leftist discourse, exercising personal hyper-leadership in a simplistic imitation of the less interesting aspects of the Bolivarian experience. It was a programmatic relativism that allows proposals to disappear according to the tactical convenience of the moment, with no relation to a project of society or strategy to achieve it. The strategic hypothesis was "we were born to govern". Or to access the government as an end in itself.
In this task, Iglesias found during a first stage a very functional ally in Errejón (a follower at that time of the theses of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe 2 on the total autonomy of politics and the denial of the role played by social classes and economic disputes for Marxists in the capitalist mode of production). Therefore, the speeches and articles were filled with abstract disquisitions. For example about the construction of the people subject through the creation of an ideologically transversal interclass electoral base around the mobilization of feelings for a leader capable of confronting the people with a meager oligarchic minority. This assumed the inadmissibility of left and right categories or of class analysis, and so on. Errejón theorized the possibility of a quick electoral victory, to which everything had to be subordinated. This meant posing efficacy versus democracy, hierarchy versus grassroots organization in circles, electoral war machine (literally formulated expression) versus mass party, plebiscitary participation versus democratic deliberation. After the first internal victory of the clique, the circles no longer had capacity to make decisions. The directions was made through the online vote of the people who registered using a form on the website. That was the only commitment of the membership. Elections without debate and 'personal'. This was absolutely antithetical to the militant party approach and the organized mass party. It was impossible, to control and revoke the leaders by the rank and file.
These theorizations did not lead to a high theoretical and ideological debate either in the academic or political circles. Although the elections to the Spanish Parliament of 2015 and 2016 were an important result for Podemos, they did not bring the longed-for sorpasso - (overtaking). The electoral decline began along with a search for the vote by abandoning any radicalism. The Laclavian populist moment -, broadcast in the Spanish state by Chantal Mouffe in the main national newspaper, El País 3 - was reduced to mere populist fashion. The ballot boxes reduced theory to ashes.
In the subsequent congress, in Vista Alegre II, the Iglesias sector turned left and purged the Errejón sector. The clash between these two bureaucratic apparatuses for control of the party expressed what Jaime Pastor and I describe - as “Pablo Iglesias vs. Iñigo Errejón: between the revived Eurocommunism and the neo-populism of the center ”4. For Emmanuel Rodríguez, the clash was one more expression of the ideology and the conception of Podemite politics as a mere generation of elites. 5. The degree of sectarian confrontation between the ex-allies in the press and social networks before the second citizens' assembly jeopardized its celebration. Despite the general maddening atmosphere, the congress was held thanks to the work and sanity of Anticapitalistas. The journalist, Raúl Solís, described being surprised that the revolutionary Marxist left had a sensible attitude (sic) 6. For a few months, Pablo Iglesias' left turn favored the policy of Anticapitalistas. But Iglesias attacked pluralism. First, he marginalized Errejón who decided to break up Podemos for political reasons, but above all because he could not breathe in an organization without democracy. Immediately afterwards began the lessening, through bureaucratic measures, of Anticapitalistas.
Very soon an evolution began, with turns to the right and left, of Pablo Iglesias towards his Eurocommunist roots. He recovered the memory of Santiago Carrillo, the leader of the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) who with Enrico Berlinguer, of the Italian Communist Party, and Georges Marchais, of the French Communist Party, were the fathers of Eurocommunism. This new form (as they called it) allowed them to gain access to government through the parliamentary system. Iglesias began to claim the benefits of the EC as a democratic social shield.
Although Pablo Iglesias used Laclau's concepts in his speech, he was probably not a disciple of it, but he was the beneficiary. The theories of the post-Marxist intellectual went well with the electoralist route to power and with the pre-eminent role of Iglesias in the process. The abstract calls for democracy as the tool to transform society within the framework of the institutions of liberal democracy lead to the impotence of left-wing populism and Eurocommunism. Stathis Kouvelakis is right when he criticizes Laclau because his concept of radical democracy, which excludes a break with the capitalist socio-economic order and with the principles of liberal democracy, is self-limiting. Contrary to what Laclau affirms, it is the class struggle that acts as an “agent of reification of the political subject” and not the so-called “populist reason” 7.
In each of the following elections, including those of 2019, in which Pablo Iglesias headed the Podemos alliance with IU called 'United We Can (UP)', the loss of votes and seats is constant and overwhelming. The weight and presence in the media are declining; Podemos no longer sets the political agenda or the issues of public debate and the prestige of the organization – very high in its beginnings – declines with each opinion poll. And the desperate search for more traditional left and center-left spaces began in search of the missing vote.
If in its beginnings Podemos had a great capacity to attract with its challenging and winning speech, the electoral results transformed that impetus into a stark and possibilist "we were born to govern." This turn was favored by the process of involution of IU with the triumph of the government theses and of increasing subordination to Podemos. UP has abandoned all vagaries of maintaining its own and differentiated left-wing profile and this has been symbolically reflected in its closing of ranks in defense of Nadia Calviño (TN: Minister of Economy, PSOE) - both in the face of the EU and in the events south of the Pyrenees.
The weaknesses and mistakes of Anticapitalistas
The result of the reformist-revolutionary confrontation within Podemos was not assured in advance. Resolution required leaving the comfort zone in which the small groups and sects of the radical left settle so often. Anticapitalistas bet big, had audacity and unleashed their programmatic and tactical potential.
The task was Herculean: to raise a mass party from scratch in a situation of social crisis, but with little culture and traditions of organized militancy. There was a context of crisis of the political regime - a disaffected youth and the Catalan conflict - with the post-Franco state apparatus intact.. With a bipartisan crisis and ungovernability, but with a stabilizing Socialist Party that maintained the confidence (diminished but still majority) of the people of the left ... In these conditions, the construction of the alternative was a difficult mission. The years of destruction and regression of the consciousness of the workers' movement and the collapse of the reformist and revolutionary political left, and above all, that the organic crisis had not yet occurred: All this objectively hindered the success of the Anticapitalistas project to make Podemos an emancipatory lever.
However, it is necessary to highlight some errors and weaknesses that, apart from the objective difficulties, weighed down Anticapitalistas. A first was to accept de facto the narrow framework that the clique imposed in a secret and maneuvering way of anti-democratic and hierarchical statutes - that granted legal ownership to the Iglesias team. With this, an attempt was made to hide Anticapitalistas as a founding political subject, and present their militants as external conspirators, entrists and enemies of the project (sic) that they themselves had created! Let the reader remember the portrait of the Lenin and Trotsky rally whose image was censored and modified by Stalin in a display of photographic magic to erase memory and make the revolution patrimonial. Well, something like this happened in Podemos. How to qualify this anti-capitalist attitude? Today there is only one adjective: naive irresponsible trust.
There was a willful overestimation of the capacity for action of our modest organized militant forces. This was key in the level of autonomy that Pablo Iglesias achieved as Secretary General - elected outside the rest of the leadership in a plebiscitary manner - to impose his dynamics on Podemos, corner any proposal for democratic structuring and justify every political lurch.
Those were the times when Podemos set up the so-called "media commando" by Santiago Alba. For a short period of time, this effectively revolutionized political communication both on social networks and in its relationship with the audiovisual media. This partisan device was appropriated exclusively by the Iglesias-Errejón tandem. Faced with this, Anticapitalistas –since the access to the Podemos community was vetoed by the bureaucratic clique– did not organize, a communication system, no matter how modest. That would have allowed it to express its positions in the media and networks autonomously. This has long hampered its activity.
Neo-caudillismo in the Spanish State was inspired ideologically, politically and organizationally by the Latin American populist experiences today in decline. But the leadership of Podemos defended its "conjunctural" and "instrumental" need . With the mantra of convenience and opportunity before the "electoral and communicational logic in the society of the XXI century". The next problem was that Anticapitalistas did not detect in time is that this caudillismo connected very well with sectors coming from post-Stalinist experiences and in the most depoliticized. They willingly accepted the hierarchy of the organization in which many of them began to call themselves soldiers.
This rapid bureaucratization process favored some sectors of left-wing activists of social movements, lacking sufficient political awareness, who initially looked with contempt at Podemos and the anti-capitalist sector. Without a political direction, some settled into the new situation, others simply looked for a job in the institutional interstices, and most left Podemos along with a large part of those who had joined.
In this situation, Anticapitalistas made a mistake in Vista Alegre I. Since the dispute framework was centered on the organizational model, it focused its effort almost exclusively on responding to the internal democratic question. Not enough energy went in the battle for a political project to radicalize the Anticapitalistas environment. Lesson of then and for the future: establishing the relationship between the political project and the aspiration to an ecosocialist and feminist society is the sine qua non of building strategic political groupings with a horizon of post-capitalist society. Only in this way can an antagonist historical bloc be created and unified. Anticapitalistas failed to put this issue at the center of the construction of Podemos. This allowed the leadership of Podemos to maneuver and change political positions at will and, therefore, define the objectives based on their immediate interests.
But the fundamental question is the task was Herculean. Anticapitalistas not only had a deficit in its numerical entity, but also in its social implantation and, even more important, in the degree of political cohesion it had. For this reason there were leaks by some less audacious, more sectarian and leftist sector that after a short time was non-existent. But there were also losses in a sector that reduced its expectations to the electoral route and that no longer saw the need for the existence of the revolutionary Marxist organization in the framework of a broader one.
The Anticapitalistas leadership understood the situation that led to founding Podemos, but not the political requirements needed. A lesson can be drawn from this question, and thinking about the post-Podemos tasks. Or, the need to have significant party ideological and strategic preparation prior to making decisions of this magnitude. It is imperative to create a conscious and planned internal party consistency superior to the one that spontaneously and routinely occurs. This must be a constant central task that will be very useful to act in unison, with strategic thinking, tactical ingenuity and organizational creativity, so that opportunities and possibilities are transformed into strengths and realities.
We will see each other in the fights
As Raúl Camargo explained (8), the underlying reasons for the departure of Anticapitalistas from Podemos are twofold. On the one hand, the non-existence of internal democratic life in an organization whose bodies rarely meet or deliberate, proportionality is not respected for the election of positions of internal management or in the electoral candidacies decided by the general secretary. All of which factors prevent the development of a pluralistic organic life. On the other hand, because the acceptance of the constitutional framework of the '78 regime and flexible adaptation to the market economy of the Iglesias team was accompanied by an approach to the PSOE, which culminated in the formation of a joint government in which UP plays a subordinate and secondary role.
UP's budget agreements with the PSOE and the coalition government program have been subordinated to the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. It is a government that, under the hegemony and attentive vigilance of Minister Nadia Calviño, has an economic and social policy determined by the limits set at all times by the European Commission, the Council, the Eurogroup or the ECB. The social soul that inspires Podemos is undeniable, but its proposals, as shown in the pandemic, have a limited scope. The measures in defense of the most disadvantaged are necessary as palliative but are insufficient.
In the short experience of the so-called government of progress, UP has made a cataract of concessions, even renouncing issues of the program agreed with the PSOE and silently consented to political setbacks and economic decisions. One of the next tests will be its attitude to the flagrant crisis of the monarchy, which will not be defeated only with pronouncements in parliament.
It is of little use to regroup the people, appeal to the interests of the people, have an electoral presence or be part of a government if it is not around a project that ends their alienation. This forces us to remember categories such as social class and exploitation. In other words, conceiving the people as a real antagonistic political subject and candidate for power in every sense. This is quite different from circumscribing their advances to the mere occupation by a new elite of professionalized young politicians of a few marginal ministerial portfolios.
Podemos has become a plebiscitary electoral apparatus. Although it shows the representation of a part of the left, albeit in a diminishing way, is an impediment to popular self-organization. Because of its leadershi, the political struggle has been reduced to a merely institutional one. But it has an instrumental relationship with social organizations. The government orientation of Iglesias, is characterized by governing at all costs, to be inserted into the progressive management structure of the State apparatus, limiting the work agenda to possibilistic criteria and renouncing the objective of transforming the political, economic and social system; constantly assuming the logic of the lesser evil, as can be verified at this time in the management of the post-Covid-19 social crisis.
In summary, the current X-ray of Podemos is that of a hierarchical party whose governing bodies have no life, identified with the parliamentary group and with the members of the government, a party that has almost completely lost its militant base - which joined its birth – and that has reduced its political action to an institutional presence lacking ideas and transformative proposals. And its main object of reflection is its location in the state structure and in the vicissitudes of Podemos itself. A party that in the classification made by Antonio Gramsci in his 'Brief Notes on Machiavelli's Politics' is dedicated to "little politics", to "partial and daily questions that arise within a structure already established by the struggles of preeminence among the various factions of the same political class ”. And it has abandoned "big politics", which really "deals with questions of the State and social transformations." And it has made the mistake - which Gramsci already warned - that "every element of small politics" becomes "a matter of great politics."
This is not good news. The current political situation does not favor leftist positions, it presents great difficulties and challenges in the absence of the mediation of a mass party. But this observation cannot ignore the positive aspects indicated above that for Anticapitalistas having carried out this experience and that makes it possible for the revolutionary Marxist organization to continue playing, as Brais Fernández9 suggests, an active role in the crisis of the 1978 regime. To do this, it will have to promote new political and social alliances in the face of austerity policies, continue working for the creation of new anti-neoliberal groups with mass influence, as is the case of Adelante Andalucía, promote the organization of trade union, social, environmentalist, feminist and social struggle, the youth and in defense of the public, and be an ideological and cultural reference in the existing debates to define a new ecofeminist and social project.
Manuel Garí is a member of Anticapitalistas and of the Advisory Council of Viento Sur, Translation by Noemi Argerich. Reproduced with permission
The article was amended for length by the editors in minor way.
1Izquierda Anticapitalista participated in the process of creating Podemos during 2013 and 2014 and later became known as Anticapitalistas. Since there is absolute political and organizational continuity between the two denominations, I use the name of Anticapitalistas throughout the entire article for my convenience and to facilitate the reading of those who access the text. To better understand this formal transit https://vientosur.info/spip.php?article9779
2Suddenly, for a short space of time, the bookstore windows were filled with works by Laclau such as Populist Reason, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy by Laclau and Mouffe or Building People. Hegemony and radicalization of the democracy of Mouffe and Errejón. What I do not know is if they really were successful with readers.
4https: //vientosur.info/spip.php? article14555
6http://www.huffingtonpost.es/raul-solis-/la-cordura-de-los- anticap_b_14635506.html? Ncid = engmodushpmg00000009